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I. INTRODUCTION
American business in the last twenty-five years has experienced an
explosion in the number of hostile corporate takeovers. Attempts to
acquire billion-dollar companies are becoming commonplace. Smaller
takeovers barely attract the attention of the financial press. The like-
lihood of a tender offer has become another everyday concern of man-
agement, as much a part of the business landscape as sales figures and
profit margins.
Proponents of hostile corporate takeovers argue that such take-
overs generally benefit society and corporate shareholders. They pro-
vide a way to discipline the management of companies which are
operating inefficiently or not returning the full value of their opera-
tions to the company's shareholders. They help produce synergistic
combinations of companies to achieve economies of scale and a more
rational organizational structure. They help insure that corporate as-
sets end up in the hands of those able to use them most efficiently. In
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the process, proponents argue that hostile takeovers provide value to
target company shareholders that otherwise they would not have
received.
Opponents argue that hostile takeovers have detrimental effects on
both the corporation and on society as a whole. According to the oppo-
nents, hostile takeovers represent not an increase in corporate effi-
ciency, but inefficient empire-building by the bidder. They result in
an unhealthy increase in corporate indebtedness and force corporate
management to focus on short-term profits at the expense of long-
term economic growth. Opponents of hostile takeovers argue that tar-
get shareholders are coerced into selling their shares at less than their
fair value. Even if the target shareholders are adequately compen-
sated, opponents argue that hostile takeovers have a detrimental ef-
fect on the local community in which the target company operates, on
employees of the target company, on creditors and other debtholders
of the target, and on other constituencies which have no voice in the
tender offer decision.
Congress reacted to the perceived abuses in tender offers in 1968,
passing the Williams Act as an amendment to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.1 At that time, only one state, Virginia, had a statute di-
rectly regulating takeovers.2 After the adoption of the Williams Act,
states began to respond in kind; by 1979, thirty-seven states had en-
acted takeover statutes.3 This first generation of state statutes was
subjected to continual constitutional attack until 1982 when the
United States Supreme Court, in a greatly divided opinion, struck
down the Illinois takeover statute.4 That decision was followed by a
second generation of state statutes which changed their focus from di-
rect regulation of tender offers to the use of procedural requirements
in state corporation codes to protect the shareholders of the target
company. The constitutionality of these second generation statutes re-
mained in doubt until 1987, when the Supreme Court approved the
constitutionality of the Indiana Control Share Acquisitions Chapter in
CTS v. Dynamics Corp. of America.5 CTS was followed by the adop-
tion of a number of state statutes mimicking and, in many cases, going
beyond the Indiana statute.
The premise of this article is that most of the recent state legisla-
1. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (hereinafter the "Exchange Act") appears at
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982). The Williams Act is in sections 13 and 14 of the
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. sections 78m-78n (1982).
2. Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash
Tender Offers, 23 J.L. ECON. 371, 377 (1980).
3. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 712
(6th ed. 1987).
4. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 94-
114.
5. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987). See infra text accompanying notes 115-143.
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tion is ill-advised and misguided. The problems envisioned by the crit-
ics of hostile takeovers are either grossly exaggerated or nonexistent,
and the statutes do little to eliminate those problems that may exist.
Many of these statutes present serious constitutional problems. In ad-
dition, drafting errors and ambiguities have resulted in unintended
consequences.
This article uses recent Nebraska legislation as a vehicle to ex-
amine takeovers and some of the problems with antitakeover legisla-
tion. In its 1988 legislative session, the Nebraska Legislature
responded to the CTS decision by enacting its third in a series of corpo-
rate takeover bills, the Nebraska Shareholders' Protection Act.6
Although the appellation is appealing, it is a mischievous misnomer.
The Act does not protect shareholders; it harms them. The Legisla-
ture's acceptance of the popular criticism of corporate takeovers has
created a bill that promotes economic inefficiency and corporate waste
at the expense of the shareholders the bill was designed to protect.
The legislative rush to fall in step with other states and address the
increasing number of corporate takeovers has resulted in a poorly
drafted statute that is bad policy and partially unconstitutional.
II. PRIOR NEBRASKA LEGISLATION
The Nebraska Shareholders' Protection Act is the Nebraska Legis-
lature's third attempt to restrict corporate takeovers. The original Ne-
braska statute dealing with corporate takeovers,7 passed in 1977,
applied to offers for the stock of any corporation which was incorpo-
rated in Nebraska, had its principal place of business or principal exec-
utive office in Nebraska, or had substantial assets in Nebraska.8
The 1977 Act required a person making an offer which, if success-
ful, would make the offeror a ten percent owner of a corporation's
stock to publicly announce the terms of the offer and to file a disclo-
sure statement with both the Nebraska Department of Banking and
Finance and the target company.9 An offer automatically became ef-
6. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 21-2432 to -2453 (Cur. Supp. 1988) [hereinafter "Shareholder
Protection Act," the "Nebraska Act," or "the Act"]. For a description of the Act's
contents, see ivfm text accompanying notes 38-93. For a discussion of the two
earlier statutes, see infra text accompanying notes 7-37.
7. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 21-2401 to -2417 (1977)(repealed 1983). This statute, popularly
known as the Corporate Takeover Act, will be referred to as the 1977 Act.
8. Id. § 21-2401(1). Regulated insurance companies were excluded, id. § 21-2417, as
were certain transactions involving regulated public utilities, public utility hold-
ing companies, banks, bank holding companies, and savings and loan holding
companies. Id. § 21-2416.
9. Id. §§ 21-2402, 21-2401(1). The information to be included in the disclosure state-
ment was specified in section 21-2404. This section also contained a catch-all cate-
gory requiring the offeror to disclose "[s]uch other and further documents,
exhibits, data, and information as may be reqvired by regulations of the depart-
[Vol. 67:459
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fective and could proceed twenty days after the disclosure statement
was filed.10 However, the Department of Banking and Finance could
summarily delay effectiveness if the statement did not contain all of
the required information or otherwise did not fully disclose all mate-
rial information.3- The Department had investigatory powers, includ-
ing subpoena power,12 and could call a hearing to investigate the
offer.13 If a hearing was called, the offer could not be made until the
Department declared it effective.14 The hearing had to be completed
within twenty days of the disclosure statement filing,15 and the De-
partment's determination as to whether the offer could proceed had to
be made within thirty days of the filing date.'6 The Department could
stop an offer if it found that the offeror did not "provide for full and
fair disclosure to offerees of all material information concerning the
offer."17 An offeror was also subject to criminal liability, injunctive
relief, and liability for damages.S
The 1977 Act also placed substantive restrictions on the terms of
the offer. Takeovers were prohibited if the offeror had, vithin one
year of the offer, become a five percent shareholder without disclosing
his intent to make the offer.19 The offer had to be open to all holders
of the security residing in Nebraska, and had to offer the same terms
to Nebraska residents as were offered to non-residents.20 If more se-
curities were tendered than the offeror was willing to buy, the offeror
had to purchase from all shareholders on a pro rata basis.21 All
tendering shareholders were given an unconditional right to withdraw
their shares during the first fifteen days of the offer.22 Any increase
ment, or as may be necessary to make fair, full and effective disclosure to offerees
of all information material to a decision to accept or reject the offer." Id. § 21-
2404(8).
10. Id. § 21-2405.
31. Id. § 21-2402.
12. Id. § 21-2415. The department's subpoena power was defined in section 8-1115 of
the Nebraska Revised Statutes.
13. Id- § 21-2405.
14. Id
15. Id. § 21-2406.
16. The 1977 Act required that the determination be made within twenty days of the
filing, but allowed the Department a ten-day extension. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. § 21-2415. The penalties provided for by the 1977 Act were found in sections 8-
1116, 8-1117, and 8-1118 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes.
19. Id. § 21-2403.
20. Id. § 21-2409. Federal law imposed no such requirements at the time, but similar
requirements were adopted by the SEC in 1986. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (1987). See
Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 23,421, [1986-87
Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,016 (Sept. 4, 1986).
21. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2409 (1977)(repealed 1983). The Williams Act already im-
posed such a requirement. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982).
22. NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2410 (1977)(repealed 1983). The Williams Act allowed with-
drawal during the first seven days of the offer. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5). In 1980, the
1988]
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in the consideration offered had to be paid to all security holders, even
those who had already tendered at the lower price.23 Finally, if the
offeror entered into a business combination with the target within one
year after the offer, the offeror was obligated to pay the remaining
shareholders at least the highest per share price the offeror paid to
acquire his stock.24
In 1983, the Nebraska Legislature repealed the 1977 Act and
adopted a new Corporate Takeover Act.25 The 1983 Act was a scaled-
down version of the 1977 Act. It applied to any corporation with
thirty-five or more shareholders residing in Nebraska26 and required a
disclosure statement similar to that required by the 1977 Act,27 but
disclosure did not have to be made until public announcement of the
offer.28 The 1983 Act continued the one-year ban on takeovers where
the offeror had become a five percent shareholder without disclosing
his intent to make the subsequent bid.29 However, the 1983 Act elimi-
nated the other substantive restrictions on the terms of the offer.30
The 1983 Act considerably restricted the powers of the Department
of Banking and Finance. Although the standard of the Department's
review was essentially the same,3 1 the Department had no administra-
tive power to stop or delay the offer, nor was Department approval
necessary to proceed with the offer. The Department could stop the
SEC increased the withdrawal period to 15 days. 40 Fed. Reg. 70,345 (1979)(super-
seded in 1986 by 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7). See Tender Offers, Exchange Act Release
No. 16,384 [1979-80 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 5 82,373 (Nov. 29,
1979). In 1986 the SEC amended its rules to allow the withdrawal of tendered
shares at any time while the offer is open. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (1987). See
Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 23,421, [1986-87
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 5 84,016 (Sept. 4, 1986).
23. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2403 (1977)(repealed 1983). This requirement was already
imposed by § 14(d)(7) of the Williams Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1982).
24. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2411 (1977)(repealed 1983). "Business combination" was de-
fined less expansively than in the current Nebraska Shareholders' Protection Act
but included a merger, consolidation, or sale or lease of any substantial part of the
target's assets. Id.
25. Id. §§ -2418 to -2430 (1983)(repealed 1988) [hereinafter the 1983 Act].
26. Id. § 21-2420(4). Regulated insurance companies were excluded, id. § 21-2430, as
were certain transactions involving regulated banks, bank holding companies,
and savings and loan holding companies. Id. § 21-2429.
27. Compare id. § 21-2423 with NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2404 (1977).
28. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2421 (1983)(repealed 1988).
29. Id. § 21-2422.
30. This was probably because many of those substantive requirements were already
imposed by federal law. See supra notes 20-23.
31. The Department's duty was to determine whether the offeror had complied with
the Act and "whether the offeror has provided full and fair disclosure to offerees
of all material information concerning the takeover bid including the filing of a
complete and accurate registration statement." NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2428(1)
(1983)(repealed 1988).
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offer only by obtaining an injunction in state district court.32 Even the
district court could not completely halt the offer but could only enjoin
offers to or purchases from Nebraska residents. 33 Offerors violating
the 1983 Act were also subject to criminal penalties and liability for
damages via the Act's incorporation of the liability provisions of the
Nebraska Securities Act.34
Tender offerors repeatedly challenged the constitutionality of both
the 1977 Act and the 1983 Act, and the enforcement of those Acts was
consistently restrained.3 5 The Nebraska Attorney General also issued
32. Id. § 21-2428(2), (3). See also i, §§ 21-2427, 8-1116.
33. Id. § 21-2428(2).
34. Id. § 21-2427. The liability provisions of the Nebraska Securities Act were found
in sections 8-1117 and 8-1118.
35. For successful challenges to the 1977 Act in Nebraska District Court, see Kreifel,
Takeover Act Enforcement Halted, Lincoln J., June 27, 1981, at 15, col. 2 (re-
strained enforcement of the 1977 Act against E.A. Development in its bid for Tex-
asgulf); Kreffel, Urbom E'oins Takeover Action, Lincoln J., July 6, 1981, at 13,
col. 1 (entered a preliminary injunction in the same case); Marlette, Takeover Act
Restrained in Mobil-Marathon Case, Lincoln J., Nov. 2, 1981, at 6, col. 3 (re-
strained enforcement of the 1977 Act against Mobil Oil in its bid for Marathon
Oil); Kelly, Corporate Takeover Act Remains Untouched, Lincoln Sunday Jour-
nal-Star, Feb. 7, 1982, at C10, col. 2 (restrained enforcement of the 1977 Act
against Whittaker Corporation in its bid for Brunswick Corporation); Marlette,
State Takeover Law Blocked in Court, Lincoln J., June 5, 1982, at 4, col. 5 (re-
strained enforcement of the 1977 Act against Cities Service in its bid for Mesa
Petroleum); Occidental's Protest of Takeover Act Upheld, Lincoln Star, Aug. 20,
1982, at 11, col. 1 (restrained enforcement of the 1977 Act against Occidental Pe-
troleum in its bid for Cities Service); State's Takeover Law Blocked A Second
Time, Lincoln J., Aug. 30, 1982, at 5, col. 5 (restrained enforcement of the 1977
Act against Bendix in its bid for Martin Marietta).
For successful challenges to the 1983 Act in Nebraska District Court, see Mis-
souri Public Service Co. v. Amen, [1985-86 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 92,488 (D. Neb. June 22, 1983)(restrained enforcement of the 1983 Act
against Missouri Public Service Company in its bid for The Gas Service Com-
pany); Takeover Law Leashed Again, Lincoln J., Dec. 31, 1983, at 4, col. 1 (re-
strained enforcement of the 1983 Act against Pennzoil in its bid for Getty Oil);
Kreifel, State Takeover Law EnjoinedAgain, Lincoln J., Feb. 24,1984, at 21, col. 5
(enjoined enforcement of the 1983 Act against Gulf Investors Group in its bid for
Gulf Corporation of Pennsylvania); Takeover Act Challenged in Federal Court,
Lincoln J., Mar. 9, 1984, at 12, col. 4 (restrained enforcement of the 1983 Act
against Standard Oil of California in its bid for Gulf Corporation of Delaware);
State's Takeover Act Restrained Again, Lincoln J., Apr. 14, 1984, at 9, col. 4 (re-
strained enforcement of the 1983 Act in connection with three separate offers:
The Limited's bid for Carter Hawley Hale Stores, SPNV Holdings' bid for Shell
Oil, and Hanson Trust's bid for U.S. Industries); Judge Halts Implementing of
Corporate Takeover Act, Lincoln J., Dec. 11, 1984, at 9, col. 1 (restrained enforce-
ment of the 1983 Act against Mesa Partners in its bid for Phillips Petroleum);
Turner's CBS Suits Include Challenge of Nebraska Law, Lincoln J., Apr. 19,1985,
at 2, col. 4 (restrained enforcement of the 1983 Act against Turner Broadcasting
System in its bid for CBS).
In the committee hearing and again in the legislative debate on L.B. 1110, Sen-
ator Schnit, who introduced the bills that became the 1977 and 1983 Acts, indi-
1988]
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two opinions concluding that the 1983 Act was unconstitutional.36 Not
a single case was found allowing enforcement of either Act.37
III. A REVIEW OF THE NEBRASKA SHAREHOLDERS'
PROTECTION ACT
The Nebraska Shareholders' Protection Act differs in focus from
the two earlier Nebraska statutes. Instead of directly regulating take-
overs, it attempts to limit the power of a successful tender offeror to
control the target corporation. It is also more limited than the earlier
statutes in terms of the target corporations covered. Designed to
make the Act constitutional, each of these changes makes the Act less
effective than the earlier statutes in preventing hostile takeovers.
A. What Corporations Are Covered?
No corporation, Nebraska or foreign, is covered by the Act unless it
has at least 100 shareholders.38 The Act also excludes corporations
that do not have a class of voting stock listed on a national securities
exchange or are not authorized for quotation on an interdealer quota-
tion system of a registered national securities association. 39 Thus,
cated that the 1983 Act "was never challenged in the court." Shareholders'
Protection Act, 1988: Hearings on LB. 1110 Before the Committee an Banking,
Commerce & Insurance, 90th Leg., 2d Sess. 38 (Feb. 1, 1988)[hereinafter Hear-
ings]; Shareholders' Protection Act, 1988: Legislative Debate on LB. 1110, 90th
Leg., 2d Sess. 9359 (March 8, 1988)[hereinafter Debate]. The challenges listed
above show that Senator Schmit was clearly wrong on this point. Perhaps he
meant that no case challenging the 1983 Act ever reached a final determination.
36. Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. No. 88 (April 21, 1983); Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. No. 103 (May 4,
1983). The latter opinion, given after an amendment to the statute that limited
injunctive relief to offers to or purchases from Nebraska residents, is much more
equivocal. It termed the answer "far from crystal clear" but nevertheless indi-
cated a belief that the Act was unconstitutional.
37. The closest either Act came to surviving a constitutional challenge was two dis-
missals holding that the Acts did not apply to the particular takeover. See
Kreifel, Urbom Enjoins Takeover Action, Lincoln, J., July 6, 1981, at 13, col. 1.
(dismissed challenge by Seagram Company because its target, St. Joseph Miner-
als, did not have "substantial assets" in Nebraska and the 1977 Act therefore did
not apply); Kreifel, Urbom Denies Acklie Request Concerning Bank Stock Offer,
Lincoln J., Aug. 26, 1983, at 22, col. 1 (refused to enjoin enforcement of the 1983
Act because the parties agreed that the target, First National Bank of Lincoln,
fell within the statutory exception for regulated banks or bank holding
companies).
38. NE1. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2442(1)(a), (2)(b) (Cure. Supp. 1988).
39. Id. § 21-2453(4). This exception does not apply if the corporation has no such
stock as a result of action taken by the interested shareholder or as a result of a
transaction in which a person becomes a listed shareholder. Id.
There are ten national securities exchanges registered with the Securities Ex-
change Commission ("SEC") pursuant to section 6 of the Exchange Act. T. HA-
ZEN, THE LAW OF SECUMRITEs REGULATION 259-260 (1985). The only national
securities association currently registered with the SEC pursuant to section 15A
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most smaller, privately owned companies are excluded.
The Act applies both to corporations incorporated in Nebraska and
to foreign corporations, but the requirements for coverage are differ-
ent.40 A Nebraska corporation must meet at least one of the four fol-
lowing requirements to be covered by the Act: (1) it must have its
principal executive offices in Nebraska41 (2) it must have assets in
Nebraska with a market value of at least ten million dollars;42 (3) ten
percent or more of its shareholders must reside in Nebraska;43 or
(4) Nebraska residents must own more than ten percent of its
shares."
A foreign corporation must have greater contacts with Nebraska to
be covered by the Act. In addition to having at least 100 shareholders
and being listed on an exchange or with the NASD,45 a foreign corpo-
ration must meet all of the following requirements: (1) its principal
executive offices must be in Nebraska; (2) it must have assets in Ne-
braska with a market value of at least ten million dollars; (3) it must
have at least 500 employees in Nebraska; and (4) either ten percent of
its shareholders must be Nebraska residents or Nebraska residents
must own ten percent of its shares.4 6
There are more than 32,000 for-profit corporations incorporated in
of the Exchange Act is the National Association of Securities Dealers ('"NASD").
T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 259 (1985).
40. The term "foreign corporation" is used in this article to refer to a corporation
incorporated in a state other than Nebraska. The terms "domestic corporation"
and "Nebraska corporation" are used to refer to a corporation incorporated in
Nebraska.
41. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2442(1)(b)(i) (Cum Supp. 1988). 'rincipal executive of-
fices" is not defined.
42. Id. § 21-2442(1)(b)(ii). The "market value" of assets other than stock or cash is
their fair market value on the date in question as determined in good faith by the
board of directors of the issuing public corporation. Id. § 21-2448(2). The market
value of stock held by the corporation is determined using listed prices or quotes,
if available. See id. § 21-2448(1)(a), (b). Otherwise, the market value of stock is
also determined based on a good faith valuation by the board. Id. § 21-2448(1)(c).
The Act does not say when the board must make its determination of market
value, nor does it require the board to notify an offeror of its determination. This
makes it possible that offerors will not know whether the Act applies to their
offer. See e.g., TLX Acquisition Corp. v. Telex Corp., 679 F. Supp. 1022, 1027
(W.D. Okla. 1987) (offeror claimed it had to submit interrogatories to the target to
ascertain whether Oklahoma's Control Shares Act applied). Another problem
with the assets test is determining the situs of intangible assets such as stock,
accounts receivable, patents, and goodwill. When are such intangible assets con-
sidered to be located in Nebraska?
43. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2442(1)(b)(iii) (Cum. Supp. 1988). A shareholder's residence
is presumed to be the address appearing on the corporation's records. Id. § 21-
2442(1).
44. Id. § 21-2442(1)(b)(iii).
45. Id. §§ 21-2442(2)(a), 21-2453(4). See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
46. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2442(2) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
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the State of Nebraska and more than 6,300 foreign corporations quali-
fied to do business in the state.47 Most of these, however, do not meet
the requirements to be covered by the Act. It is difficult to estimate
exactly how many corporations are covered by the Act, but the
number is probably less than thirty.48 Thus, the Act affects less than
one-tenth of one percent of all the corporations incorporated or quali-
fied to do business in Nebraska. It is nevertheless important because
it affects large corporations that are important to the Nebraska
economy.
The Act allows corporations that would otherwise be covered to
opt out of the Act's coverage. However, the provisions for opting out
are very limited. The board of directors of an existing public corpora-
tion may opt out by amending its bylaws within forty-five days of the
effective date of the Act.4 9 Once that election is made, it may not be
revoked or amended by the board. However, the shareholders could
amend the bylaws to bring the corporation back within the Act's cov-
erage.5 0 If an existing corporation does not opt out within forty-five
47. Telephone interview with Nebraska Secretary of State's office (June 21, 1988).
48. My research assistant reviewed two files available on the DIALOG Information
Retrieval Service-File 527 (Standard and Poor's Register-Corporate) and File
133 (Standard and Poor's Corporate Descriptions). File 527 provides information
on over 45,000 public and private companies. File 133 provides information on
over 9,000 publicly owned corporations with securities trading on the New York,
American, and regional stock exchanges, the NASDAQ system, and over-the-
counter. The search of File 527 was limited to corporations described as public
companies. The search of these two files produced a combined list of forty com-
panies with their corporate offices in Nebraska. Of these forty companies, at
least five clearly do not meet the additional requirements for inclusion. A few of
the others, such as the Dawson County Public Power District, the Metropolitan
Utilities District, the Nebraska Public Power District, and the Omaha Public
Power District, are on the list only because they have issued debt securities and
would not be subject to takeovers. This leaves a total of thirty-one companies
which appear to be covered or for which insufficient information was available to
determine whether they are covered. This includes several foreign corporations
to which application of the Act may be unconstitutional. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 144-71. This research sufficiently indicates the Act's limited applica-
tion. No attempt was made to further refine the list. As to foreign corporations,
the list should be overinclusive because it does not completely exclude corpora-
tions with insufficient Nebraska assets, employees, or shareholders. As to domes-
tic corporations, the list conceivably could be underinclusive because it considers
only Nebraska corporations with corporate headquarters in Nebraska. Nebraska
corporations with headquarters elsewhere also could be covered by the Act.
However, since Nebraska is not a hotbed for the incorporation of corporations
located outside of the state, it seems safe to assume that all, or almost all, of the
Nebraska corporations that would meet the other tests would be headquartered
in Nebraska. Therefore, the list is probably overinclusive as to Nebraska corpora-
tions as well.
49. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2453(3) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
50. See id. § 21-2026 (1987)(corporate bylaws may be amended or repealed by the
shareholders).
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days of the Act's effective date, that election is irrevocable and the
corporation becomes permanently covered by the Act.51 Newly
formed corporations are covered unless their original articles of incor-
poration contain a provision expressly electing not to be covered.5 2
B. Substantive Prohibitions
The Act contains two major substantive provisions affecting take-
overs. First, the Act restricts the voting rights of shares acquired in a
control-share acquisition.5 3 Second, the Act prohibits certain transac-
tions between the corporation and interested shareholders.54
1. The Voting Rights of Control Shares
a. The Limitation of Voting Rights
Shares acquired in a control-share acquisition have the same right
to elect directors as do other shares of the same class and series.
51. The Act provides only two ways out: (1) through a bylaw amendment within
forty-five days of the Act's effective date; and (2) through an opt-out provision in
the corporation's original articles of incorporation. Any opt-out provision in an
existing corporation's articles would be by amendment and by definition would
not appear in the original articles of incorporation. Thus, an existing corporation
which did not opt out within forty-five days after the effective date of the Act is
forever barred from doing so.
The Shareholders' Protection Act as originally introduced would have allowed
a majority of non-interested shareholders to vote to opt out of the Act at any
time. However, this election would not have been effective for eighteen months
and would have related only to persons who were not interested shareholders at
the time of the opt-out vote. This provision was dropped when the committee
amendments were accepted.
52. NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2453(2) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
53. Id. § 21-2451. Hereinafter, "control shares" is used instead of the more awkward
"shares acquired in a control-share acquisition" language employed in the Act.
54. Id. § 21-2452.
55. Id. § 21-2451. Most control-share acquisition statutes do not allow for the transfer
of any voting rights. See, eg., IND. CODE § 23-1-42-9(b) (1986). However, the Ne-
braska Constitution requires the Legislature to:
provide by law that in all elections for directors or managers of incorpo-
rated companies every stockholder owning voting stock shall have the
right to vote in person or proxy for the number of such shares owned by
him, for as many persons as there are directors or managers to be elected
or to cumulate such shares... and such directors shall not be elected in
any other manner.
NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
Although there is nothing in the legislative history to support this conclusion,
the drafters of the bill may have felt that taking away the right of control shares
to elect directors might violate the constitutional requirement that "every stock-
holder owning voting stock... have the right to vote." This construction of the
constitutional requirement is not self-evident. The constitution does not define
"voting stock." It is at least arguable that the Legislature is free to define what is
or is not "voting stock," and the constitution only requires that voting stock, how-
ever defined, be allowed to vote cumulatively. Thus, the Legislature might be
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However, the holder of control shares has no right to vote those shares
on other matters unless such voting rights are first approved by the
holders of a majority of the non-interested shares entitled to vote.5 6
An acquiring person may compel a special shareholders' meeting to
consider the voting rights of shares that he has already acquired or is
to acquire. 57 However, the corporation is required to call such a spe-
cial meeting only if the acquiring shareholder files an information
statement at the time of the request.58 The information statement
must: 1) identify the acquiring person and any affiliates and associates
able to circumvent the constitutional requirement and deny all voting rights to
control shares simply by specifying that control shares are not "voting stock."
The constitutionality of such a statute is unclear, as there is no Nebraska case law
on the point.
56. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2451 (Cum. Supp. 1988). If any shares are entitled to vote as
a class, a majority of the non-interested shares of that class must also approve
voting rights. Id.
Section 21-2451 literally requires a majority vote of non-interested sharehold-
ers to approve the control share acquisition itself: "Any such control-share acqui-
sition shall be approved by ...." Id. However, this appears to be a drafting
oversight, because the rest of sections 21-2450 and 21-2451 deal exclusively with
the approval of voting rights, and nothing in the statute itself refers to any prohi-
bition on the transqfer of the shares without majority approval, as long as the
transferee is willing to accept reduced voting rights. But see id. § 21-2449(1)(e)
(the information statement filed by the acquiring person shall include "such ob-
jective facts as would be substantially likely to affect the decision of a share-
holder with respect to voting on the control-share acquisition") (emphasis added).
In the floor debates, one of the bill's sponsors indicated that the Act does not
prohibit anyone from acquiring stock; it only requires a vote to approve voting
rights. Debate, supra note 35, at 9357 (statement of Sen. Johanns). See also Veere
Inc. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 685 F. Supp. 1027 (N.D. Ohio 1988) (Ohio
statute requiring shareholder approval of the acquisition itself upheld); Fleet
Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 848 F.2d 720, 724-25 (6th Cir. 1988)(Kennedy, J.,
dissenting)(rejecting Ohio's argument that, for constitutional purposes, there is
no practical difference between restricting voting rights and prohibiting the
transfer of shares without shareholder approval).
57. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2450(1) (Cum. Supp. 1988). In order to compel a meeting,
the acquisition must be completed or the subject of a bona fide written offer. Id.
§ 21-2450(1)(b). It is unclear what constitutes a bona fide offer. The issue of
whether the offer is bona fide presents an opportunity for the management of the
target corporation to delay the special meeting by contending that the offer is not
bona fide. For example, is a tender offer made subject to financing bona fide?
What if the offeror indicates that it is "highly confident" that such financing can
be obtained? The SEC and at least one court have indicated that a tender offer
may proceed even if financing is not completed. See Newmont Mining Corp. v.
Pickens, 831 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). Those decisions of course are not determi-
native in deciding for purposes of the Act whether an offer is bona fide.
58. NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2450(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1988). An offeror is not required to
file an information statement. See id. § 21-2449 ("An acquiring person may de-
liver ... an information statement"). However, the written request for a special
meeting must be made "at the time of delivery of the information statement,"
and the corporation has until "fifty days after receipt of the information state-
ment" to honor the request. Id. § 21-2450(1)(a). Thus, if the acquiring person
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of the acquiring person; 2) disclose the number of shares owned by
each such person prior to the control-share acquisition; 3) disclose the
number of shares acquired or to be acquired by each such person and
the range of voting power that the acquiring person in good faith be-
lieves would result from the acquisition; and 4) disclose the terms of
the acquisition, "including such objective facts as would be substan-
tially likely to affect the decision of a shareholder with respect to vot-
ing on the control-share acquisition."59 The acquiring person must
also give the corporation a written undertaking agreeing to pay the
expenses incurred by the target corporation in connection with the
special meeting.60
The special meeting, if properly requested, must be held within
fifty days after receipt of the information statement, unless the acquir-
ing person agrees to a later date.6 ' Although the board has latitude
within the fifty-day period, the acquiring person by written request
may force a thirty-day delay.62
If the acquiring person does not properly request a special meeting,
the Act provides that the shares' voting rights shall be considered at
the next special or annual meeting "notice of which has not been given
prior to the receipt of the information statement."63 Thus, if no infor-
wants a special meeting to determine voting rights, the information statement
must be delivered.
59. Id. § 21-2449(1). The information statement must be amended if there are any
material changes in the facts disclosed. Id. § 21-2449(2).
60. Id. § 21-2450(1)(c). An interesting and important issue is whether the person
seeking the special meeting must pay the target corporation's proxy solicitation
expenses, or just the expenses of actually holding the meeting. Courts have held
that proxy solicitation expenses are legitimate corporate expenses if the soliciting
materials are designed to defend corporate policies and to inform the corpora-
tion's shareholders of the issues involved. See Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine &
Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955). A construction requiring the
acquiring person to pay for the corporation's proxy expenses would force the ac-
quiring person to finance opposition to his own tender offer. This construction
should be rejected. The acquiring person is responsible for the cost of holding the
meeting because the meeting would not have been held but for the acquiring per-
son's request. This would include the cost of giving shareholders notice. How-
ever, the acquiring person is not responsible for costs the board, in its discretion,
decides to incur to oppose the offer and, therefore, should not have to pay such
costs. If the directors decide that opposition is in the best interests of the corpora-
tion, the corporation should pay for that opposition.
61. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2450(1) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
62. Id. Management would have to wait a minimum of ten days in any event because
of the notice requirements for meetings of shareholders. Id. § 21-2029 (1987).
63. Id. § 21-2450(2) (Cum. Supp. 1988). This section presents an interesting opportu-
nity to circumvent the requirement that the acquiring person pay the expenses of
the special meeting. No undertaking to pay costs is required under section 21-
2450(2), probably on the theory that the meeting would have been held in any
event.
The simplest way for a bidder to use section 21-2450(2) is to make a tender
offer and file an information statement just prior to the date that notices of the
1988]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:459
mation statement is filed, the shareholders cannot vote to grant full
voting rights to the shares.
An initial shareholder vote denying full voting rights may be irre-
versible, at least as long as the same person holds those shares. Noth-
ing in section 21-2450 of the Act provides for reconsideration of voting
rights after the initial shareholder meeting which considers the ques-
corporation's annual meeting are mailed. Section 21-2450(2) then would require
consideration of the acquirer's voting rights at that annual meeting. However,
once the information statement was filed, incumbent management could delay
the vote temporarily and complicate the tender offer by withholding the notices
and postponing the annual meeting. The NBCA provides that the annual meet-
ing shall be held "at such time as may be stated in or fixed in accordance with the
bylaws." Id. § 21-2027 (1987). Most corporate bylaws allow the board to set the
date of the annual meeting. If the postponement delayed the annual meeting to a
date more than thirteen months after the last annual meeting, any shareholder
could get a summary order from the district court compelling the meeting. Id.
An alternative would be to use the ordinary NBCA special meeting proce-
dures, rather than those specified in the Act. The holders of at least ten percent
of the shares entitled to vote at a meeting may call a special meeting. Id. The
acquiring person could not call a special meeting using these procedures because
he would not be entitled to vote on his own voting rights, id. § 21-2451 (Cum.
Supp. 1988), but the call might be made by friendly shareholders. A problem is
that such friendly shareholders, in agreeing to call a special meeting, might them-
selves be treated as owning "interested shares" not entitled to vote. See id. §§ 21-
2441, 21-2434. The agreement to call a special meeting on behalf of the acquiring
person might be treated as an "agreement, arrangement, relationship, or under-
standing... for the purpose of acquiring, owning, or voting shares of an issuing
public corporation." The NBCA does not say whether the shareholders calling a
special meeting must pay for the expense of holding the meeting, nor has any
Nebraska case addressed the issue. However, the inclusion of a special expense
provision in section 21-2450(1) of the Act and the omission of such a provision in
the NBCA support the conclusion that the corporation itself must bear the ex-
penses associated with an ordinary special meeting. Thus, an acquiring person
might avoid the expense reimbursement requirement of the Act by arranging for
an ordinary NBCA special meeting.
A problem with using the ordinary NBCA special meeting provisions is that
the acquiring person loses the timing advantages of section 21-2450(1) of the Act.
The NBCA does not indicate when a corporation must hold a special meeting
called by the shareholders. Although a court might impose a "reasonable time"
requirement, a reasonable time could be longer than the fifty-day maximum spec-
ified in section 21-2450(1) of the Act. Thus, the benefit to the acquiring person of
not having to pay for the special meeting could be offset by the possibility of
additional delay. However, the NBCA provides that written notice to all share-
holders specifying the time, date, and location of the special meeting may be de-
livered by the persons calling the meeting, in this case the cooperating
shareholders. Id. § 21-2029 (1987). If they have access to a current shareholder
list, those calling the special meeting on behalf of the acquiring person could
specify their own meeting date which could be as early as ten days after the no-
tice is mailed. Id. (notice to shareholders must be mailed at least ten days before
the meeting). Thus, an acquiring person using the NBCA special meeting proce-
dures could avoid not only the undertaking for expenses required by section 21-
2450(1), but also might gain the strategic advantage of being able to set a quick
meeting date.
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tion, and section 21-2451 provides that such shares shall have full vot-
ing rights only if approved by the shareholders "at a special or annual
meeting of shareholders pursuant to the Shareholders' Protection
Act."64 Because the Act does not provide for any subsequent vote, an
acquiring person who loses in the initial election apparently becomes
permanently disenfranchised except as to the election of directors.
Full voting rights could be restored to those shares in only two ways.
First, the holder could transfer the control shares to unrelated per-
sons whose acquisition of the shares would not constitute a control-
share acquisition, in which case the shares would regain their full vot-
ing rights.65 Second, the holder could transfer the shares to an unre-
lated person in a control-share acquisition and let that person go
through the approval procedure.66
b. What Shares Are Included-Groups and Related Parties
Only shares acquired in a control-share acquisition are subject to
this loss of voting rights. The voting rights of shares owned by the
acquiring person prior to the control-share acquisition are unaffected.
A "control-share acquisition" is an acquisition, directly or indirectly,
by an acquiring person6 7 of the ownership of voting stock that, but for
the Act, would raise the person's voting power to or above one of three
thresholds: twenty percent, thirty-three and one-third percent, or
fifty percent.68 All shares acquired within a 120-day period or pursu-
ant to a single plan are treated as part of the same control-share
acquisition.69
Ownership of stock is broadly defined to include the holdings of
related parties and transactions involving less than an outright
64. Id. § 21-2451 (Cum. Supp. 1988)(emphasis added).
65. Id.
66. A transfer to a related person would, in effect, be no transfer at all, since that
related person already would be treated as part of the acquiring person. See infra
text accompanying notes 70-77.
67. In an amusing bit of circularity, the Act defines an "acquiring person" as one who
makes or proposes to make a control-share acquisition. NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2434
(Cum. Supp. 1988). The definition adds that two or more persons acting together
may constitute a single acquiring person:
If two or more persons act as a partnership, limited partnership, syndi-
cate, or other group pursuant to any agreement, arrangement, relation-
ship, or understanding, whether or not in writing, for the purpose of
acquiring, owning, or voting shares of an issuing public corporation, all
members of the partnership, limited partnership, syndicate, or other
group shall constitute a person for purposes of this section.
Id.
68. Id. § 21-2439. A person crosses the first two thresholds when that person's owner-
ship equals either of the two specified percentages. A person crosses the third
threshold only when the person's ownership exceeds fifty percent. Id.
69. Id.
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purchase.70 First, two or more persons acting as a partnership, syndi-
cate, or group are treated as a single acquiring person.7 1 Ownership
also includes acquisitions by affiliates or associates.72 "Associate" in-
cludes: 1) any entity of which the acquiring person is an officer, direc-
tor, or partner, or as to which the acquiring person directly or
indirectly owns at least ten percent of any class of voting stock; 2) any
trust or estate in which the person has at least a ten percent beneficial
interest or which the person serves as trustee, personal representative,
or in a similar fiduciary capacity; and 3) any relative or spouse of the
person, or any relative of the spouse, who has the same residence as
the person.73 "Affiliate" is a person who directly or indirectly con-
trols, is controlled by, or is under common control with the acquiring
person.74 Control is defined as the power, directly or indirectly, to di-
rect or cause the direction of the management and policies of the con-
trolled person.75 A person who owns at least ten percent of a
corporation's outstanding voting stock is presumed to have control of
that corporation, although that presumption is rebuttable.7 6 However,
voting power held as agent, bank, broker, nominee, custodian, or
trustee for persons who do not themselves have control is not control,
as long as such voting power is held in good faith and not for the pur-
pose of avoiding the Act.77
In addition to covering ownership by related persons, the definition
of "owner" includes control of stock short of full title.78 First, the Act
looks to direct or indirect beneficial ownership, not record ownership.
Second, a person owns stock if he has any agreement, understanding,
or other right to acquire the stock, whether or not that right is imme-
diately exercisable. However, this does not include stock which has
been tendered pursuant to a tender offer, but not yet accepted. Third,
ownership includes a right to vote the stock; however, a revocable
proxy or consent given in response to a solicitation made to ten or
more shareholders is excluded. Finally, ownership includes any
agreement, arrangement, or understanding with any other person who
beneficially owns or whose affiliates or associates beneficially own the
stock, directly or indirectly, for the purpose of acquiring, holding, vot-
ing, or disposing of the stock. Again, a revocable proxy or consent
given in response to a solicitation made to ten or more shareholders is
excluded.
70. Id. § 21-2443.
71. Id. § 21-2434. See supra note 67.
72. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2443 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
73. Id. § 21-2436.
74. Id. § 21-2435.
75. Id. § 21-2438.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. § 21-2443.
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The Act expressly excludes certain transactions from the defini-
tion of control-share acquisition.79 All transactions consummated
before the effective date of the Act, or pursuant to a contract existing
before the effective date of the Act, are excluded. All purchases from
a person who owns more than fifty percent of the corporation's voting
stock and who acquired those shares prior to the effective date of the
Act are excluded. Acquisitions pursuant to the laws of descent and
distribution are excluded, as are acquisitions in satisfaction of a pledge
or security interest, as long as the pledge or security interest was cre-
ated in good faith and not for the purpose of circumventing the Act.
Finally, acquisitions pursuant to a merger or share exchange with the
issuing public corporation are excluded.8 0
2. The Five-Year Prohibition of Business Combinations
The Act generally prohibits business combinations between an in-
terested shareholder and the issuing public corporation for a period of
five years after the interested shareholder's share acquisition date.81
However, section 21-2452 does not apply where the target board gave
advance approval to the business combination or the acquisition of
shares before the person became an interested shareholder.82 There is
no exception for business combinations approved by the other share-
holders, no matter how many disinterested shareholders approve the
transaction. No business combination is allowed even if all disinter-
ested shareholders approve.
a. Who is an Interested Shareholder?
An "interested shareholder" is any person, other than the issuing
public corporation or a subsidiary of the issuing public corporation,
who directly or indirectly owns ten percent or more of the corpora-
tion's outstanding voting stock.83 The term also includes any affiliate
or associate of the issuing public corporation or its subsidiaries that
owned ten percent or more of the outstanding voting stock at any time
79. Id. § 21-2439.
80. Id. This exception allows voting rights to pass in transactions agreed to by the
target board and approved by the shareholders. See infra text accompanying
notes 378-80.
81. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2452 (Cur. Supp. 1988). The "share acquisition date" is the
date on which the person first becomes an interested shareholder. Id. § 21-2445.
82. Id. § 21-2452. Thus, the prohibition could be circumvented by a proxy fight to
gain control of the board prior to the acquisition.
83. Id. § 21-2440(1). In calculating the number of outstanding shares, any unissued
shares which may be issuable pursuant to any agreement, arrangement, or under-
standing or upon the exercise of conversion rights, warrants, options, or other-
wise, are ignored, unless they are deemed to be owned by the interested
shareholder. Id. § 21-2440.
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within the prior five-year period.8 4 However, the ban on business
combinations does not apply if the interested shareholder was an in-
terested shareholder prior to the effective date of the Act, unless the
person subsequently increases his proportionate ownership without
the approval of the board.8 5 The business combination restriction also
does not apply where the person inadvertently becomes an interested
shareholder and divests sufficient shares "as soon as practicable" to
lose that status.8 6
b. What Transactions are Prohibited?
The Act's definition of business combination is comprehensive and
thorough.87 It includes a merger or consolidation between the issuing
public corporation, or its subsidiary, and the interested shareholder, or
any affiliate or associate of the interested shareholder.8 8 It also in-
cludes "[a]ny sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge, transfer, or
other disposition" of any assets of the issuing public corporation or its
subsidiary to the interested shareholder or to any affiliate or associate
of the interested shareholder.8 9 However, no transfer of assets is a
"business combination" unless the assets transferred have an aggre-
gate market value of at least ten percent of (1) the aggregate market
value of the issuing public corporation's assets, or (2) the aggregate
market value of all the outstanding shares of the issuing public corpo-
ration.90 The third prohibited business combination is an issuance or
transfer to the interested shareholder of stock of the issuing public
corporation or its subsidiary with an aggregate market value of at least
five percent of the aggregate market value of all the outstanding
shares. Dividends or distributions issued pro rata to all shareholders,
the exercise of warrants offered or distributed pro rata to all share-
holders, and the conversion of convertible securities outstanding
before the person became an interested shareholder are excluded.9 1
The fourth prohibited business combination is any transaction di-
rectly or indirectly increasing the interested shareholder's proportion-
84. Id. § 21-2440(2). See supra text accompanying notes 73-77, for definitions of "affil-
iate" and "associate."
85. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2453(1) (Cum. Supp. 1988). Inadvertent increases in such a
person's proportionate ownership after the effective date of the Act do not invoke
the ban on business combinations if the person divests himself of sufficient shares
to return to his original proportionate ownership.
86. Id. § 21-2453(5).
87. See id. § 21-2437.
88. Id. § 21-2437(1). This includes corporations that are affiliates or associates either
before or after the merger or consolidation.
89. Id. § 21-2437(2).
90. Id. § 21-2437(2)(a), (b).
91. Id. § 21-2437(3).
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ate ownership of any stock or securities convertible into stock.92
Finally, the interested shareholder or its affiliates or associates
may not directly or indirectly receive the benefit of any loans, guaran-
tees, pledges, financial assistance, tax credits, or tax advantages from
the issuing public corporation or a subsidiary unless those benefits are
shared proportionately with other shareholders. 93
IV. IS THE NEBRASKA ACT CONSTITUTIONAL?
The Nebraska Act poses serious constitutional problems. The
Act's application to foreign corporations is clearly unconstitutional.
Although the control share part of the Act closely mirrors the Indiana
statute approved by the United States Supreme Court and therefore is
probably constitutional, the business combination part of the statute
may be unconstitutional even as applied to Nebraska corporations.
A. The Supreme Court's Review of Antitakeover Statutes
1. Edgar v. MITE Corp.
Consideration of the Nebraska Act's constitutionality must begin
with the two United States Supreme Court cases reviewing the consti-
tutionality of state antitakeover statutes. The Supreme Court's first
review of a state statute restricting corporate takeovers came in Edgar
v. MITE Corp.,94 which involved the constitutionality of the Illinois
Business Take-Over Act.95 The Illinois Act was similar to the 1977
Nebraska Act. It applied to tender offers for any corporation's equity
securities if Illinois shareholders owned ten percent or more of the
security subject to the offer. It also applied to corporations not meet-
ing that test if at least two of the following requirements were satis-
fied: (1) the corporation had its principal executive offices in Illinois;
(2) the corporation was incorporated in Illinois; or (3) the corporation
had at least ten percent of its stated capital and paid-in surplus repre-
sented within Illinois.
No tender offer could be made for the stock of a company covered
by the Illinois Act unless the offeror first filed a registration state-
ment with the Illinois Secretary of State. The registration statement
automatically became effective and the offer could commence after
twenty days, but the Secretary could call a hearing during the twenty-
day waiting period if he felt it was necessary to protect the target
92. Id. § 21-2437(4). This includes stock owned directly or indirectly by the interested
shareholder. The only exception is for immaterial changes due to fractional
share adjustments.
93. Id. § 21-2437(5).
94. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
95. ILL REV. STAT. cl. 121 1/2, 137.51 to .70 (Supp. 1979), repealed by PA. 83-365 § 1
(effective Sept. 14, 1983).
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shareholders. A hearing was mandatory if requested by a majority of
the target's outside directors or by Illinois shareholders owning ten
percent of the securities subject to the offer. If a hearing was called,
the offer could not proceed until the hearing process was completed.
The Secretary could permanently enjoin the offer if he found that it
(1) did not fully and fairly disclose all material information; (2) was
inequitable; or (3) would defraud or deceive the offerees.
MITE made a cash tender offer for all of the outstanding shares of
Chicago Rivet & Machine, an Illinois corporation. Twenty-seven per-
cent of Chicago Rivet's shareholders resided in Illinois, so the Illinois
Act applied. MITE challenged the Illinois Act on two grounds: first,
that it was unconstitutional under the supremacy clause because it
was preempted by the federal Williams Act regulating tender offers;
and second, that it was in violation of the dormant commerce clause.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Illinois Secretary of
State from enforcing the Illinois Act and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.96
The Supreme Court reached a majority decision only on the com-
merce clause question, although a three-judge plurality also would
have held the Illinois Act preempted by the Williams Act.9 7
Relying primarily on the Court's opinion in Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc.,98 the commerce clause portion of Justice White's opinion began
by stating that a state statute violates the commerce clause only if it
directly regulates interstate commerce or if the burden the statute im-
poses on interstate commerce is excessive when compared to the local
interests the statute purports to further.99 Four justices would have
held that the Illinois Act was an invalid direct restraint on interstate
commerce. The plurality noted that the Act could be applied to a
96. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980).
97. Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Rehnquist would have held the case moot and
did not discuss the merits of either constitutional challenge. Edgar v. MITE Corp.
457 U.S. 624, 655, 664 (1982). Justice White, joined by Justices Burger and Black-
mun, would have held that the Williams Act preempted the Illinois Act. Id. at
626. In separate opinions, Justices Powell and Stevens rejected this preemption
conclusion. Id. at 646-47. Justice Powell agreed that the case was moot but never-
theless addressed the merits. Id. at 646. Justice O'Connor found it unnecessary
to reach the preemption issue. Id. at 655. Justice White's opinion on the com-
merce clause challenge was joined in full by Justices Burger, Stevens, and
O'Connor. Justice Powell joined only one part of the commerce clause opinion,
producing a majority only as to that portion of the opinion. Justice Blackmun did
not join the commerce clause portion of Justice White's opinion. Id. at 626.
98. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
99. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624,640 (1982). Because Justice Powell joined only
Part V-B of the opinion, a majority of the Court did not join in the general discus-
sion of the commerce clause standard of review.
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tender offer for a corporation without a single Illinois shareholder.100
Even if there were Illinois shareholders, the Illinois Act would pre-
vent MITE from making its offer to all shareholders in all states, not
just those in Illinois. The plurality felt that this "sweeping extraterri-
torial effect" was too much.10 '
A majority of five justices reached agreement on the second com-
merce clause attack. The majority held that the burden on interstate
commerce outweighed the local interests which the Illinois Act was
designed to protect. The burden on interstate commerce was the Illi-
nois Secretary of State's power to block a nationwide tender offer. Ac-
cording to the majority, the exercise of that power would deprive
shareholders of the opportunity to sell their shares at a premium, hin-
der the reallocation of economic resources to their highest valued use,
and reduce the incentive the tender offer mechanism provides incum-
bent management to perform well.10 2
The Illinois Secretary of State argued that the Illinois Act fur-
thered two legitimate local interests: first, it protected resident secur-
ity holders; and second, it merely regulated the internal affairs of
corporations incorporated under Illinois law. The Court rejected both
of these claimed interests.103
The Court recognized that protecting local investors is a legitimate
state objective, but stated that Illinois had no legitimate interest in
protecting nonresident shareholders. As to these nonresident share-
holders, there was no countervailing state interest to sustain the law.
The court also noted that the Illinois Act's exemption of a corpora-
tion's repurchases of its own shares was inconsistent with the share-
holder protection rationale. The Court agreed with the court of
appeals that the benefits to resident security holders were speculative
at best since the Williams Act already provided many of the same sub-
stantive protections as the Illinois Act and "the possible benefits of the
potential delays required by the Act may be outweighed by the in-
creased risk that the tender offer will fail due to defensive tactics em-
ployed by incumbent management."104
The Court also rejected the internal affairs justification for the Illi-
nois Act. The Court argued that tender offers contemplate the trans-
fer of shares from shareholders to a third party and therefore do not
implicate the internal affairs of the target company. Even if they did,
the Illinois Act applied to corporations not incorporated in Illinois
100. Id. at 642. For example, the Illinois Act would apply to an offer for the stock of a
corporation which was incorporated in Illinois and had its principal executive of-
fices in Illinois, even if it had no Illinois shareholders.
101. Id. at 642-43.
102. Id. at 643-44.
103. Id. at 644-46.
104. Id. at 645.
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with principal places of business in other states; the Court held that
"Illinois has no interest in regulating the internal affairs of foreign
corporations." 105
A plurality of three justices would also have held that the Williams
Act preempted the Illinois Act.106 The Williams Act does not explic-
itly prohibit states from regulating takeovers. Therefore, according to
the plurality, the Illinois Act was void only if (1) compliance with both
the Illinois Act and the Williams Act was a physical impossibility, or
(2) the Illinois Act stood " 'as an obstacle to the accomplishment... of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.' "107 No one contended
that it would be impossible to comply with both the Illinois Act and
the Williams Act,108 so the plurality focused on the second test.
The plurality recognized that Congress' primary purpose in adopt-
ing the Williams Act was to protect investors. However, the plurality
argued that "it is also crystal clear that a major aspect of the effort to
protect the investor was to avoid favoring either management or the
takeover bidder."109 According to the plurality, "[t]his policy of 'even-
handedness' .. . represented a conviction that neither side in the con-
test should be extended additional advantages vis-a-vis the investor,
who if furnished with adequate information would be in a position to
make his own informed choice."1o
The plurality identified three provisions of the Illinois Act that up-
set the careful balance struck by Congress between management and
the offeror.I'i First, the Illinois Act required registration of the offer
twenty days before the offer became effective. The plurality noted
that Congress had considered and several times refused to include a
precommencement disclosure requirement in the Williams Act and
that "by providing the target company with additional time within
which to take steps to combat the offer, the precommencement notifi-
cation provisions furnish incumbent management with a powerful tool
to combat tender offers."112 Second, the plurality found the hearing
provisions of the Illinois Act, and the delays they might cause, objec-
105. Id. at 645-46.
106. Id. at 630-40.
107. Id. (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963)).
108. Id. at 631-32. Subsequent to MITE's tender offer, but before the Supreme Court's
consideration of the case, the SEC adopted Rule 14d-2(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b)
(1988), requiring a tender offeror to begin its offer within five days after publicly
announcing the material terms of the offer. Rule 14d-2(b) seems to directly con-
flict with the Illinois Act, but its effect was not considered by the Court because
the rule operated only prospectively, and therefore did not apply to Mi' s offer.
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 636 n.11 (1982).
109. Edgar v. MITE Corp. 457 U.S. 624, 633 (1982).
110. Id. at 633-34 (citation omitted).
111. Id. at 634-40.
112. Id. at 635.
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tionable. The plurality noted that the ability to delay the offer until
the conclusion of a fairness hearing could be used by incumbent man-
agement to seriously impede and stymie indefinitely a takeover. The
plurality was particularly concerned about the ability of incumbent
management to force the Secretary to hold a hearing. Third, the plu-
rality was disturbed by the power of the Secretary of State to block an
offer that the Secretary found to be substantively unfair. The plural-
ity found this inconsistent with the congressional judgment in the Wil-
liams Act that investors should be free to make their own decisions.
According to the plurality, Illinois was attempting to offer "'investor
protection at the expense of investor autonomy-an approach quite in
conflict with that adopted by Congress.' ":13
Justices Stevens and Powell refused to join in the plurality's pre-
emption opinion. Each disagreed with the argument that the Williams
Act's policy of neutrality implied a federal prohibition of state legisla-
tion designed to protect incumbent management.1' 4
2. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America
The Supreme Court's only other consideration of a state statute
restricting takeovers came in 1987 in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America," 5 involving the Control Share Acquisitions Chapter16 of
the Indiana Business Corporation Law. The Indiana Act applies to "is-
suing public corporations," which include only businesses incorpo-
rated in Indiana 1 7 that have (1) 100 or more shareholders; (2) their
principal place of business, principal office, or substantial assets within
Indiana; and (3) either ten percent or more of their shareholders re-
siding in Indiana, ten percent or more of their shares owned by Indi-
ana residents, or 10,000 shareholders residing in Indiana.118
Under the Indiana Act, a person or entity acquiring "control
shares" does not acquire the right to vote those shares for any purpose
unless voting rights are approved by a majority vote of all disinter-
ested shareholders of each class of voting stock.119 An entity acquires
"control shares" whenever it acquires shares that, but for the opera-
tion of the Act, would increase its voting power to or above any of
113. Id. at 640 (quoting MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 494 (7th Cir. 1980)).
114. Id. at 646-47 (Powell, J., concurring in part); Id at 654-55 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
115. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
116. IND. CODE §§ 23-1-42-1 to 23-1-42-11 (Supp. 1988).
117. Id. § 23-1-20-5.
118. Id. § 23-1-42-4(a). As in the Nebraska Shareholders' Protection Act, the residence
of a shareholder is presumed to be the address appearing on the records of the
corporation. Compare id with NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2432 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
119. IND. CODE § 23-1-42-9 (Supp. 1988). Unlike the Nebraska Act, the Indiana Act
excludes the shares of officers and inside directors from voting in this election.
Compare id § 23-1-42-3(2), (3) with NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2432 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
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three thresholds: twenty percent, thirty-three and one-third percent,
or fifty percent.120 As in the Nebraska Act, an acquiring person can
compel a special shareholders' meeting within fifty days by filing a
disclosure statement.' 2 ' If no such statement is filed, the acquiring
person's voting rights are considered at the next special or annual
meeting. The Indiana Act also gives the corporation the right to re-
deem the control shares at their fair value if no disclosure statement is
filed or if the shareholders do not approve full voting rights for the
shares.122
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois held the Indiana statute preempted by the Williams Act and vio-
lative of the commerce clause;' 23 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed, only to be reversed by the Supreme Court.
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, concluded that the Wil-
liams Act does not preempt the Indiana Act.124 Noting that it was
possible to comply with both the Williams Act and the Indiana Act,
the Court reasoned that the Indiana Act was preempted only if it frus-
trated the purposes of the Williams Act. Claiming to apply the MITE
plurality's preemption reasoning, the Court held that the Indiana Act
did not frustrate the purposes of the Williams Act.'2 5
The Court believed that the Indiana statute, unlike the Illinois
120. IND. CODE § 23-1-42-1 (Supp. 1988).
121. Id. § 23-1-42-7.
122. Id. § 23-1-42-10.
123. Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp. 389 (N.D. I. 1986), aff'd,
794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
124. Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion agreeing that the Williams Act does not
preempt the Indiana Act, but using a different rationale. Justice Scalia relied on
section 28(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982), providing that noth-
ing in the Exchange Act "shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission
(or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any State over any security
or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this chapter or
the rules and regulations thereunder." Admitting that this provision might not
literally apply to the Indiana Act because the Indiana Act was not within the
province of the Indiana securities authority, Justice Scalia nevertheless felt that
section 28(a) foreclosed preemption on the basis of a conflict of purpose. CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1653 (1987) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment). According to Justice Scalia-
It would be peculiar to hold that Indiana could have pursued the purpose
at issue here through its blue-sky laws, but cannot pursue it through the
State's even more sacrosanct authority over the structure of domestic
corporations. Prescribing voting rights for the governance of state-
chartered companies is a traditional state function with which the Fed-
eral Congress has never, to my knowledge, intentionally interfered. I
would require far more evidence than is available here to find implicit
pre-emption of that function by a federal statute whose provisions con-
cededly do not conflict with the state law.
Id.
125. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1645 (1987). The major-
ity did not concede that the MITE preemption analysis was correct.
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statute reviewed in MITE, did not favor incumbent management over
offerors.126 The Court saw the Indiana Act as protecting independent
shareholders from the coercive aspects of some tender offers, particu-
larly two-tier offers.12 The Court felt that shareholders could use the
Act's voting provisions to reject offers that individual shareholders
might feel pressured to accept. The Court found this consistent with
the basic policy of the Williams Act-protecting investors by placing
them on an equal footing with the offeror.
The Court noted that the Indiana Act avoided the problems with
the Illinois statute pointed out by the MITE plurality. The Indiana
Act gives neither management nor the offeror an advantage in com-
municating with shareholders, it does not indefinitely delay tender of-
fers, and it does not allow the state to impose its own view of fairness
on the shareholders.
The court of appeals based its finding of preemption on its view
that, since no offeror would want to acquire shares without voting
rights, the Indiana Act forces a fifty-day delay between commence-
ment of the offer and its conclusion and therefore conflicts with the
SEC rule allowing an offer to close after twenty days.12S The Supreme
Court rejected this argument; the Indiana Act does not force the of-
feror to leave the offer open for more than twenty days; if the offeror
wants voting rights, it can condition its offer on the approval of voting
rights within a specified period. 2 9 Finally, the Court noted that the
MITE plurality did not say that any delay would create a conflict with
the Williams Act, only unreasonable delay. The Court did not con-
sider a fifty-day delay unreasonable.13 0 The Court pointed out other
126. Id. at 1645-46. The Court noted Dynamics' argument that the provision of the
Indiana Act allowing management to opt into the Act during the first seventeen
months after enactment gave management a potential strategic advantage be-
cause offerors would be reluctant to take the expensive preliminary steps of a
tender offer if they did not know whether they would be subjected to the Act.
However, the Court felt that the temporary nature of the opt-in provision ren-
dered it of little significance. Id- at 1646 n.7. The Court also felt that the added
expense imposed by the Indiana Act "does not alter the balance between manage-
ment and offeror in any significant way." Id. According to the Court, "[i]f an
offeror-who has no official position with the corporation-desires a special
meeting, solely to discuss the voting rights of the offeror, it is not unreasonable to
have the offeror pay for the meeting." Id.
127. Id. at 1646. See infmr text accompanying notes 250-95.
128. Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 263 (7th Cir. 1986); see 17
C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1988).
129. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1647 (1987).
130. Id. In a curious misreading of the Williams Act, the Court stated that "[t]his pe-
riod is within the 60-day maximum period Congress established for tender offers
in 15 U.S.C. Section 78n(d)(5)." Section 14(d)(5) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(d)(5) (1982), does not establish a maximum duration for tender offers, but
merely provides that shareholders may withdraw tendered shares if the offer re-
mains open for more than sixty days. Nothing in the Act prohibits an offeror
1988]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
provisions of state corporate law, particularly classified boards131 and
cumulative voting,132 which limit or delay the free exercise of control
after a tender offer. The Court argued that, given "the longstanding
prevalence of state regulation in this area," if Congress had intended
to preempt all state laws delaying the acquisition of voting control af-
ter a tender offer, it would have done so expressly.13
3
The Court also rejected the commerce clause challenge to the Indi-
ana Act. According to the Court, the principal objects of dormant
commerce clause scrutiny are state statutes that directly discriminate
against interstate commerce. The Indiana Act is not directly discrimi-
natory because it applies equally to all offerors, whether or not they
are Indiana residents. The Court was unconcerned that most offerors
are likely to be out-of-state entities, as long as the burden imposed on
Indiana offerors and nonresident offerors is the same.
The Court noted that it had previously invalidated state statutes
which adversely affected interstate commerce by subjecting activities
to inconsistent regulation by more than one state. However, the Court
felt that the Indiana Act posed no such problem. A state's authority to
regulate the voting rights of domestic corporations is well-established,
and "[s]o long as each State regulates voting rights only in the corpora-
tions it has created, each corporation will be subject to the law of only
one State."'134
The Court then turned to the final commerce clause challenge-
the claim that the burden imposed by the Indiana Act on interstate
commerce was excessive in relation to the putative local benefits of
from leaving the offer open for a longer period. The sixty-day period is no longer
important even with respect to withdrawal rights. The SEC rules now allow
withdrawal at any time during the offer. Rule 14d-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (1988).
131. A board is "classified" when all of the directors do not stand for election each
year. Instead, they are chosen for periods longer than one year with staggered
terms of office. Only one class of directors is elected each year. See 2 W.
FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 334.1 (perm. ed. 1982); H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 556-
57 (3d ed. 1983). The NBCA allows a Nebraska corporation to provide in its arti-
cles of incorporation for a classified board of directors. NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2037
(1987). The corporation's directors may be divided into two or three equal classes
of at least three directors each, with one class elected at each annual meeting on a
rotating basis. Id.
132. Cumulative voting is a method of voting for corporate directors in which each
shareholder may cast as many votes as he or she has shares multiplied by the
number of directors to be elected. Each shareholder is permitted to concentrate
or distribute the votes among the candidates as he sees fit. The purpose of cumu-
lative voting is to promote minority shareholder representation on the board. See
5 W. FLETCHER, supra note 131, §§ 2048-2048.3; H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra
note 131, at 495-98. The Nebraska Constitution requires cumulative voting for
Nebraska corporations. NEB. CONsT. art. XII, § 1.
133. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1648 (1987).
134. Id. at 1649.
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the statute.135 The Court emphasized the traditionally recognized in-
terest of a state in regulating corporations incorporated in that state
and noted that such state laws necessarily affect interstate commerce
where the corporation has nonresident shareholders. According to
the Court, the interstate operation of a free market for capital "de-
pends at its core upon the fact that a corporation--except in the rarest
situations-is organized under, and governed by, the law of a single
jurisdiction, traditionally the corporate law of the State of its incorpo-
ration."136 State laws regulating domestic corporations may directly
affect a variety of corporate transactions, but the state "has an interest
in promoting stable relationships among parties involved in the corpo-
rations it charters, as well as in ensuring that investors in such corpo-
rations have an effective voice in corporate affairs."'137 The Court
found that the purpose of the Indiana Act-to protect the autonomy of
the shareholders of Indiana corporations-was "well within the
State's role as overseer of corporate governance," even as extended to
nonresident shareholders of Indiana corporations.13 8 According to the
Court, MITE only held that a state has no interest in protecting non-
resident shareholders of nonresident corporations. Morever, unlike
the Illinois statute at issue in MITE, the Indiana Act applies only to
corporations with a substantial number of shareholders resident in In-
diana, and the Court felt that Indiana indisputably had an interest in
protecting those resident shareholders.139
135. Justice Scalia, who concurred with the rest of the majority's commerce clause
analysis, refused to join in this portion of the Court's opinion:
[The balancing required by this test] is ill suited to the judicial function
and should be undertaken rarely if at all.... Nothing in the Constitution
says that the protection of entrenched management is any less important
a 'putative local benefit' than the protection of entrenched shareholders,
and I do not know what qualifies us to make that judgment-or the re-
lated judgment as to how effective the present statute is in achieving one
or the other objective-or the ultimate (and most ineffable) judgment as
to whether, given importance-level x, and effectiveness-level y, the
worth of the statute is 'outweighed' by impact-on-commerce z.... As
long as a State's corporation law governs only its own corporations and
does not discriminate against out-of-state interests, it should survive this
Court's scrutiny under the Commerce Clause, whether it promotes
shareholder welfare or industrial stagnation. Beyond that, it is for Con-
gress to prescribe its invalidity.
Id. at 1652-53 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
136. Id. at 1650.
137. Id. at 1651.
138. Id. at 1651-52.
139. Id. at 1652. Professor Cox is probably correct when he characterizes this brief
focus on the other contacts required by the Indiana Act as an "afterthought." See
Cox, The Constitutional 'Dynamics" of the Internal Affairs Rule-A Comment
on CTS Corporation, 13 J. CORP. L. 317,350 n.173 (1988). The only lower courts to
have considered the question agree with Professor Cox that the additional con-
tacts required by the Indiana Act are not constitutionally required. RP Acquisi-
tion Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,763, at 98,580
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Dynamics argued that the prospect of coercive tender offers was
illusory and that the Indiana Act would substantially limit the
number of tender offers, thereby interfering with the efficient reallo-
cation of corporate assets. The Court responded that the Constitution
does not require the states to subscribe to any particular economic the-
ory, and that it was not the Court's province to second-guess the state
legislators' empirical judgments concerning the utility of the legisla-
tion.140 Since the state created and defined corporations, it was not
required to define them as other states did, as long as residents and
nonresidents had equal access to them.
Justice White, who wrote the plurality opinion in MITE, found
himself alone in arguing that the Williams Act preempted the Indiana
Act.14 ' Justice White argued that the majority improperly equated
the protection of individual investors, the focus of the Williams Act,
with the protection of shareholders as a group. According to Justice
White, the Williams Act was designed to promote individual investor
autonomy, and the Indiana Act, which effectively allows a majority of
the target corporation's shareholders to prevent a sale by any individ-
ual investor, conflicts with that individual autonomy. Justice White
distinguished other corporate control provisions, such as cumulative
voting and staggered boards, on the ground that the Indiana Act is
transactional in nature, "designed to prevent certain tender offers
from ever taking place."142
Justice White's commerce clause dissent, joined by Justices Black-
mun and Stevens, saw the Indiana Act as economic protectionism,
designed to protect Indiana corporations. According to Justice White,
the practical effect of the Indiana Act is to restrain the transfer of
voting rights in interstate commerce. "A state law which permits a
majority of an Indiana corporation's stockholders to prevent individ-
ual investors, including out-of-state stockholders, from selling their
stock to an out-of-state tender offeror and thereby frustrate any trans-
fer of corporate control, is the archetype of the kind of state law that
the commerce clause forbids."143
B. The Constitutionality of the Act's Regulation of Foreign Corporations
Senator Hartnett, who introduced the Nebraska Act, expressed
(D. Del. May 9, 1988); Veere Inc. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 685 F. Supp.
1027, 1033 (N.D. Ohio 1988). But see Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 848
F.2d 720, 725 (6th Cir. 1988)(Kennedy, J., dissenting)(shareholders within the
state are a "crucial requirement" for constitutionality).
140. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1651 (1987).
141. Id. at 1653 (White, J., dissenting). Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined only
Justice White's commerce clause discussion.
142. Id. at 1655.
143. Id. at 1656.
[Vol. 67:459
SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION ACT
complete confidence in its constitutionality.144 The aide who helped
draft the bill was more cautious, indicating that the definition of "issu-
ing public corporation" was bifurcated to guarantee that the regula-
tion of foreign corporations would be severable and would not affect
the constitutionality of the rest of the bill.145 This concern was appro-
priate because the Nebraska Act's regulation of foreign corporations is
almost certainly unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court's approval of the Indiana Act in CTS was
strongly grounded in the Indiana Act's limitation to Indiana corpora-
tions. The Supreme Court's evaluation of the possibility of inconsis-
tent regulation focused heavily on the traditional internal affairs rule
allowing states to regulate domestic corporations:
The Indiana Act poses no such problem. So long as each State regulates vot-
ing rights only in the corporations it has created, each corporation will be sub-
ject to the law of only one State. No principle of corporation law and practice
is more firmly established than a State's authority to regulate domestic corpo-
rations, including the authority to define the voting rights of shareholders.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 304 (1971) (concluding
that the law of the incorporating State generally should 'determine the right
of a shareholder to participate in the administration of the affairs of the corpo-
ration'). Accordingly, we conclude that the Indiana Act does not create an
impermissible risk of inconsistent regulation by different States.
1 4 6
The Nebraska Act, on the other hand, does pose a risk of inconsis-
tent regulation. The voting rights of shares of foreign corporations
which meet the Nebraska Act's jurisdictional requirements would be
governed by both the law of their state of incorporation and by Ne-
braska law. Given the Supreme Court's emphasis on a state's tradi-
tional authority to regulate the internal affairs of domestic
corporations, it is clear which of the two potentially inconsistent regu-
lations must fall-the Supreme Court would almost certainly support
the "state's authority to regulate domestic corporations." 14 7 Justice
Scalia's concurrence in CTS is equally limited; his opinion approves
laws like the Indiana Act only "[a]s long as a State's corporation law
governs only its own corporations."-148
The Nebraska Act's regulation of foreign corporations is also of
questionable constitutionality under the CTS balancing analysis. The
CTS majority noted that the national free market system for capital
"depends at its core upon the fact that a corporation-except in the
rarest situations--is organized under, and governed by, the law of a
single jurisdiction, traditionally the corporate law of the State of its
144. In hearings before the Committee on Banking, Commerce & Insurance Senator
Hartnett stated "[it is a legislation that we know will past [sic] court tests of
constitutionality." Hearings, supra note 35, at 51.
145. Id. at 104 (statement of Bill Stadtwald).
146. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1649 (1987).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1653 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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incorporation." 4 9 Nebraska's exercise of jurisdiction over foreign cor-
porations would upset the single-jurisdiction system of governance
upon which the Court indicated the free market for capital was depen-
dent.5 0 CTS held that a state "has an interest in promoting stable
relationships among parties involved in the corporations it charters, as
well as in ensuring that investors in such corporations have an effec-
tive voice in corporate affairs."151 The Court relied on a state's power
to define the corporations that it creates. Nebraska has not created
the foreign corporations covered by the Nebraska Act and CTS, there-
fore, does not give Nebraska the power to define the attributes of such
corporations. Justice White's opinion in MITE expressly rejected the
idea that a state has any interest in regulating the internal affairs of
foreign corporations. 152 Justice White found the internal affairs justi-
fication advanced by the Illinois Attorney General "somewhat incredi-
149. Id. at 1650.
150. Professor Buxbaum argues for a moderate reading of CTSs state of incorporation
passages. Buxbaum, The Threatened Constitutionalization of the Internal Af-
fairs Doctrine in Corporation Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 29 (1987). Professor Bux-
baum believes that the strongest scrutiny of potentially inconsistent state
regulation should come only with respect to state laws, such as those regulating
takeover bids, which have an impact on the interstate commerce implicit in stock
market trading. Id. at 53-54. Although he recognizes a strong state-of-incorpora-
tion theme in CTS, he would limit it to state statutory responses to takeovers. He
argues that the Court might allow regulation by another state if the number of
resident shareholders in that other state and the local interests are strong
enough. Id. at 54. Professor Buxbaum's conclusion might be correct but should
not affect the analysis with respect to statutes affecting takeovers.
Professor Cox sees the two Supreme Court opinions as leaving the question
even more open:
MITE Corp. and CTS Corp. established that the state of incorporation has
a constitutionally legitimate interest in protecting nonresident share-
holders of resident corporations and that a state has no legitimate inter-
est in protecting nonresident shareholders of nonresident corporations.
It is unknown whether a state has a legitimate interest in protecting resi-
dent shareholders of a nonresident corporation ....
Cox, supra note 139, at 355. Professor Cox argues that CTS and MITE may be
read narrowly as not compelling the internal affairs rule, but concludes that the
constitutional status of the internal affairs rule remains an implication of the two
cases. Id. Professor Cox's open question is important, particularly as it relates to
the scope of state blue sky laws, but it need not be answered in order to deter-
mine the constitutionality of the Nebraska Act. The Nebraska Act is of the type
condemned in MITE-it regulates both resident and nonresident shareholders of
nonresident corporations. The CTS majority agreed with Dynamics that a state
has no interest in protecting nonresident shareholders of nonresident corpora-
tions. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1652 (1987).
151. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1651 (1987)(emphasis
added).
152. According to the opinion, a state "has no interest in regulating the internal affairs
of foreign corporations." Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645-46 (emphasis
added).
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ble" as applied to foreign corporations. 5 3 This position was
apparently accepted by the CTS majority as well; the Court distin-
guished MITE on the basis that the Illinois statute in MITE applied
both to foreign and domestic corporations. 5 4 Thus, it is unlikely that
Nebraska's regulation of foreign corporations will withstand constitu-
tional scrutiny.
Lower court cases since CTS reaffirm this conclusion. Every fed-
eral court which has considered the issue has rejected extraterritorial
state takeover statutes. TLX Acquisition Corp. v. Telex Corp.'15 in-
volved the most analogous statute. The Oklahoma statute at issue in
TLX156 was similar to the Indiana Act approved in CTS except that
the Oklahoma statute also applied to certain foreign corporations with
Oklahoma contacts.3S7 Telex, the target, was a Delaware corporation,
but Oklahoma was Telex's principal place of business, and all of its
officers, employees, and assets were located in Oklahoma.5 8 Between
ten and twenty percent of its shares were owned by Oklahoma resi-
dents. 5 9 The defendants argued that these substantial Oklahoma con-
tacts gave Oklahoma a sufficient interest in regulating Telex; its state
of incorporation was only "a legal technicality which is irrelevant."16 0
The district court held that the Oklahoma statute violated the com-
merce clause because Oklahoma's regulation of the voting rights of
foreign corporations posed an impermissible risk of inconsistent regu-
lation.' 6 1 According to the Court, such inconsistent regulation might
make it impossible for a tender offeror to know whether his shares
would have voting rights, 'bringing control-share acquisitions and
tender offers to a sudden halt."162 The Court rejected the State's ar-
gument that there was no conflict because Delaware, the state of in-
153. Id. at 645.
154. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1652 (1987).
155. 679 F. Supp. 1022 (W.D. Okla. 1987).
156. Oklahoma Control Shares Acquisition Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, §§ 1145 to
1155 (West Supp. 1988).
157. The Oklahoma Act applied to any corporation with 100 or more shareholders
with its principal place of business, principal office, or substantial assets in
Oklahoma, which met one or more of the following tests: (1) more than ten per-
cent of its shareholders reside in Oklahoma; (2) more than ten percent of its
shares are owned by Oklahoma residents; or (3) ten thousand or more of its
shareholders reside in Oklahoma. Id. § 1148.
158. TLX Acquisition Corp. v. Telex Corp., 679 F. Supp. 1022, 1029, 1025 n.6 (1987).
This is somewhat misleading because the wholly-owned subsidiary which gener-
ated most of Telex's revenues operated worldwide. Id. at 1025 n.6.
159. Id. at 1029.
160. Id. at 1025 (emphasis added).
161. Id. at 1030. The court's decision was on a request for a preliminary injunction, so
the court was only required to determine whether there was a substantial likeli-
hood that the plaintiff offeror would prevail on the merits. However, the court
held that "[p]laintiffs' success is certain." Id. at 1029 (emphasis added).
162. Id. at 1031.
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corporation, had no comparable statute. In the Court's view, it was
the risk, not the actual existence, of inconsistent regulation that cre-
ated the commerce clause problem.
The Court rejected the argument that a state other than the state
of incorporation might have a greater interest in regulating the voting
rights of the corporation's shareholders. If that were so, the Court
argued, the Supreme Court in CTS "would have found it necessary to
determine whether some state other than Indiana... had a greater
interest" in applying its law to Dynamics. 163 Since the Supreme Court
did not undertake such a review, it must have intended to constitu-
tionalize the internal affairs rule.
The district court also held, with little analysis, that the burden the
Oklahoma Act imposed on interstate commerce exceeded its putative
local benefits. The burden seen by the Court was the inhibitory effect
the Oklahoma Act would have on nationwide tender offers because of
the risk that the offeror would not gain voting rights. The Court rec-
ognized that Oklahoma had an interest in protecting resident share-
holders and, arguably, in protecting the assets and business of
corporations with all their assets or their principal place of business in
Oklahoma. However, the Court saw no Oklahoma interest in protect-
ing nonresident shareholders of foreign corporations or in regulating
the internal affairs of those corporations.1 64
Campeau Corp. v. Federated Department Stores 165 involved the
Ohio Foreign Business Acquisitions Act,166 which regulated takeovers
of "resident" Ohio businesses by non-United States businesses. "Resi-
dent business" was defined to include foreign corporations with sub-
stantial contacts with Ohio.167 The court held that the Ohio Act gave
rise to an impermissible risk that a person would be subject to incon-
sistent regulation:
[Miany states could seek to regulate the acquisition of control of a national
company, such as Federated, which has substantial assets and principal places
163. Id. at 1030.
164. Id. at 1032.
165. Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,650 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 22, 1988).
166. OHio REV. CODE § 1710.01-.05 (effective July 1, 1988, S.B. 359 Feb. 1988 Leg.
Bull.).
167. To be included, a foreign corporation had to meet all of the following tests:
(a) have assets in Ohio with a fair market value of at least five million
dollars;
(b) have more than five hundred employees in Ohio;
(c) paid more than one million dollars in taxes to Ohio in its last fiscal
year;
(d) have its principal place of business or its principal executive office in
and own or lease real estate in Ohio; and
(e) prior to the commencement of the proposed acquisition of control,
have more than ten percent and at least one thousand of its benefi-
cial or record shareholders resident in Ohio.
Id. § 1710.01(B)(2).
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of business in states other than Ohio. These other states would likely impose
different requirements. Thus, the risk of inconsistent state regulations cre-
ated by the Ohio Act, renders it invalid under the commerce clause.1 6 8
No other lower court opinion since CTS has directly addressed the
constitutionality of state takeover statutes regulating foreign corpora-
tions, but there is dictum in at least one other case indicating that ex-
traterritorial application would be unconstitutional. The First Circuit
Court of Appeals in Hyde Park Partners, L.P. v. Connolly169 reviewed
a Massachusetts statute that applied to offers for either Massachusetts
corporations or foreign corporations with their principal place of busi-
ness in Massachusetts.17o The target in the case was a Massachusetts
corporation, so the court did not review the statute's extraterritorial
application, but the court indicated in dictum: "As to an out-of-state
corporation, the statute would not likely survive commerce clause
analysis under CTS because the corporation might be subject to regu-
lations in both Massachusetts and its state of incorporation as to the
same transaction."171
C. The Constitutionality of the Act as Applied to Nebraska Corporations
Even if the Nebraska Act's regulation of foreign corporations is un-
constitutional, the Act contains a savings clause that would preserve
the remainder of the statute.172 Thus, whether the Act is constitu-
tional as applied to Nebraska corporations must also be considered.
168. Campeau Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,650, at
97,986 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 22, 1988). The court's argument is somewhat overstated,
because a corporation could only have one principal place of business. If every
state followed the Ohio formula, every corporation would be subject to regulation
by at most two states-the state of incorporation and the state where the corpora-
tion has its principal place of business.
169. 839 F.2d 837 (1st Cir. 1988).
170. Massachusetts Take-Over Bid Regulation Act, MAss. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 110C, §§ 1-
13 (West. Supp. 1988).
171. Hyde Park Partners, L.P. v. Connelly, 839 F.2d 837, 844 (1st Cir. 1988).
172. L.B. 1110, 90th Leg., 2d Sess. § 25 (1988). A possible state constitutional issue is
raised if a court finds the Act unconstitutional as applied to foreign corporations
but respects the savings clause and upholds its application to domestic corpora-
tions. The Nebraska Constitution provides that foreign corporations "shall not be
given greater rights or privileges than are given domestic corporations of a simi-
lar character." NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 1. If the Nebraska Act is judicially limited
to Nebraska corporations, one might argue that the resulting prohibition on busi-
ness combinations with domestic corporations would violate this constitutional
provision. The state constitutional argument against limiting the Act to domestic
corporations seems unlikely to succeed. The only Nebraska case to consider arti-
cle XII, § 1 held that it did not affect taxation and thus was inapplicable. State v.
Marsh, 119 Neb. 197, 200, 227 N.W. 926, 927 (1929). The court implied in dictum
that the constitutional prohibition would not preclude a state from requiring ac-
tions of domestic corporations not required of foreign corporations, especially
where the state would not be permitted to so regulate foreign corporations. Id.
Disallowing differential treatment of domestic and foreign corporations would fly
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For discussion purposes, it is convenient to split the Act into its two
constituent parts: first, the part of the Act affecting the voting rights
of control shares; second, the part of the Act prohibiting business
combinations with interested shareholders.
1. The Voting Rights Limitation
The voting rights portion of the Nebraska Act probably is constitu-
tional because of its similarity to the Indiana Act upheld in CTS. In
fact, in some ways the Nebraska Act is less restrictive than the Indi-
ana Act. The Indiana Act takes away all voting rights from control
shares, whereas the Nebraska Act gives control shares the right to
elect directors without shareholder approval.173 In addition, the Ne-
braska Act does not allow the corporation to redeem the control
shares if they do not receive voting rights,174 nor does the Nebraska
Act give minority shareholders appraisal rights after a control-share
acquisition, as does the Indiana Act.175
The Nebraska Act is more restrictive than the Indiana Act in some
ways, but these differences should not affect the constitutional analy-
sis. First, it is much harder for a corporation to opt out of the Ne-
braska Act.176 The Indiana Act allows a corporation to opt out of
coverage at any time by an amendment to its articles of incorporation
or bylaws.177 The Nebraska Act, on the other hand, only allows an
existing corporation to opt out of coverage within the first 45 days af-
ter the Act's effective date.178 Since there is nothing in CTS which
indicates that the Indiana Act's opt-out provisions were significant,
this is unlikely to affect the Nebraska Act's constitutionality. 79 Sec-
ond, the Nebraska Act grants full voting rights to control shares only
if approved in the initial shareholder vote; the shareholders may not
subsequently rescind a disapproving vote. The Indiana Act, on the
in the face of the long history of state corporation codes applicable only to domes-
tic corporations.
173. Compare NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2451 (Cum. Supp. 1988) with IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 23-1-42-5, 23-1-42-9 (Supp. 1988).
174. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-10 (Supp. 1988). One of the bills introduced in the
Nebraska Legislature contained such a redemption provision. See L.B. 938, 90th
Leg., 2d Sess. § 12 (1988).
175. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-11 (Supp. 1988). This was also a feature of one of the
bills introduced in the Nebraska Legislature. See L.B. 938, 90th Leg., 2d Sess. § 13
(1988).
176. Compare NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2453(2), (3) (Cum. Supp. 1988) with IND. CODE
ANN. § 23-1-42-5 (Supp. 1988).
177. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-5 (Supp. 1988).
178. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2453(2), (3) (Cure. Supp. 1988). See supra text accompany-
ing notes 49-52.
179. See Cox, supra note 139, at 344-45 n.154 (arguing that an opt-out provision is prob-
ably not essential to constitutionality under CTS and that the statute would be
constitutional even if mandatory).
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other hand, arguably allows shareholders to change their minds after
initially denying voting rights. 8 0 Again, there is no reason to believe
that this would affect constitutionality. On balance, the voting rights
portion of the Nebraska Act, as applied to Nebraska corporations,
seems less restrictive than the statute approved in CTS and, therefore,
would be constitutional.
2. The Prohibition of Business Combinations
The business combination part of the Nebraska Act presents
greater constitutional difficulties. Its breadth and the inability of dis-
interested shareholders to override the ban cause serious preemption
and commerce clause concerns. The Act would probably not survive
under the analysis imposed by present case law.
a. Preemption
Indiana also has a prohibition against business combinations with
interested persons,'s' but that statute was not at issue in CTS, nor was
it discussed. Four lower court cases have reviewed the constitutional-
ity of business combination statutes since CTS. BNS, Inc. v. Koppers
Co.,182 RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc.,8 3 and City
Capitol Associates Limited Partnership v. Interco Inc.'8 4 upheld the
Delaware business combinations statute.185 RTE v. Mark IV Indus-
tries8 6 struck down the Wisconsin statute, 8 7 but was eventually va-
cated as moot.
The Delaware statute, which applies only to Delaware corpora-
tions, prohibits a variety of business combinations between a fifteen-
percent shareholder and the corporation for a three-year period after
the person becomes a fifteen-percent shareholder. There are three
main ways around the ban. First, business combinations approved by
the board before the person became an interested shareholder are not
prohibited. Second, the ban does not apply if the person becomes an
interested shareholder in an acquisition of at least eighty-five percent
of the outstanding voting stock, excluding stock owned by officers and
180. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-9 (Supp. 1988).
181. Id. §§ 23-1-43-1 to 23-1-43-15.
182. [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 93,730 (D. Del. Apr. 1,
1988).
183. [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,763 (D. Del. May 9,
1988).
184. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,079 (D. Del. Sept. 23,1988). This opinion will not be
discussed further because it merely adopts the reasoning of the other two Dela-
ware cases.
185. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1988).
186. No. 88-C-378 (E.D. Wis. May 6,1988), vacated as moot, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,789 (E.D. Wis. June 22, 1988).
187. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.726 (West Cum. Supp. 1988).
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certain employee stock ownership plans. Third, the interested share-
holder may proceed with business combinations approved by the
board after the person becomes an interested shareholder if the hold-
ers of two-thirds of the non-interested outstanding voting stock au-
thorize the transaction. In addition, among other exceptions, the
interested shareholder is freed from the ban when management ap-
proves a transaction with another person.
In BNS, the court's preemption analysis focused on the Delaware
statute's interference with tender offers. The court rejected Dela-
ware's argument that the statute was constitutional simply because it
did not directly affect the tender offer process. According to the court,
"[p]reventing states from unduly interfering with the tender offer it-
self but allowing them to deprive the tender offeror of perhaps the
most important fruit of gaining control, i.e., a business combination,
would permit a de facto frustration of the goals of the Williams
Act."188 Nevertheless, the court noted that even statutes which sub-
stantially deter tender offers do not circumvent Williams Act goals,
"so long as hostile offers which are beneficial to target shareholders
have a meaningful opportunity for success."18 9 The court found that
the three-year delay was not troublesome for preemption purposes
since the use of staggered boards, implicitly approved in CTS, delays
shifts of control for two years.190 Further, although the Delaware
statute tilts the balance in favor of management, it is still constitu-
tional "so long as it does not prevent an appreciable number of hostile
bidders from navigating the statutory exceptions."'19 1
The court noted that the exceptions might place a substantial bur-
den on would-be acquirors, but in the absence of hard evidence that
the exceptions were illusory, the court was unwilling to upset the Del-
aware legislature's judgment. According to the court:
The legislature's judgment is that those escapes, together with the exceptions
specified in subsection (b), allow offers beneficial to shareholders to proceed,
and thus save the statute from constitutional infirmity.
... [B]ecause the legislature presumably has balanced the countervailing
effects and found the degree of stockholder protection to offset potential harm
to stockholders, the Court concludes that the statute will be in all likelihood
constitutional and not preempted. If the method Delaware has chosen to pro-
tect stockholders in fact on balance harms them, then at that time reconsider-
188. BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., [1987-1988 transfer binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,730, at 98,401 (D. Del. Apr. 1, 1988).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 98,402.
191. Id. Given the court's prior determination that the three-year delay did not create
preemption problems, it is unclear why the exceptions matter at all. If the three-
year delay is itself consistent with the Williams Act, it should not matter whether
some offerors can use the exceptions to complete business combinations even
sooner.
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ation of the statute's congruence with the Williams Act will be warranted. 192
The preemption analysis in RP Acquistion was similar. The court
noted the conflict between the statute's protection of independent
shareholders and its deterrence of tender offers. According to the
court, the statute protects shareholders by discouraging coercive two-
tier tender offers or "all holders" offers followed by a freezeout of
nontendering shareholders. 93 On the other hand, the statute could
prevent a potential acquiror from quickly realizing synergistic gains
and could make it more difficult for a highly leveraged offeror to bor-
row funds to finance the offer.194 However, the court found that the
eighty-five percent ownership exception was sufficient to save the
statute from constitutional attack: "Certainly, Section 203 can be char-
acterized as a good faith effort by the General Assembly to comply
with the Constitution and specifically with the CTS decision. Given
our independent analysis of the 85 percent exception, we discern no
reason to disturb the balance the General Assembly struck."195
The Wisconsin statute imposes an absolute three-year ban on busi-
ness combinations between an interested shareholder and the corpora-
tion unless the combination is approved by the board of directors prior
to the interested shareholder's share acquisition date.196 After three
years, such business combinations are allowed if approved by a major-
ity vote of the disinterested shareholders or the combination passes a
multifaceted fair value test.197 In a brief opinion, the RTE court held
the Wisconsin law incompatible with the Williams Act's purpose of
promoting investor choice with respect to tender offers: "The Wiscon-
sin act does not promote investor choice and instead gives to the man-
agement of target companies a virtual veto power over the outcome of
a tender offer contest. The Wisconsin statute is the kind of parochial
economic protectionism that cannot stand."198
These cases create significant preemption problems for the Ne-
braska Act. The Nebraska Act is even less compatible with investor
choice than the Wisconsin statute because the Nebraska prohibition
lasts longer. As in the Wisconsin statute, the Nebraska Act gives tar-
get management the only real power to circumvent the ban, and thus
provides management with strong control over the outcome of tender
192. Id. at 98,403.
193. RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc., [1987-1988 transfer binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,763, at 98,575 (D. Del. May 9, 1988).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 98,578.
196. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.726(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1988).
197. See id, § 180.726(3). Such combinations also are allowed after three years if the
board of directors approved the interested shareholder's acquisition of stock in
advance of the acquisition.
198. RTE v. Mark IV Indus., No. 88-C-378 (E.D. Wis. May 6, 1988), vacated as moot,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,789 (E.D. Wis. June 22, 1988).
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offers. Management might even use the prohibition on business com-
binations to defend against tender offers supported by all of the share-
holders. The shareholders might elect a new board in such a case but,
because timing is often crucial in takeovers, such a change might come
too late. The Nebraska Act also does not contain any of the statutory
exceptions for shareholder approval which the Delaware courts found
arguably allowed offers beneficial to shareholders to proceed. Be-
cause there are no exceptions, the Nebraska Act would, in the words
of BNS, "permit a de facto frustration of the goals of the Williams
Act."199 Thus, assuming the preemption analysis of these lower court
cases is correct, the Nebraska Act probably is preempted by the Wil-
liams Act.
b. Commerce Clause
The Wisconsin case did not discuss the commerce clause challenge,
but both Delaware cases did, following the three-part analysis set
forth in CTS. Both cases recognized that the Delaware statute does
not discriminate against out-of-state offerors, and that it does not sub-
ject interstate activities to possibly inconsistent regulations since it
regulates only Delaware corporations.20 0
The two courts differed on the third test to be applied. The court
in BNS saw the third test as whether the statute "promote[s] stable
corporate relationships and protect[s] shareholders."20 1 The court be-
lieved that it did. The RP Acquisition opinion seemed understandably
confused about the third part of the CTS test. Noting that the full-
scale balancing test used in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 202 was seem-
ingly abandoned by CTS in cases where the state only regulates intra-
state corporate governance, the court nevertheless believed that the
Supreme Court was engaged in some sort of deferential balancing,
otherwise, its opinion would have ceased after discussing discrimina-
tion and inconsistent regulation. Thus, the court in RP Acquisition
felt a need to weigh the benefits of the statute against its effect on
interstate commerce. The court found CTS determinative. The Dela-
ware statute, like the Indiana statute, applies only to domestic corpo-
rations and serves the purpose of preventing the Delaware corporate
form from becoming a shield for unfair business dealings. 203 On the
burden side of the analysis, the court noted that given the exceptions
199. BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., [1987-1988 transfer binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
98,724, at 98,401 (D. Del. April 1, 1988).
200. Id. at 98,404. RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc., [1987-1988 transfer
binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,763, at 98,579 (D. Del. May 9, 1988).
201. BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Corp. [1987-1988 transfer binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,730, at 98,404 (D. Del. April 1, 1988).
202. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
203. RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc., [1987-1988 transfer binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,763, at 98,580 (D. Del. May 9, 1988).
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to the Delaware ban on business combinations, the plaintiff had failed
to prove that the Delaware statute would be any more restrictive of
tender offers than the Indiana Act.204
Applying this commerce clause analysis to the Nebraska Act is dif-
ficult. The Act does not directly discriminate against out-of-state of-
ferors and, as limited to Nebraska corporations, there is no danger of
inconsistent regulation. But the balancing test creates problems. BNS
asks only whether the statute promotes stable corporate relationships
and protects shareholders. If one accepts the argument that two-tier
takeovers are coercive and harmful to shareholders (as the Supreme
Court did in CS), the Nebraska Act's five-year ban on business com-
binations, which deters such takeovers, protects shareholders. The
Nebraska Act, therefore, would pass the BNS commerce clause test.
The court in RP Acquisition purported to balance the statute's
costs and benefits, albeit quite deferentially. The Nebraska Act might
limit the number of tender offers for covered corporations, but the
court correctly read CTS as saying that such a deterrent effect does
not by itself make a state statute unconstitutional. The court hinted
that the statute would be unconstitutional if the plaintiff could prove
that it "virtually precludes all hostile tender offers, and thereby bur-
dens interstate commerce in the extreme."205 The court, referring to
its discussion of the statutory exceptions, held that the plaintiff had
failed to prove that. However, it might be easier for a plaintiff to show
that the Nebraska Act, with no major exceptions, precludes most
tender offers.
It is at least arguable that CTS defers absolutely to state corpora-
tion laws, absent some discrimination against interstate commerce.2 06
Unlike MITE, CTS did not explicitly balance the Indiana Act's puta-
tive benefits against its impact on interstate commerce.2 07 CTS did not
cite Pike, and the only reference to balancing is a quotation from
MITE rejecting a state's interest in regulating out-of-state corpora-
tions.208 Justice Scalia's concurrence suggests that he believed the
majority was engaged in some sort of balancing,209 but the majority
never explicitly balanced. Professor Cox argues that the majority
merely "pays lip service" to the balancing test and that the case "is
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Langevoort, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A Com-
ment on CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 101 HARV. L. REV. 96, 100-03;
Cox, supra note 139, at 360-61.
207. For good discussions of the CTS Court's treatment of the balancing test, see
Langevoort, supra note 206, at 100-01, 104-10; Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine;
(II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MIcH. L. REv. 1864, 1866-68 (1987).
208. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1651 (1987).
209. See supra note 135.
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properly viewed as undermining, if not abandoning, the notion that
the dormant commerce clause requires a balancing analysis." 210
Professors Regan and Langevoort, although they do not agree as to
what the majority is doing in CTS, both concur that no balancing is
involved.21 1 A state is free to define the corporate entities it creates as
it feels wise, as long as it regulates only its own corporations, and
whether or not such laws decrease tender offers is irrelevant to com-
merce clause analysis. As Professor Cox argues, "[t]he fundamental
point made by the Court's opinion in CTS Corp. is that the wisdom of
the Indiana Control Shares Statute is an irrelevancy for constitutional
purposes."2 2 Assuming this view is correct, the Nebraska Act's five-
year prohibition of business combinations, as limited to Nebraska cor-
porations, probably survives the commerce clause challenge. How-
ever, a recent Supreme Court case casts doubt on these conclusions.
In Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc.,213 the Court
considered a challenge to an Ohio statute that tolled the statute of
limitations against foreign corporations which had not appointed an
Ohio agent for service of process. The Court overturned the statute
after expressly balancing the local interest advanced by the statute
against the burden imposed on interstate commerce.2 1 4 However, the
Court's only reference to CTS was in discussing direct discrimination
and inconsistent regulation.21 5 It is therefore unclear whether the
Bendix opinion recognizes state corporation statutes as being subject
to a full balancing test.
c. Legislative Purpose
One might argue that the Nebraska Act, even if otherwise permis-
210. Cox, supra note 139, at 357, 360-61.
211. See Langevoort, supra note 206, at 100-01; Regan, supra note 207, at 1866-68.
Langevoort hypothesizes that one reason the Court refused to engage in balanc-
ing may be that there was no evidentiary record on the effects of the statute or its
motivation, leaving a later court free to distinguish CTS if the plaintiff presents a
compelling factual showing on these questions. Langevoort, supra note 206, at
103 n.45. Langevoort also believes that balancing would have raised exceedingly
difficult questions of federalism in corporate law:
The Court saw before it a disturbingly slippery slope: if it mandated a
balancing approach simply because of the extraterritorial effects of the
statute, it would open up all corporate law principles to similar chal-
lenge. Subjecting all of corporate law to such a balancing test would be
an imposing task at best.... The effort would hardly be appealing to a
Court committed to maintaining a separation between the federal and
state spheres of influence in matters of corporate law.
Id- at 106.
212. Cox, supra note 139, at 362.
213. 108 S. Ct. 2218 (1988).
214. Id. at 2220-23. Justice Scalia again strongly disagreed with the Court's use of a
balancing test. Id. at 2223-24 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
215. Id. at 2222.
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sible, is unconstitutional because it was adopted for an impermissible
purpose-to prevent the movement of assets and jobs from Nebraska
to other states.21 6 Professor Regan sees the CTS discrimination analy-
sis as focusing on the purpose of the statute rather than its effect.217
According to Professor Regan, if the Indiana legislature's sole purpose
was to prevent the removal of corporate operations from Indiana, the
statute would violate the commerce clause.218 The Indiana Act's re-
quirement of additional contacts with Indiana other than incorpora-
tion in Indiana strongly supports the argument that Indiana was
motivated by a desire to prevent corporate relocations to other states.
If Indiana's concern was solely to protect the shareholders of Indiana
corporations, these further requirements would be unnecessary.21 9
The additional contacts required by the statute suggest that "Indiana
sought to reward incumbent managements that agreed to engage in
significant economic activity within Indiana by protecting them from
offerors identifiable with economic activity outside the state."220
However, the majority opinion in CTS focused on the burden of the
statute rather than the legislative motivation underlying it: "Because
nothing in the Indiana Act imposes a greater burden on out-of-state
offerors than it does on similarly situated Indiana offerors, we reject
the contention that the Act discriminates against interstate com-
merce."221 Although Professor Regan's reading of the words "simi-
larly situated" is ingenious,222 this passage clearly focuses on the effect
of the statute. The CTS majority did not examine the possible purpose
of advantaging local workers and suppliers. The only court to have
considered the question with respect to an antitakeover statute con-
cluded that legislative motive was irrelevant. 223 Thus, if one of the
216. Hearings, supra note 35, at 48. (Statement of Sen. Hartnett)('"rhis bill is just one
of more provisions to encourage businesses that are looking at Nebraska to locate
... here"). Actually, there is little expression in the legislative record of purely
protectionist motives, although an undercurrent of protectionist sentiment per-
vades the legislative discussions of the attempts to take over Goodyear and En-
ron. See ifra text accompanying notes 327-33.
217. Regan, supra note 207, at 1869-73.
218. Id. at 1871-72. See also Comment, Beyond CTS: A Limited Defense of State
Tender Offer Disclosure Requirements, 54 U. CM. L. REv. 657, 675 (1987)('Thile
it is no doubt in a state's interest to keep within its borders the economic and
intangible benefits that responsible corporations provide, such protectionism
seems to be precisely what the commerce clause was intended to prevent").
219. Langevoort, supra note 206, at 106-07; Cox, supra note 139, at 341-42.
220. Cox, supra note 139, at 342.
221. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1649 (1987).
222. See Regan, supra note 207, at 1870.
223. BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., [1987-1988 transfer binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,730, at 98,404 (D. Del. April 1, 1988). ("Indications that the stated purpose of
the statute may not wholly conform with the legislature's true motives, however
strong, must be ignored where the statute does accomplish the stated purpose.").
The court found the legislative history of the Delaware statute to be mixed, focus-
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Nebraska Legislature's motives was to keep businesses in Nebraska,
this would not in and of itself render the Nebraska Act
unconstitutional.
V. IS THE ACT GOOD POLICY?
The Nebraska Act is designed to chill hostile takeovers in two
ways. The control-share provision is designed to make it easier for
target management and shareholders to defend against hostile take-
overs, primarily by giving them more time to react and by placing an
additional cost on tender offers. Both the control-share provision and
the business combination provision are designed to make the prize-
control of the target company-less valuable to the bidder. They limit
what a successful bidder may do with the corporate assets. The Legis-
lature's adoption of the Act was premised on a belief that hostile cor-
porate takeovers are bad-for the target shareholders, for the state,
and for the nation's economy. This section begins with a review of the
purported benefits of hostile tender offers, followed by a review of the
major arguments made in opposition to hostile tender offers and in
favor of the Nebraska Act. This analysis shows that most of the argu-
ments against allowing a free market for hostile takeovers are wrong.
Furthermore, the Nebraska Act aoes little to correct the purported
abuses pointed to by the critics.
A. The Arguments for Takeovers
1. Disciplining Inefficient Management
One of the benefits of hostile takeovers is that they give target
shareholders a way to discipline and control the management of the
target corporation in situations where other control mechanisms fail.
To understand this point, it is first necessary to briefly review the
problem of managerial inefficiency and why other controls on such
inefficiency do not always work.
The opportunities for managerial inefficiency fall into two catego-
ries, 224 which will be called productive inefficiency and allocative inef-
ficiency. The residual return ultimately going to a corporation's
shareholders can be visualized as a two-part path (See Figure A.). The
first part of the path represents the economic return on the corpora-
tion's assets, after paying all costs economically associated with pro-
ducing that income. The second part of the path represents how much
of that return actually benefits the shareholders, either in the form of
ing both on shareholder welfare and on the possible losses of corporate franchise
taxes and fees to other states. Id. 98,404 n.31.
224. This categorization, but not the terminology, appears in Gilson, A Structural Ap-
proach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33
STAN. L. REv. 819, 836-40 (1981).
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FIGURE A
Return on Assets Return to Shareholders
Assets ---------- > I CORPORATION ---------------- >Shareholders
Productive Allocative
Inefficiency Inefficiency
dividends or retained earnings. Productive inefficiency is a failure to
maximize the first path-a failure to achieve the best possible return
in the product market on the corporation's assets. Allocative ineffi-
ciency is a failure to maximize the second path. Allocative inefficiency
does not involve a below-market return on the corporation's assets.
The assets might earn as high a rate of return as they could if deployed
by any other management, but a portion of that return is diverted to
management and not shared with the shareholders. Management may
deal with the corporation in an unfair manner (self-dealing), may pro-
vide itself luxurious perquisites, or may pay itself above-market com-
pensation.2 2 5 Allocative inefficiency gives managers a noncompetitive
return for their services and confiscates value that might otherwise go
to the shareholders. Management has an incentive to engage in such
allocative inefficiency because management does not fully share in the
returns to shareholders but receives the full benefit of such diversions.
Both forms of managerial inefficiency reduce the return to share-
holders and thereby reduce the value of shareholders' investments.
The possibility of a hostile takeover helps shareholders to control such
inefficiency.22 6 Either form of inefficiency causes the price of the cor-
poration's stock to fall. This creates an opportunity for en-
trepreneurial profit. An outsider could purchase a controlling interest
in the corporation at this reduced market price, or at some premium
price between the depressed market price and the stock's value with
225. Ordinary, competitive benefits and compensation to management are part of the
cost of producing the income and are, therefore, legitimate deductions from gross
economic income in determining the size of the first stream. It is only the pay-
ment of compensation in excess of the market value of the manager's services
that constitutes allocative inefficiency. The model admittedly leads to some cate-
gorization difficulties, but it is nevertheless adequate to convey the idea that man-
agerial inefficiency is not merely suboptimal productive performance.
226. Many authors have discussed the disciplinary effects of hostile takeovers. The
seminal work is Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL.
ECON. 110 (1965). See also Gilson, supra note 224, at 841-845; Easterbrook & Fis-
chel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer,
94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1173-74 (1981); Coffee, Regulating the Marketfor Corpo-
rate Control" A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Gov-
ernance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145,1163-66 (1984).
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efficient management, and use the resulting control of the corporation
to install new, more efficient managers. The additional return earned
by the corporation under these more efficient managers would in-
crease the price of the corporation's stock, producing a profit for the
takeover entrepreneur.227
This process tends to move corporate assets from the hands of less
efficient managers into the hands of more efficient managers. Even
shareholders whose corporation is not subject to a bid are benefitted
by the general deterrent effect of hostile takeovers. Managerial ineffi-
ciency is constrained by the threat that a hostile takeover could occur
and managers would lose their jobs.228
Obviously, the hostile takeover does not prevent all managerial
inefficiency. As Professor Coffee points out, the tender offer operates
as a disciplinary mechanism only within a limited range of inefficient
companies:
Basically, this range is bounded, on the one end, by the bidder's level of risk
aversion and, on the other, by the minimum premium necessary to acquire
control. Companies in which the level of inefficiency is either not extreme
enough to justify the necessary premium or so extreme as to surpass the bid-
der's level of risk aversion fall outside this range and may therefore be only
weakly disciplined by the market for corporate control.2 2 9
Many minor instances of managerial inefficiency or self-dealing
will not produce a significant enough discount in the company's stock
price to justify the substantial premiums being offered. However, it is
clear that hostile takeovers have at least some beneficial deterrent ef-
fect on management inefficiency. The full extent of that deterrent
effect cannot be quantified. There is no way to measure the extent to
which the threat of a hostile takeover causes management to modify
227. Professor Lowenstein questions the efficient market hypothesis upon which this
analysis is based. Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Pro-
posal for Legislation, 83 CoLuM L. REv. 249, 268-306 (1983). Lowenstein's views
on the efficiency of the stock markets are not shared by most scholars. See eg.,
R. GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcQUISMONS 156-57 (1986)(the
efficient capital market hypothesis has been the leading success story of modern
finance theory); Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Eff-
ciency, 6 J. FIN. EcON. 95, 96 (1978)("there is no other proposition in economics
which has more empirical evidence supporting it than the efficient market hy-
pothesis"). Lowenstein's reliance on accounting data, such as reported earnings,
renders his analysis suspect. Such data is easily manipulated by a corporation's
management and, because of its reliance on historical cost, often does not reflect
true economic values and returns. See, e.g., R. GILSON, supra, at 382. For an ex-
cellent criticism of the view that the market is inefficient, see Coffee, supra note
226, at 1170-73. Professor Coffee points out that even if the inefficient market
view is correct, takeovers still will be beneficial in curbing managerial ineffi-
ciency. Id. at 1171-73.
228. Coffee, supra note 226, at 1192.
229. Id. at 1204.
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its behavior; only the cases where hostile tender offers actually occur
can be observed.
Even if hostile takeovers effectively discipline management, how-
ever, they are desirable only if less expensive and equally effective
controls on managerial inefficiency are not available. There are sev-
eral other mechanisms that might control managerial inefficiency.
These include the shareholder's power to replace the directors, the use
of outside monitors, litigation asserting violations of fiduciary duty,
compensation schemes, competition in the market for the company's
products, and competition in the market for managerial services. A
close analysis of each of these other mechanisms reveals that none ef-
fectively checks management inefficiency. Thus, the hostile takeover
is a necessary device to protect shareholders.
The primary problem with the election process is the lack of share-
holder incentives to adequately monitor management.230 It is expen-
sive to monitor management performance, and no single shareholder
receives most of the gains from monitoring. The cost for a particular
shareholder to monitor the corporation's performance often exceeds
the gain to be expected from changing management when inefficiency
is discovered, even assuming for the sake of argument that such a
change of management would be costless. It is usually in the share-
holder's self-interest to forego monitoring and simply sell his shares if
he is dissatisfied with management's performance.
Assume, nevertheless, that an individual made the investment nec-
essary to monitor and detect managerial inefficiency. How is that
shareholder to use the election process to stop the inefficiency and
force value-maximizing behavior? A shareholder attempting to do
anything about inefficient management once it is discovered faces the
same collective action problem that inhibits discovery of such behavior
in the first place. The other shareholders would be persuaded to oust
existing management only if they too were convinced of the ineffi-
ciency, and they would have to invest a significant amount of time to
study the corporation's performance. The cost of examining the dissi-
dent shareholder's claims, like the cost of monitoring, is likely to ex-
ceed the possible benefit to each shareholder of a change in
management. Each shareholder will recognize that he cannot affect
the outcome of the election and, therefore, will not invest in the cost
of judging the corporation's performance, freeriding instead on the ef-
forts of others. Each shareholder's self-interest thus leads him to ig-
nore the dissident's claims and to side with existing management by
default.
In addition, existing management's control of the proxy machinery
and its ability to use corporate funds to support its goals stack the deck
230. Easterbrook & Fischel, suprm note 226, at 1171.
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against dissident shareholders. The dissident must pay for the fight
himself and will limit expenses to the discounted expected gain from a
change of control. Management, however, is basically free to bombard
the shareholders with pro-management material at corporate ex-
pense.23 ' It is not surprising that dissidents seldom win proxy
fights.232
Shareholders might respond to the freeriding problem by estab-
lishing a separate mechanism to monitor management so that no sin-
gle shareholder bears the expense. However, as Professor Gilson
points out, "hiring yet another team of monitors merely recreates the
problem one level removed." 23 3 In theory, this is the traditional func-
tion of the board of directors. The shareholders elect the directors to
oversee the performance of the corporation and correct any inefficien-
cies. Boards have been notoriously unsuccessful in performing this
monitoring function, partially because of management's cooptation of
the board through control of the proxy machinery. 234 In practice, it is
management, and not the shareholders, that selects the board, and one
can hardly expect vigilant monitoring when the monitor is chosen by
the monitored.
Litigation is another alternative for a shareholder seeking to stop
managerial inefficiency, but litigation is unlikely to help. Courts tra-
ditionally have been reluctant to supervise productive inefficiency, in-
voking the business judgment rule to protect management from all
but the most egregious mismanagement. Although some courts have
toughened their duty of care review recently, the most that such cases
seem to require is an adequate paper trail supporting management de-
cisions.23 5 These recent cases do not adequately protect shareholders
from informed incompetence. Courts also have been reluctant to in-
231. See, e.g., Levin v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
Lock Manufacturing Cos. v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 80 (D. Conn. 1964); Ro-
senfield v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168,128 N.E.2d 291 (1955).
See generally W. FLETcHER, supra note 131, § 2052.3 (discussing the general rule
that the board of directors may send out proxies at the expense of the corporation
and the pro-management implications of the rule).
232. The Nebraska Act does not recognize these disparities but rather reinforces
them. An acquiring person seeking control must endure a special meeting and
undoubtedly a proxy fight to obtain full voting rights or to obtain advance ap-
proval of a planned business combination.
233. Gilson, supra note 224, at 835. As Alchian and Demsetz ask, "who will monitor
the monitor?" Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777, 782 (1972).
234. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIs 139-48
(1976); Gelfond & Sebastian, Reevaluating the Duties of Target Management in a
Hostile Tender Offer, 60 B.U.L. REv. 403, 464-65 (1980). But see Coffee, supra
note 226, at 1202-03 (arguing that a "minimally independent board" would replace
inefficient management before a hostile bidder could detect or respond to the
inefficiency).
235. See Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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terfere with at least one form of allocative inefficiency-the amount of
compensation going to managers.23 6 Courts have been more willing to
review other forms of allocative inefficiency such as self-dealing and
the taking of corporate opportunities, but these are only the most bla-
tant forms of allocative inefficiency, and the limitations imposed on
managers by the self-dealing rules still leave great latitude for
inefficiency.
Martin Lipton argues that the rise of institutional investors makes
these traditional mechanisms of corporate governance more effec-
tive.23 7 He argues that institutional investors possess both a signifi-
cant stake in corporate governance, because of the size of their
holdings, and the skills necessary to assert their influence. The size of
the institutional investor's holdings increases the benefits of interven-
tion, but it is still generally in the institutional investor's best interest
to sell rather than to work for change through the voting process. In-
cumbent management's control of the proxy machinery poses substan-
tial obstacles even to institutional investors. 238 The other investors
whom the institutional investors would have to persuade to throw out
the incumbents would still have no incentive to invest their time and
money to evaluate the competing claims. Thus, the presence of insti-
tutional investors may lessen the problems of shareholder action, but
those problems are not eliminated. Even a large institutional investor
is still dealing with a deck stacked against it.239
Shareholders might also try to control management by carefully
structuring management's compensation to provide incentives for effi-
cient performance. Managers can be given bonuses, stock options, and
other incentive plans pegged to the performance of the corporation.
Such devices help bring managerial incentives closer to shareholders'
interests, but they are imperfect. For one thing, they do little to con-
236. See, eg., Broski v. Jones, 614 S.W.2d 300 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Heller v. Boylan, 262
A.D. 1020,29 N.Y.S.2d 653 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941); Murrell v. Elder-Beerman Stores
Corp., 16 Ohio Misc. 1, 239 N.E.2d 248 (1968). Courts have been more willing to
review executive compensation and perquisites in close corporations, recognizing
that such compensation can be used in lieu of dividends to reward the controlling
shareholders and freeze out the other shareholders. See, ag., Wilderman v. Wild-
erman, 315 A.2d 610 (Del. Ch. 1974); Newton v. Hornblower, Inc., 224 Kan. 506,
582 P.2d 1136 (1978); Lynch v. Patterson, 701 P.2d 1126 (Wyo. 1985). However, the
problems of shareholder coordination and incentives to monitor are less extreme
in close corporations.
237. Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L.
REv. 1, 67-69 (1987).
238. Lipton apparently recognizes this problem because he supports an amendment to
the federal securities laws to make the corporation's proxy machinery more ac-
cessible to large shareholders. Id. at 67-68.
239. In fact, the institutional investor may be even more likely to bail out without a
fight than other shareholders. See LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN SHAREHOLDER 60-
67 (1958).
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trol allocative inefficiency. Incentive compensation plans give manag-
ers some portion of every dollar gained by reducing allocative
inefficiency, but, unless managers get 100 percent of the gains, it is
always in management's self-interest to continue to receive the bene-
fits of allocative inefficiency. Every additional dollar of return to the
shareholders resulting from increased allocative efficiency is a dollar
out of management's pocket. If such plans do give managers all or
almost all of the gains, then the incentive compensation contract
merely sanctions the preexisting allocative inefficiency; it results in no
true gains to shareholders.
Compensation plans are also imperfect in stopping productive inef-
ficiency. Such plans depend on the firm's ability to determine the
marginal contribution of each manager to the overall performance of
the firm.240 It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine an individual
manager's effect on the performance of a large enterprise. In addition,
because the gains of increased performance go at least in part to the
shareholders, managers will not find it in their self-interest to fully
monitor each other.241
Competition in the product and managerial labor markets is also
an inadequate control on management. Competition in the markets
for the corporation's products will penalize a company with inefficient
management. 242 Ultimately, in a perfectly competitive market, an
inefficient corporation would be unable to keep up with its competi-
tors and would fail. Management would lose their jobs. One would
expect this possibility to constrain significant inefficiency. However,
because most product markets are not perfectly competitive, it is pos-
sible for a corporation to survive despite some management ineffi-
ciency. The product market only insures that the most inefficient
companies will go out of business. Moderate productive inefficiency
will not be deterred. Even if competition in the product market forces
out inefficient companies, this is slight comfort to shareholders whose
investments are lost. Shareholders need a mechanism to promote effi-
ciency before they lose their investments. Also, product market com-
petition is unlikely to constrain allocative inefficiency. Allocative
efficiency is solely a question of who receives the income and does not
involve a suboptimal return on the corporation's assets. A corporation
can compete successfully in the product market despite allocative
inefficiency. 243
The market for managers is another potential constraint on mana-
gerial inefficiency. 244 The corporation's performance is commonly
240. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 226, at 1172.
241. Id. at 1172-73.
242. Gilson, supra note 224, at 837.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 837-40.
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treated as a measure of managerial skills; corporate performance thus
affects a manager's mobility and future compensation. Managers will
want to increase the return to the corporation in order to increase the
future value of their own services. However, the disciplinary effect of
the managerial market is limited. First, managers will be worried
about the market for their future services only to the extent that they
anticipate leaving their present positions. If there is no mechanism to
force them out of their current jobs, competition in the market for
managerial services adds little additional incentive. Second, as Profes-
sor Gilson has pointed out, "[tihe buyers of managers for public corpo-
rations are, realistically, other managers." 245 Even if the market for
managers penalizes productive inefficiency, other managers have little
incentive to penalize allocative inefficiency. High pay and perquisites
are likely to be seen by these other managers as part of the game. A
manager may also find that the discounted expected value of the fu-
ture loss of compensation due to labor market discipline is less than
the present value of the compensation diverted from the corporation's
shareholders.
The failure of these other control mechanisms makes the tender
offer extremely important in protecting shareholders from manage-
ment inefficiency. The Nebraska Act, therefore, bears the burden of
showing that the obstructions it places in the way of tender offers are
worth the cost. The Act's potential effect on shareholder welfare is
multiple. Even if the Act results in an increased premium to target
shareholders when successful tender offers are made, one also must
consider its effects on both the incidence of tender offers and the like-
lihood of tender offers succeeding once made.246 Professor DeMott,
commenting on the European restrictions on shareholder voting
rights-particularly those rules limiting a single owner's voting power
to a stated percentage-concludes: The experience on the European
continent with restrictions on the voting power of shares demon-
strates that such restrictions can effectively preclude the appearance
of hostile bids."247
245. Id. at 839.
246. See Coffee, supra note 226, at 1183-86 (an economic analysis of these conflicting
effects with respect to shark repellent amendments). Professor Coffee concludes
that the net effect of this tradeoff on shareholders is indeterminate. For an ear-
lier analysis of the net effect of the Williams Act and first generation state an-
titakeover statutes on shareholders, see Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 2 at 404.
Professors Jarrell and Bradley conclude that such legislation, although it in-
creased the premiums paid in successful tender offers, also reduced the incidence
of tender offers and not just those tender offers which left nontendering share-
holders with lower share values.
247. DeMott, Comparative Dimensions of Takeover Regulation, 65 WAsH. UJ..Q. 69,
79 (1987).
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2. Achieving Synergistic Gains
Another possible social benefit of takeovers is the possibility of
synergistic gains-gains in performance due to factors other than the
replacement of inefficient target management. Synergy is merely a
label applied to combinations where the value of the combined com-
pany exceeds the sum of the values of the two companies individually.
Synergistic gains can result from a number of factors-economies of
scale, reduced capital or borrowing costs, and product complementar-
ity.248 Such synergistic gains represent true increases in social value;
the same assets are producing more goods for the same price or the
same amount of goods for a cheaper price. Takeovers, therefore, are
beneficial to society if the synergistic gains outweigh the other costs
associated with the takeover.249
B. The Arguments for Regulation
Critics argue that hostile takeovers produce a number of socially
undesirable effects. They claim that target shareholders are unfairly
coerced into accepting offers at a price below the intrinsic value of the
target. They claim that takeovers lead to excessive corporate debt and
a focus on short-term profits rather than on long-term capital invest-
ment or research and development. They argue that hostile takeovers
have an adverse effect on the local communities in which target com-
panies are located and on employees, creditors, suppliers, and custom-
ers of the target. They argue that hostile takeovers are little more
than economically inefficient empire-building by the bidder.
Although these arguments have popular appeal, a closer look shows
that corporate takeovers on the whole are beneficial. Furthermore,
any problems that may exist are not solved by the Nebraska Act.
1. Preventing the Coercion of Target Shareholders
One of the arguments frequently made against takeovers and in
support of provisions such as those in the Nebraska Act is that share-
holders are coerced into accepting tender offers that do not fairly com-
pensate them for the "intrinsic value" of the company. Shareholders
would be better off under existing management, the argument goes,
but are unable to resist the pressures to tender.
The weak form of the shareholder coercion argument focuses on
two-tier offers, where the bidder offers a premium price for a control-
ling interest (usually fifty-one percent), then after obtaining control
248. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARv. L. REv.
1028, 1031-32 (1982); Coffee, supra note 226, at 1166-67.
249. The term "costs" is used loosely here to include not only the transaction costs
incurred in combining the two companies but also any other social costs caused by
the takeover that are not merely redistributions of wealth.
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engages in a merger to cash out the remaining shareholders at a lower
price. For example, assume that the pre-offer market price of the tar-
get stock was $30 per share. The bidder makes a tender offer for fifty-
one percent of the target's stock at a premium price of $40 per share
and announces that, upon obtaining control, the acquiring company
will enter into a cashout merger with the target in which the remain-
ing forty-nine percent of the shares will receive $18 per share. If the
bidder does not receive tenders for fifty-one percent of the stock, he
will not purchase any stock. The shareholder has to choose whether
or not to tender. In the case of most shareholders, the probability that
the tender offer will succeed is only slightly affected by their individ-
ual choice; therefore, they may ignore the effect of their individual
choice on the probability that the tender offer will succeed and take
the probability of success as a given. With that assumption, it is al-
ways in each shareholder's self-interest to tender his shares if the
first-tier price exceeds the second-tier price, no matter how low the
average, blended price of the offer.
The individual shareholder's decision is diagrammed in Figure B.
If he decides to tender and the offer fails, he keeps his stock, which
presumably will fall back to the pre-offer price of $30 per share.2 0 If
he decides not to tender, and the offer fails, the result is the same.
Thus, if the offer ultimately fails, it makes no difference to the share-
holder whether or not he tendered.251 If the shareholder tenders his
stock and the offer succeeds, he receives either $40 per share or some
pro rata blend of $40 per share and $18 per share, depending on
whether or not the offer is oversubscribed. This value will always be
higher than the second-tier cashout amount he receives if he does not
tender ($18 per share). Thus, no matter what the probability of suc-
cess, and no matter what the second-tier price-as long as it is less
than the tender offer price-the shareholder should tender.252 If the
shareholders behave rationally, they will all tender, and the offer will
succeed even though the blended price to the shareholders in the ex-
ample would be only $29 per share, which is less than the value of the
shares if the shareholders did not tender and the offer failed. The
250, Whether the stock actually falls to the pre-offer price or remains at some higher
price if the tender offer does not succeed does not matter in evaluating the weak
form of the coercion argument.
251. This conclusion is dependent on the assumption that the bidder does not purchase
any shares if the desired 51 percent is not tendered. If the bidder is willing to
purchase tendered shares even when he does not succeed in getting control, the
balance is tipped even more in favor of tendering. The shareholder would then
receive $40 per share if he tendered and the offer failed. In that scenario, the
assumption that the stock price falls to its pre-offer level after an unsuccessful
tender offer is crucial. If not, the shareholder may have a greater incentive not to
tender.
252. This proposition can be proven mathematically. Assume the following variables:
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problem is that shareholders cannot coordinate their response in de-
ciding whether to tender and, therefore, are unable to affect the
probability of success. Because of this coordination problem, the of-
feror has coerced the shareholders into accepting less than market
value for their shares.
Front-end loaded, two-tier tender offers have never constituted a
large part of the total number of tender offers and are even less preva-
lent today than in the past.25 3 Thus, the two-tier bid is simply not a
major problem. However, Professor Bebchuk points out that tender
offers might be unfairly coercive even where there is no second-tier
cashout.2 4 He notes that a successful bidder can decrease the value of
the minority's continued investment even without cashing them out
T = Tender offer price,
S = Second-tier price in cashout merger of minority shareholders,
M = Pre-offer market price,
p = Probability that the tender offer will succeed,
(l-p) = Probability that the tender offer will fail.
Make the same assumptions that are made in the text:
1. T> S,
2. p is independent of the individual shareholder's decision to tender,
3. The market price after an unsuccessful tender offer is equal to the pre-
offer price (M).
To simplify the calculations, assume the worst-case scenario for the tendering
shareholders. If the offer succeeds, 100 percent of the shareholders will tender,
so that each shareholder receives the lowest possible blended price.
The expected value of not tendering is then pS + (1-p)M. The expected
value of tendering is then p(.51T + .49S) + (1-p)M. The proposition to be
proven is that
p(.51T + .49S) + (1-p)M > pS + (1-p)M
Subtracting the common term from both sides of the equation yields:
p(.51T + .49S) > pS
Simplifying
.51pT + .49pS > pS
Subtracting .49pS from each side yields:
.51pT > .51pS
Dividing each side of the equation by the common factors (.51p) yields:
T >S.
Because this is true by definition, the equation is proven. The expected value of
tendering is greater than the expected value of not tendering.
253. Langevoort, supra note 206, at 105; Lipton, supra note 237, at 19. Lipton argues
that there is no guarantee that this technique will remain dormant, but if there is
a resurgence of two-tier tender offers, the problem can be met legislatively at
that time. Two-tier offers have subsided as the availability of junk bond financ-
ing has increased, suggesting that their primary function was not to coerce target
shareholders but to help finance larger takeovers where the offeror could not
afford to buy 100 percent of the stock initially.
254. Bebhuk, The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy, 12 DEL.
J. CoRP. L. 911, 917-31 (1987) [hereinafter The Pressure to Tender]; Bebchuk, To-
ward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 1693, 1708-33 (1985) [hereinafter Toward Undistorted Choice].
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FIGURE B
100% Tender 29
Offer succeeds
Offer fails
.0
(1 -p)
by operating the business to divert part of the target's profits to it-
self.2z5 This could lower the market value of the minority's shares
below the pre-offer market price. Professor Bebchuk also notes that
the acquirer might find it beneficial to defer the eventual takeout to a
later date because (1) inside information would help predict whether a
cashout merger would be profitable, and (2) the acquirer might be able
to manage the corporation in the interim period to manipulate the
eventual cashout price. Anticipation of a future cashout also would
decrease the market value of the minority's shares. Bebchuk thus ar-
gues that the acquirer's operation of the firm with continued minority
ownership could reduce the value of the shareholders' investment just
as much as a second-tier cashout.
In either case (cashout merger or continued operation), sharehold-
ers clearly suffer if the blended price is less than the pre-offer market
price of the company. In addition to unfairly compensating target
shareholders, this result is not economically efficient. The corpora-
tion ends up in the hands of a bidder who may value its assets less
than their market value under existing management. The assets do
not necessarily go to the highest-value user. In the example above, the
255. Toward Undistorted Choice, supra note 254, at 1711-13.
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offeror would pay a total acquisition price of $29 per share even
though the market valued the company at $30 per share in the hands
of existing managment. Almost everyone would concede that the
takeover is not beneficial. However, such a result is unlikely. On av-
erage, shareholders in the second tier of two-tier tender offers receive
substantial premiums over the target stock's pre-offer market price.2 56
In many two-tier offers, the second-tier price is equivalent to or higher
than the tender offer price.257 Even if the successful offeror does not
cash out the minority, the minority shares continue to be valued at a
premium above the pre-offer market price.258 Any attempt to cash
out the minority at a price below the pre-offer market price would
almost invariably run afoul of the minority's appraisal rights.259 If the
bidder does not cash out the remaining minority, current fiduciary
duty law clearly allows the bidder to divert some value from the mi-
nority, and this diversion should lower the market price of the minor-
ity's shares. However, the tender offer price is on average about sixty
percent higher than the pre-offer market price of the target.260 As-
suming a first-tier offer for only fifty-one percent of the target's stock,
the acquirer would have to divert around sixty percent of the value
from the remaining shares before the blended price would be less than
the pre-offer market price. Although fiduciary duty review tolerates
some diversion of profits, it is unlikely to tolerate a diversion of this
magnitude. Thus, it is extremely unlikely that the blended price of a
tender offer would be less than the pre-offer price.
Bebchuk and others go beyond this weak form of the coercion ar-
gument and argue that tender offers are coercive and unfair to share-
holders even if the second-tier price (or the value of minority shares if
there is no cashout) 261 exceeds the pre-offer price.262 For example,
assume once again that the pre-offer market price of the target's stock
is $30 per share and the offeror offers to buy fifty-one percent of the
stock at a price of $40 per share. The second-tier price is $32 per share.
The blended price is now approximately $36 per share, well above the
original market price, but Bebchuk nonetheless argues that the target
shareholders are disadvantaged and that the existence of a blended
256. See Office of the Chief Economist, SEC, The Economics of Any-Or-All, Partial,
And Two-Tier Tender Offers (1985)(finding overall premiums in two-tier tender
offers in 1981-1984 averaging over 50 percent).
257. Gilson, supra note 224, at 861.
258. Bradley, Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control, 35 J.
Bus. 345, 360-365 (1980).
259. Bebchuk concedes this. See Toward Undistorted Choice, supra note 254, at 1709-
10.
260. Office of the Chief Economist, SEC, supra note 256; see also infra note 268.
261. For convenience, I will refer only to the second-tier price. The analysis is also
valid in situations where the acquirer continues to operate the firm without cash-
ing out the minority.
262. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 227, at 307-09; Lipton, supra note 237, at 18-19.
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above-market price does not insure that the corporation is going to a
more productive user.
The problem with Bebchuk's argument is that it presupposes an
inefficient stock market that does not properly value the target's
shares. The pre-offer market price reflects investors' estimates of the
target's value under the direction of existing management.2 63 Any of-
fer in which the blended price exceeds the pre-offer market price of
the stock should represent a return to a majority of the shareholders
in excess of the market valuation of the target in the hands of incum-
bent management. Such an offer, therefore, is both efficient, because
it is likely to place the corporation in the hands of a more productive
owner, and fair, because shareholders receive a return in excess of
their own collective valuation of the target.
Professor Bebchuk offers several arguments why this might not be
true, but on closer examination, each of these arguments is flawed.
First, Professor Bebchuk notes that target shareholders receive a
great deal of new information during the bid-market participants
evaluate the target more thoroughly, target management discloses
new plans and proposals, and investors draw inferences from the mak-
ing of the bid itself.264 Bebchuk argues that this new information will
cause target shareholders to increase their estimates of the independ-
ent target's value above the pre-offer market price. Even though the
bid is at a premium above the pre-offer market price, it may actually
be below the shareholders' revised valuation. To support his thesis,
Bebchuk points to a study by Professors Bradley, Desai, and Kim
showing that the market price of target stock remains significantly
higher than the pre-offer market price even after a tender offer is re-
jected.2 65 Bebchuk sees this data as evidence that tender offers cause
target shareholders to revalue their company; otherwise, the stock
should return to its pre-offer level. However, that same study indi-
cates that the reason for the continued higher price is the expectation
of another bid for the company. If no further bid is made, the price of
the target stock returns to its expected level within five years.266
Thus, the post-bid price is higher not because shareholders have reval-
ued the target, but because they expect another premium bid. If the
expected bid does not materialize, the shareholders' valuation of the
company under incumbent management returns to the expected level.
263. If the market price did not represent the true value of the target under existing
management, investors could profit by purchasing the company's shares at the
lower market price. Investors would have an incentive to make such purchases
until the market price equalled the "true value" of the shares. Thus, the market
price would quickly reach equilibrium.
264. The Pressure to Tender, supra note 254, at 928.
265. Id. at 929. See Bradley, Desai & Kim, The Rationale Behind Interfirm Tender
Offers: Information or Synergy?, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 183 (1983).
266. Bradley, Desai & Kim, supra note 265.
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This is inconsistent with Bebchuk's thesis. Under Bebchuk's thesis,
any revaluation should persist over time.267
Finally, it is difficult to envision revaluation during the course of
the offer of the magnitude that Bebchuk's thesis would require. Be-
cause the first-tier price averages over sixty percent above the pre-
offer market price, and second-tier premiums average over forty per-
cent above the pre-offer market price,268 the average blended price in
a fully prorated two-tier buyout is more than fifty percent above the
pre-offer price.269 It is hard to envision new information sufficient to
raise the value of the target stock to such an extent. Thus, even if
there is a revaluation, it is likely that the blended tender offer price
still exceeds the revalued price.
Professor Bebchuk also argues that even in the absence of new in-
formation, shareholders might rationally want to reject a bid above
their pre-offer valuation if they expect an even higher bid in the fu-
ture, either from the same bidder or from a competing bidder.270
However, if there is another potential bidder to whom the target is
more valuable, that other bidder could be expected to come forward
with a higher offer under the present rules, rather than let the first
bidder succeed. Assume that the pre-offer market price of the stock is
$50 per share. Offeror A makes a tender offer for fifty-one percent of
the stock at a price of $80 per share, and announces that he will cash
267. Bebchuk's reliance on any increased value resulting from plans and proposals put
forth by target management in defending against the takeover is troubling for
another reason. Such plans and proposals are a classic illustration of the effi-
ciency effects of hostile takeovers. Management's ability to come up with propos-
als to increase shareholder value indicates that management was operating
inefficiently prior to the tender offer. The tender offer has forced management
to operate more efficiently. Rules such as those set forth in the Nebraska Act
make tender offers less likely and, therefore, make such efficiency-increasing
plans and proposals less likely. This gives target management a strategic advan-
tage. Management may operate the company inefficiently, and propose efficient
operation only when a takeover appears imminent. Once the threat has passed,
the inefficient operation may resume at the expense of the shareholders. Given
this strategic possibility, it is unclear that shareholders would significantly re-
value their shares as a result of management proposals.
268. Office of the Chief Economist, SEC, supra note 256 (based on a study of over 200
successful tender offers during the period 1981-1984). Jarrell, Brickley & Netter
report a follow-up study by the Office of the Chief Economist of tender offers in
1985 and 1986 which found lower overall premiums, 37 percent in 1985 and 33.6
percent in 1986. See Jarrell, Brickley & Netter, The Marketfor Corporate Con-
trok The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. ECON. PERSPECTVES 49 (1988).
They also report an unpublished study by Jarrell and Poulsen finding overall
premiums of 30 percent for successful tender offers in the period from 1980 to
1985. Id. at 51. These lower figures would not significantly affect the conclusion
in the text.
269. This assumes a first-tier tender offer for 51 percent of the target's stock and
tender by 100 percent of the shareholders.
270. The Pressure to Tender, supra note 254, at 929-30.
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out the remaining forty-nine percent at a price of $50 per share. This
constitutes a blended price of approximately $65 per share. Now as-
sume, as Bebchuk does, that for some reason the pre-offer price was
below the true value of the target in the hands of existing manage-
ment, and that its actual value is $75 per share. The target sharehold-
ers would prefer to reject the below-value offer, but, according to
Bebchuk, would be coerced into accepting. However, the possibility of
competing bids makes this unlikely. A competing bidder would find it
profitable to make an offer with a blended price greater than $65 per
share but less than $75 per share. Thus, competition in the market for
control would gradually dissipate the supposed difference between the
true value of the firm and the price offered to the shareholders until
the two-tier, blended price equalled the shares' true value. This would
be true even if the company were worth $75 per share only in the
hands of existing management, because management itself would then
have an incentive to outbid Offeror A by means of a management
buyout (or any other investor would find it worth his while to buy the
stock and leave the existing management in power). Competition
should drive the bid price to a point where shareholders could not ra-
tionally expect a higher bid.271 The bidder to whom the target was
most valuable would offer the highest bid and the assets would go to
the highest-value user.
The Williams Act provides a minimum delay period of at least
twenty business days for competing bids to arise,272 and existing man-
agement has broad discretion under existing law to solicit additional
bids. Bebchuk concedes that the Williams Act delay period is often
sufficient to bring forth competing bids, and offfers no evidence that it
is ever insufficient.273 Professor Ruback has demonstrated that the
market for corporate acquisitions is competitive and that, in most
cases, the bid price exceeds that which could profitably be offered by
other bidders.274 Thus, the empirical evidence refutes Bebchuk's ar-
gument.275 If twenty business days is too short, the delay period can
271. See Lehn, Blackwell & Marr, The Economics of Leveraged Takeovers, 65 WASiL
U.L.Q. 163, 183-184 (1987); Lowenstein, supra note 227, at 307.
272. SEC Rule 14e-1(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1(a) (1987).
273. The Pressure to Tender, supra note 254, at 929.
274. Ruback, Assessing Competition in the Market for Corporate Acquisitions, 11 J.
FIN. ECON. 141 (1983).
275. Critics often point to situations in which an initial bid is rejected and sharehold-
ers later receive a higher bid. Three responses are appropriate. First, a later,
higher bid is more valuable to target shareholders only if it exceeds the present
value of the initial bid. Because of the delay between the bids, this is often not
the case. Second, the existence of such situations is itself evidence that share-
holders are able to reject inadequate initial bids under the existing legal rules.
No further legislation is needed to protect them. Finally, such arguments often
fail to account for general price changes during the time separating the two bids.
A superficially higher second bid may not be higher in real terms.
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be extended; no other legislation is needed.
Bebchuk contends that the initial offeror may have a strategic ad-
vantage that would prevent other bids from coming forward, thereby
lowering the price paid to target shareholders. He offers the following
example:
For example, consider a case in which both A, the first bidder, and B, another
potential offeror, value the target by $X per share, and B is aware of A's valu-
ation of the target. A has already incurred the transaction costs involved in
making a tender offer, and now B is considering whether to make these ex-
penditures and advance a rival bid. Because the transaction costs involved in
A's bid are sunk, A will be prepared to raise its bid for the target to anything
less than $X per share. Thus, to win a contest over the target, B will have to
bid $X per share in addition to spending the transaction costs involved in mak-
ing a bid. Consequently, B's rational decision will be not to enter into a con-
test with A, even though B's valuation of the target is the same as A's.27 6
There are two problems with this argument. First, Bebchuk as-
sumes that the second potential bidder is aware of the first bidder's
valuation of the target. This is unlikely to be true; tender offerors'
valuations of the target company are closely guarded and hard to esti-
mate. If B is not aware of A's valuation, it makes perfect sense for B
to bid in the hope that A places a lower value on the company than B
does. Second, Bebchuk assumes that both bidders place the same
value on the target. If B's valuation is higher than A's by at least the
amount of the transaction costs involved in making a second bid, B
would bid even if B knows A's valuation. If the two bidders do place
equal values on the target and B knows A's valuation, Bebchuk is cor-
rect that target shareholders may receive a lower price, but this is not
economically inefficient. Since the two valuations are equal, the tar-
get assets still end up in the hands of one of the two highest-value
users. The allocation of gains between the initial bidder and the
shareholders in this case is purely a distributional concern.277 Empiri-
cal studies indicate target shareholders fare quite well in this distribu-
tional game; it is typically the selling target shareholders rather than
the successful bidder who receive the greatest abnormal returns.278
Finally, Bebchuk argues that "the shareholders might believe that
the bidder's motive for making the bid was the possession of private
information that the target's shares were undervalued by the market;
and the shareholders might conclude that the target's accurate value
exceeds the offered acquisition price." 279 Bebchuk necessarily focuses
276. The Pressure to Tender, supra note 254, at 1036 n.45.
277. The highest-value bidder for any asset will never pay his full valuation to the
seller of that asset. He will only need to pay a slight increment above the price
offered by the next highest-value user. A sale is in the seller's best interests at
such a price, even though it allows the buyer to retain some of the gains, because
the seller has no other use of the asset which would provide as great a return.
278. See R. GILSON, supra note 227, at 441.
279. The Pressure to Tender, supra note 254, at 930.
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on private information of undervaluation because any publicly avail-
able information that the target stock was undervalued would result
in arbitrage and competitive tender offer bidding that would quickly
drive the offer price to the proper level. But why would a hostile bid-
der have private information that the target's stock is undervalued? If
there really is such information, surely the target's management has it
as well. They could release it publicly or to another bidder and force
the first bidder to pay a competitive price in an auction. The situations
where private information of undervaluation is most likely to exist are
in management buyouts or management-negotiated deals. In either
case, the bidder is likely to have access to inside information not avail-
able to the market. Yet, these situations are exempted from the Ne-
braska Act, leading one to question the Act's commitment to
protecting shareholders from receiving unfair compensation for their
shares.
The argument that shareholders are coerced into accepting unprof-
itable tender offers also disregards the presence of institutional inves-
tors and arbitrageurs who purchase substantial positions from existing
shareholders after the tender offer is made. As Gilson points out,
these arbitrageurs serve a valuable risk-taking function by allowing
risk-averse shareholders to sell at a favorable price without incurring
the risk that the tender offer will not succeed.280 However, they also
help protect against coercion of the target's shareholders. The coer-
cion argument is premised on the inability of target shareholders to
coordinate their response and negotiate with the offeror. Arbi-
trageurs, in concert with institutional investors, have much greater
bargaining power and much lower costs of coordination and coopera-
tion. Their cooperative response to tender offers makes coercion
much less likely.281
The discussion above points to a single conclusion: it is highly un-
likely that a tender offeror will be able to obtain control of a target
company, even in a two-tier offer, at a blended price below the actual
value to the target shareholders of their stock. Thus, the possibilities
of coercion or unfair treatment of target shareholders are negligible.
A final response to the shareholder coercion argument focuses on
the pre-offer price of the target stock. Assume that hostile tender of-
fers are coercive and unfairly compensate target shareholders. Inves-
280. Gilson, supra note 224, at 855-56.
281. Professor Bebchuk's arguments on this point are somewhat inconsistent. He ar-
gues that the intervention of arbitrageurs and other buyers should not matter
because no matter how many times the shares change hands, whoever holds them
at the moment of truth is faced with the same coerced decision. Toward Undis-
torted Choice, supra note 254, at 1727. However, in an earlier work, he admitted
that the existence of large shareholders who could take into account the effect of
their tender decision on the success of the offer would strengthen the bargaining
position of the target's shareholders. Bebchuk, supra note 248, at 1040.
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tors in the market are certainly aware of this, so they will discount the
price to account for the risk that they will be coerced into selling the
stock for less than fair value.28 2 The investor will pay a lower price
for the stock, with the difference between the price paid and the "ac-
tual value" being the discounted expected loss associated with the risk
of a coercive hostile takeover. Thus, shareholders would be fully com-
pensated for the risk of coercion when they purchase their stock.
They suffer no real loss when the "coercive" takeover actually
comes.
283
Professor Carney argues that hostile takeovers are unfair to some
shareholders even when the majority is not unfairly pressured into
deciding and the majority receives a blended price above its valuation
of the target company.284 Carney begins by assuming an upward-slop-
ing supply curve for the target shares. If the bidder wants majority
control, he sets the tender offer price at a level so that the price of-
fered equals or exceeds the valuation placed on the company by fifty-
one percent of the shareholders (See Figure C). However, this price is
necessarily lower than the valuation placed on the firm by the remain-
ing forty-nine percent of the shareholders due to the assumption that
the supply curve is upward-sloping. If the bidder can cash out these
other shareholders in a second-tier transaction at the same price, they
suffer "losses" equivalent to the shaded area in Figure C. These losses
may or may not be fully offset by the countervailing gains to share-
holders who sell for more than their reservation price (cross-checked
area in Figure C). If the loss to the minority exceeds the gain to the
majority, shareholders suffer a net loss. The problem with this argu-
ment is that if the minority losses really exceeded the majority gains,
the minority could buy out the majority by making a tender offer at a
higher price. Carney's argument is thus another example of the fail-
ure to consider the effects of competition-in this case competition
from the allegedly injured minority. Also, many successful tender of-
282. To the extent that this risk is diversifiable, as by purchasing the stock of acquir-
ing companies likely to receive the gains from any such coercion, the diversified
shareholder receives no net harm from any coercion, and no discount is neces-
sary. To the extent that such risk is not diversifiable, the risk should be reflected
in the price of the stock.
283. There may be some shareholders who purchased their stock before the advent of
hostile, two-tier takeovers. Since the risk was not known at the time of their
purchase, the price they paid for their stock was not discounted for that risk, and
they are losers if they are coerced into accepting a tender offer for less than fair
value.
284. See Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents, and Takeout
Mergers: The Case Against Fiduciary Duties, 1983 AM. B. FouND. REs. J. 341,
354-57 (1983) [hereinafter Shareholder Coordination Costs]; Carney, Fundamen-
tal Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders, and Business Purposes, 1980 AIM.
B. FouND. RES. J. 69, 112-15 (1980) [hereinafter Fundamental Corporate
Changes].
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fers are oversubscribed, indicating that the bidder does not set the pre-
mium at a level low enough to capture all of this value from the
minority. This reduces the minority losses, making it even more
likely that the majority's gains exceed the minority's losses. Finally,
unfairness or coercion of this sort is a necessary feature of majority (or
even supermajority) rule. Any majority shareholder action, whether
or not related to a hostile takeover, is capable of imposing such losses
on the minority. Carney's real objection is not to hostile takeovers but
to the long-standing notion of corporate governance by majority rule.
In any event, the Nebraska Act does little to prevent this type of coer-
cion. A majority of the shareholders can still approve an acquisition,
and the majority, through their control of the board, can even allow
the bidder to cash out the remaining shareholders.
Because shareholders are not unfairly coerced into accepting
tender offers, the Nebraska Act cannot be justified on that basis. But
what if tender offers are coercive-would the Nebraska Act protect
against such coercion? A tender offeror who wants full control of the
corporation must first receive a favorable vote from the shareholders
pursuant to sections 21-2450 and 21-2451 of the Act. If the sharehold-
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ers do not like an offeror's proposal, they can refuse to grant him vot-
ing rights. This would not stop him from acquiring the shares in a
tender offer, but a successful bidder would be unable to do a second-
tier transaction without approval from the other shareholders at some
point, either when they initially granted him voting rights or when
they approved the second-tier transaction. Thus, if the shareholders
felt that the second-tier transaction was unfair, they could simply vote
against it.285 The shareholder decision on voting rights would not af-
fect the value they would receive if the offer succeeded. Shareholders
could disapprove the voting rights, but still tender their shares and
capture the full value of the offer, should it succeed. This resembles
the separate vote on the success of the tender offer suggested by Pro-
fessor Bebchuk to eliminate what he sees as coercion.286
Of course, the Nebraska Act's voting rights limitation comes at a
cost. The costs are the additional time given to target management to
engage in obstructive tactics and the additional cost to the bidder of
extending his financing until shareholder approval is obtained. Ob-
structive tactics by target management are made even more likely by
the amendments to the duties of directors adopted as part of the same
bill.287 These amendments allow the directors of Nebraska corpora-
tions to consider the interests of the community, employees, and sup-
pliers in acting on behalf of the corporation. Now, in responding to
tender offers, the target directors need not even engage in the pre-
tense that obstruction of the offer is in the best interests of their
shareholders.288 The resulting deterrence of tender offers, and the
285. The initial vote on the voting rights of the control shares would not necessarily
constitute approval or disapproval of the second-tier transaction. However, the
federal tender offer rules would require disclosure of any second-tier transactions
planned at the time of the offer. See Schedule 13D, Item 4,17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101
(1987); Schedule 14D-1, Item 5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1987). The target share-
holders, with this information, presumably would deny full voting rights if they
felt that the blended price of the tender offer and the proposed second-tier trans-
action would provide less value to them than existing management's continued
operation of the corporation. This assumes that the tender offer is conditioned on
the receipt of full voting rights. If the tender offer is not so conditioned, the
shareholders would approve voting rights only if they felt that the second-tier
transaction would be more valuable to them than the offeror's operation of the
firm.
286. See Toward Undistorted Choice, supra note 254, at 1747-50. See also The Pressure
to Tender, supra note 254, at 931-35. Professor Bebchuk considers a separate
shareholder vote such as this only a second-best solution because it involves
higher transaction costs and results in greater delays than his proposal. See To-
ward Undistorted Choice, supra note 254, at 1757-59; The Pressure to Tender,
supra note 254, at 934-35.
287. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2035 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
288. Professor Gilson argues that an Indiana-type statute may actually make it more
difficult for target management to engage in defensive tactics to obstruct the
offer:
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loss of shareholder value that such deterrence is likely to cause, must
be balanced against any gains from reducing coercion. Because, as ar-
gued above, any coercion is minor, the net effect is undoubtedly
negative.
An additional problem with the Nebraska voting rights limitation,
even if one accepts the coercion argument, is that it does not stop the
successful offeror from penalizing non-tendering shareholders.
Bebchuk sees two ways in which the minority remaining after a par-
tial acquisition is penalized. The first way is by a second-tier cashout
at a below-value price. The Nebraska Act protects shareholders from
that strategy. The second way is by the acquiring person's continued
operation of the firm at the expense of the minority. The acquirer
could capture a disproportionate amount of the returns to itself
through self-dealing, above-market compensation, and other forms of
allocative inefficiency. Bebchuk argues that anticipation of this out-
come also coerces shareholders into tendering because allocative inef-
ficiency reduces the value of any shares not tendered.
The Nebraska Act does little to prevent such allocative inefficiency
by the acquiring person. Even without shareholder approval, the ac-
quiring person has the power to elect the board of directors and to
manage the corporation through the board. As long as the acquiring
person takes no extraordinary action requiring shareholder approval
(in which case the acquiring person would be ineligible to vote), the
acquiring person is free to divert benefits to himself, subject only to
A second advantage that a fifty day delay might provide target man-
agement is the chance to undertake defensive tactics that might cause
the acquirer to withdraw the offer before the vote. The problem with
this idea, however, is that a court would be hard pressed to justify man-
agement action that had the effect of interfering with the shareholders'
opportunity to approve an offer in a vote required by statute. Put in
terms of the current Delaware proportionality test, where a statute man-
dates a shareholder vote and effectively prohibits the offer unless the
shareholders approve it, what possible threat could be reasonably related
to precluding shareholders from voting in favor of the offer? Indeed,
even an action like a restructuring that purported to give the sharehold-
ers greater value might be problematic because management could have
presented the restructuring to shareholders as an alternative to the offer
and thereby not prejudiced the vote mandated by the statute.
R. G soN, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcQUIsrIoNs 197 (Supp.
1987)(citation omitted). The problem with this argument in the context of the
Nebraska Act is that it assumes a standard for director action that focuses solely
on the interests of the shareholders. If this is the standard, Gilson is correct that
actions by directors to prevent shareholders from voting on the offer are prob-
lematic. However, as a result of the amendments to section 21-2035, that is no
longer the standard in Nebraska. Directors now may also consider non-share-
holder interests, and if such consideration is to have any meaning at all, the direc-
tors could favor those non-shareholder interests over the interests of the
shareholders. Defensive tactics to obstruct the offer then could be justified as
protecting those non-shareholder interests even if the shareholders would prefer
to vote on the offer.
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normal fiduciary duty review.28 9
The five-year prohibition on business combinations provides some
additional protection against this second type of coercion, but not
much. Insofar as it prohibits mergers and sales of substantially all of
the corporation's assets,290 it is statutory overkill. The voting rights
approval requirements already protect minority shareholders from
unfair second-tier cashouts. This additional, and absolute, ban on such
transactions precludes second-tier transactions that a majority of the
disinterested shareholders feel are in their best interests, and thus re-
sults in inefficiency.
The business combinations section of the Act also prohibits some
transactions that would not require a shareholder vote (which the vot-
ing rights section of the Act therefore would not protect against).
These include sales of less than substantially all but more than ten
percent of the corporation's assets to the controlling person, dispro-
portionate transfers of stock to the controlling person, and loans, guar-
antees, or other financial assistance to the controlling person.291 Each
of these represents a way in which a controlling shareholder might
capture a disproportionate amount of the corporation's value at the
expense of the minority shareholders. However, transactions such as
these are also the type of disproportionate taking most likely to be
adequately controlled by duty of loyalty review. They are highly visi-
ble, disclosure is inevitable, and their fairness to the corporation is eas-
ily evaluated. Thus, the ban on business combinations provides little
additional protection to shareholders. The business combination pro-
hibition does not bar the more prevalent day-to-day takings of value
such as above-market compensation, smaller inter-company dealings,
and the like. Thus, from the standpoint of coercion, the business com-
bination prohibition is both grossly overinclusive and grossly
underinclusive.
It is apparent from the Act's exclusion of management-sponsored
buyouts that the Nebraska Act is not designed to protect shareholders
from coercion. Shareholders also can be unfairly compensated in
takeovers approved by incumbent management. In fact, management
approval may come only after the offeror agrees to management pro-
tections such as job guarantees and generous severance payments.
Although such provisions might be justified as protecting the share-
289. Judicial review of the director's violation of fiduciary duty might prevent such
diversion of benefits. For reasons explained earlier, this is doubtful. See supra
text accompanying notes 235-36. If this conclusion is wrong, and such judicial
review is effective, then Professor Bebchuk's argument that shareholders are co-
erced in the absence of a second-tier merger is simply wrong. Minority share-
holders would not be coerced because they would know that they could stop any
allocative inefficiency by court action.
290. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2437(1), (2) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
291. Id. § 21-2437(2)-(5).
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holders' long-term interest in retaining good managers, they are just
as likely to be a side payment to management to induce management
not to oppose the offer.2 92
If the Nebraska Act actually benefited shareholders, it would not
have to be foisted upon shareholders by the Legislature. The voting
rights limitations and the ban on business combinations could have
been adopted by the shareholders without any legislative help at all in
amendments to the corporation's articles of incorporation. 293 At most,
the only legislative action necessary would have been an opt-in en-
abling act, with actual adoption of the provisions requiring a share-
holder vote. The shareholders then could have decided whether the
Act's provisions were beneficial. Professor Romano hypothesizes that
corporate management lobbies the legislature for provisions such as
these only when they feel they would be unable to convince a majority
of the shareholders that such provisions are desirable.294 The Ne-
braska Act, with its forty-five-day opt-out provision left solely to the
discretion of the board of directors, does not even give shareholders an
opportunity to escape the Act if they feel it reduces the value of their
investments. 295 This also strongly suggests the Act was motivated not
by a desire to protect target shareholders but by a desire to protect
incumbent management and to keep assets and jobs in Nebraska-
even if those goals come at the expense of the shareholders of Ne-
braska corporations.
2. The Effect of Takeovers on Corporate Indebtedness
Critics of takeovers have objected to the increased amount of debt
used by bidders to finance their bids and by target companies to de-
fend against hostile bids.296 Lipton, for example, criticizes the increas-
ing use of junk bonds and bridge loans whereby the assets of the target
292. In a 100 percent cash buyout offer, such guarantees to management and employ-
ees should be irrelevant to target shareholders because the shareholders will
have no further connection with the target company. If the offer succeeds, the
target shareholders' sole financial concern is the amount paid for their stock; any
increases in the long-term value of the company go to the new 100 percent owner.
If such inducements to management are not associated with a higher price, the
target shareholders do not gain.
293. Langevoort, supra note 206, at 105-06.
294. Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 111, 130, 181
(1987).
295. There is some evidence that this type of statute would reduce the value of share-
holders' investments. See L. SCHUMANN, STATE REGULATION OF TAKEovERs AND
SHAREHoLDlER WEALTH: THE EFFECTS OF NEw YoRu's 1985 TAKEOVER STATUTES
(FTC Bureau of Economics Staff Report March 1987)(announcement of the New
York business combinations statute resulted in a negative abnormal return to the
shareholders of 94 New York corporations of approximately $1.2 billion).
296. Lipton, supra note 237, at 20-23; Hearings, supra note 35, at 49 (statement of Sen.
Hartnett); Id. at 66 (statement of Moon Landrieu).
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company can be used to help finance the acquisition.29 7 Opponents of
takeovers object to both the increased amount of debt in the economy
and the transfer of wealth from debtholders to shareholders suppos-
edly caused by increased leverage. 298
The focus on increased debt as something inherently bad is mis-
guided. A corporation has no funds of its own and by its very nature
must borrow funds from others to function. Both debtholders and
shareholders lend money to the firm; the only difference is in the na-
ture of the firm's obligation to repay.299 Debtholders have a priority
on payment, but the amount of their return is usually fixed or, if vari-
able, variable only within a narrow range. Common shareholders are
subordinated to the debtholders, but their return varies depending on
the performance of the firm.
The nature of the financing does not divert the long-term focus of
the firm.300 As the controlling shareholder, a successful bidder owns
only a residual claim on the target's discounted cash flow. Regardless
of how the bidder finances the takeover, his goal is the same-he must
increase the discounted cash flow of the target by an amount sufficient
to exceed the premium paid to acquire control. Foregoing profitable
long-term investments solely to service takeover-related debt would
diminish that discounted cash flow and thereby reduce the bidder's
profits.
The successful bidder does have a strong incentive to abandon un-
profitable projects in which the target was invested and service the
debt with the funds that would otherwise be wasted on these negative-
return projects. Abandonment of projects that constitute a drain on
the target's earnings enables the bidder to profit from the acquisition,
pay off the debt, and coincidentally divert funds from economically
inefficient investments. Professors Jensen, Lehn, Blackwell, and
Marr301 argue that this explains the prevalence of bids for oil compa-
nies. As explained by Lehn, Blackwell, and Marr:
Since the early 1980's, the oil industry has been characterized by substantial
free cash flow. By the late 1970's, the leveling (and subsequent decline) of oil
prices, high interest rates, and increased costs of drilling and exploration
caused growth prospects in the industry to decline. Yet, oil companies still
had considerable earning ability due to a significant divergence between the
price of crude oil and the average cost of extracting proven oil reserves.
Rather than distribute the free cash flow to shareholders via stock repur-
297. Lipton, supra note 237, at 11-15.
298. Id. at 27-28.
299. Lehn, Blackwell, & Marr, supra note 271, at 172-73. Retained earnings are in
essence borrowings from income that would otherwise be returned to the
shareholders.
300. Id. at 179-80.
301. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76
AM. ECON. REv. 326-28 (May 1986); Lehn, Blackwell, & Marr, supra note 271, at
182.
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chases or dividend increases, many oil companies continued to reinvest free
cash flow into negative-return exploration projects. Evidence shows that, on
average, the market negatively revalued the equity of oil companies upon the
announcement of new exploration programs during the late 1970's.
3 0 2
The opportunity to divert free cash flow from such negative-return
projects and thereby earn a greater return justifies the debt used to
finance the premiums offered target shareholders. The premium of-
fered, and the cost of the debt incurred to finance that premium, rep-
resent a lower bound on the expected liberation of additional cash
flow. The highly leveraged takeover does not destroy economic
wealth but actually encourages the redeployment of target assets to
more valuable uses, creating economic wealth.
It also has been argued that leveraged takeovers transfer wealth
from debtholders to shareholders. The increased leverage makes out-
standing debt riskier and, as a consequence, less valuable.303 Whether
or not debtholders are seriously injured by takeovers is the subject of
some dispute. Empirical studies have concluded that the impact of
takeovers on bondholders is slight.304 Bondholders' losses are likely
to be small in comparison to the gains of the target shareholders in
most takeovers,3 05 but it is likely that there will be some losses.3 06
The transfer may be even greater when the impact on smaller credi-
tors is considered. 07
However, such wealth transfers, to the extent that they occur, are
likely to be only transitional.3 0 s Bondholders, preferred shareholders,
and creditors are capable of protecting themselves by contract. 09 If
creditors forego protection against such risks, they should receive a
higher return in exchange for the increased risk that they face.3 10
Thus, any adverse effect on most creditors should be only temporary,
due to their failure to anticipate and guard against leveraged take-
overs and takeover defenses.3 11 No legislative help is necessary to pro-
302. Lehn, Blackwell & Marr, supra note 271, at 182.
303. Lipton, supra note 237, at 27-28; Coffee, supra note 226, at 1244-45.
304. Coffee, supra note 226, at 1246.
305. Lehn, Blackwell, & Marr, supra note 271, at 186-87; Coffee, Shareholders Versus
Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MIcH. L. REV. 1, 51 (1986).
306. Coffee, supra note 305, at 49.
307. Coffee, supra note 226, at 1246.
308. Coffee, supra note 305, at 49.
309. Lehn, Blackwell, & Marr, supra note 271, at 185; Coffee, supra note 226, at 1247-
48; Coffee, supra note 305, at 45-51. But see Lipton, supra note 237, at 27 (assert-
ing that such transfers of wealth "arguably cannot be, prevented by contract or
other existing constraints").
310. Lehn, Blackwell, & Marr, supra note 271, at 185. Indeed, it is difficult to verify
that they have not already made this choice. If corporate creditors already re-
ceive higher returns to compensate them ex ante for the risk of expropriation,
then corporate creditors are fully compensated for any ex post transfers of
wealth.
311. Coffee, supra note 226, at 1247-48; Coffee, supra note 305, at 45-51.
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tect their interests.
Coffee points out that the increased leverage often resulting from
takeovers and takeover defenses is just another example of the mar-
ket for corporate control forcing managers to act in the interests of the
target shareholders.312 Target shareholders are better able to diver-
sify their investments than managers, who are overinvested in the
firm they serve. As a result, managers will be more risk averse than
the shareholders would prefer; shareholders, unlike managers, can di-
versify to protect against firm-specific risk and do not need the firm
itself to diversify.313 Managers, on the other hand, see the firm's debt
capacity as a buffer protecting them from the risk of future insolvency
and, therefore, they underutilize debt.
The corporate takeover is then understandable as a device that dis-
ciplines excessive risk aversion on the part of the target manage-
ment.314 Diversified shareholders are able to maximize the value of
their investments by forcing management to accept a higher level of
risk. The tender offer premium represents, at least in part, the gain
that the bidder anticipates from increasing the company's leverage.
Even if the bidder is unsuccessful, the restructurings often used by
existing management as defensive tactics achieve the same result-
management is forced to minimize firm-level diversification and in-
crease the target's leverage. This benefits the shareholders. Under
this view, the Nebraska Act, by making it more difficult for a success-
ful hostile bidder to leverage the company to pay for the acquisition,
actually takes value away from the shareholders.
Coffee argues that, in addition to creditors, employees and lower
level managers are also adversely affected by the increased leverage
and risk associated with takeovers. Coffee asserts that these people
tend to lack contractual mechanisms to protect themselves and, there-
fore, suffer from the increased imposition of risk and the dismissals
and plant terminations that often follow the increase in leverage.
However, Coffee concedes that such dislocations can increase eco-
nomic efficiency, and, therefore, their net social effect is indetermi-
nate. Also, labor and management contracts can protect against the
risk of leveraged takeovers to some extent. Although imperfect, such
contractual provisions should compensate employees and manage-
ment for at least some of the added risk. If these groups choose to
forego such contractual protection, they presumably are compensated
for doing so. In addition, these groups may to some extent free ride on
the protections negotiated by creditors, although as Coffee has pointed
312. See Coffee, supra note 305, at 16-24.
313. Id at 16-19. See also Levy & Sarnat, Diversifiation, Portfolio Analysis and the
Uneasy Case for Conglomerate Mergers, 25 J. FIN. 795 (1970).
314. Coffee, supra note 305, at 70-71, 73-81. Viewed in this way, this is just a special
case of the corporate takeover's ability to discipline management inefficiency.
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out, this is an imperfect substitute.3 15 Nevertheless, the range of pos-
sible protections suggests that, as with creditors, losses to employees
and managers caused by leveraged takeovers are mostly transitional.
The Nebraska Act makes leveraged hostile takeovers more diffi-
cult. The voting rights limitation should have little effect because the
increased leverage is in the shareholders' best interests if it transfers
wealth from creditors to shareholders. Shareholders have no interest
in the wealth effects on creditors as long as the proposed takeover
maximizes shareholder value. It is the business combination portion
of the Act that prevents leveraged hostile takeovers. This provision
makes it harder for a successful bidder to encumber the corporation
with acquisition-related debt.
3. The Effect of Takeovers on the Long-Term Focus of the Firm
Critics of hostile takeovers also argue that takeovers and the threat
of takeovers "have forced companies to focus on short-term profitabil-
ity rather than on capital investment, or long-term planning, research,
and development."3 ' 6 Martin Lipton argues that "[p]otential takeover
targets seek to maximize short-term performance in the hope of avert-
ing hostile takeover bids."317 He sees this as resulting from the activi-
ties of "short-term investors" like arbitrageurs whose only goal is
immediate profit and who have no concern for the long-term profit-
ability of the firm. However, the threat of takeovers does not prevent
managers from engaging in long-range planning. A successful long-
term strategy will be reflected in higher share prices that will in turn
discourage takeovers.318 Managers, therefore, have an incentive to en-
gage in those activities that will maximize the long-term value of the
firm, discounting future profits at the market discount rate. Critics
may not agree with the rate at which the market discounts future
profits, but there is no reason why investors' views on the time value
of money and the appropriate discount rate should be subordinated to
management's views. Furthermore, Lipton's attack on the short-term
goals of arbitrageurs (as opposed to the alleged long-term goals of
other investors) misses the point. Arbitrageurs purchase their shares
from other investors who have already shown, by selling their shares,
that they consider the premium offered more valuable than the long-
315. Coffee, supra note 226, at 1248. The problem is that creditors can be paid to waive
their contractual protections and accept an increased risk. In deciding whether to
accept such payments, creditors will not consider the effect of their actions on
employees and managers.
316. Lipton, supra note 237, at 23. Hearings, supra note 35, at 49 (statement of Sen.
Hartnett); Id at 69 (statement of Gordon McDonald); Id at 71, 73 (statement of
Paul Ess); Debate, supra note 35, at 9358-59 (statement of Sen. Wesely).
317. Lipton, supra note 237, at 24.
318. Easterbrok & Fischel, supra note 226, at 1183-84.
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term value of their shares.319 Arbitrage allows the long-term inves-
tors who sell to receive most of the tender offer premium while avoid-
ing the risk that the offer will be defeated, oversubscribed, or never
made.320 The arbitrageurs merely stand as proxies for the interests of
Lipton's long-term shareholders.321
Lipton also argues that takeovers divert resources from socially de-
sirable productive activity to the "inherently non-productive activity"
associated with tender offers-those activities associated with invest-
ment banking firms, law firms, arbitrage firms, investment advisers,
and so forth.322 The money used to pay for tender offers (the pre-
mium price for the target shares) is not necessarily diverted from pro-
duction. The target shareholders are free to reinvest the funds they
receive in other productive activities.3 23 It is the other costs of tender
offers about which Lipton complains. It is unfortunate that there are
transaction costs associated with takeovers, but there are transaction
costs associated with most transfers of assets, especially on such a
large scale. The existence of transaction costs does not mean that the
transfer itself is economically inefficient. Would Lipton have us ban
real estate sales because of the funds diverted to real estate brokers
and land speculators? Takeovers allow assets to flow to managers
who value those assets more highly than their current users and,
therefore, increase economic efficiency.324 The transaction costs in-
volved are relatively small in comparison to the gains to shareholders
resulting from corporate takeovers.3 25 Takeovers, therefore, increase
productivity; they do not reduce it. The transaction costs Lipton dis-
dains are increased by the management discretion and obstructing tac-
tics he supports and by the delays created by the Nebraska Act. Thus,
the effect of the Act is to increase the diversion of resources to "non-
productive" activities and make it more difficult to place assets into
the hands of their most productive users. The Nebraska Act does ab-
solutely nothing to change the profit focus of the target corporation.
Transactions that shareholders approved prior to the takeover will
still be approved by those same shareholders under the voting rights
provision of the Act, and the ban on business combinations does not
319. Gilson, supra note 224, at 856; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 226, at 1183 n.60.
320. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 226, at 1183 n.60. Recent evidence suggests
that the market does react positively to long-term investments in capital and re-
search and development. See Jarrell, Brickley, & Netter, supra note 268, at 55,
and authorities cited therein.
321. Gilson, supra note 224, at 856.
322. Lipton, supra note 237, at 24-25. Interestingly, this view makes most of Mr. Lip-
ton's own activities "inherently non-productive" and socially wasteful.
323. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 226, at 1184; Jensen, Takeovers. Folklore and
Science, HARv. Bus. REv. 109, 113-14 (Nov.-Dec. 1984).
324. See supra text accompanying notes 224-28.
325. Jensen, supra note 323, at 113.
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prevent the corporation from reorienting its business to a shorter-
term focus.
4. Protecting Non-Shareholder Groups
Another argument frequently advanced against hostile takeovers is
that they have an adverse effect on corporate employees and on the
communities in which the target corporation has facilities. Lipton ar-
gues that "[t]he current wave of highly leveraged takeovers has
threatened or caused the flight of business operations upon which
communities have come to rely and disrupted settled relationships be-
tween the target companies and employees, customers, and suppli-
ers."326 Individual communities often are highly dependent on
employment and tax revenues provided by a single corporate em-
ployer. The corporation and its management and employees often
contribute heavily to the charities and cultural activities of that com-
munity. Opponents of hostile takeovers argue that the acquiring com-
pany is likely to fire employees, sell off the local plant, and contribute
less to the community, all in the name of efficiency.
This was one of the concerns underlying the passage of the Ne-
braska Act.327 Several witnesses argued that successful corporate
takeovers result in plant closings and the loss of jobs.328 Witnesses
noted Sir James Goldsmith's attempted takeover of Goodyear in 1986
and the potential loss of the Goodyear plant in Lincoln. 329 Senator
Wesely pointed to Enron's merger with a white knight, Houston Natu-
ral Gas, and Houston Natural Gas's subsequent relocation of Enron to
Houston.3 30 Senator Johanns probably phrased the issue in the
bluntest manner:
One of the reasons I support this is because one of the things that a hostile
takeover attempts to do is to drive the bottom line for stockholders. Not all
corporations are 100 percent interested in the bottom line and get involved in
such things as community projects, donating high schools, being a good corpo-
rate citizen which really adds to the benefit of having that corporation in the
community. If they are forced to look at profits only and bottom line only,
326. Upton, supra note 237, at 25. Lipton argues that directors should be free to con-
sider these non-shareholder interests in responding to hostile takeovers. Id at
3643.
327. This was also one of the concerns underlying a 1988 amendment to the NBCA
allowing corporate directors to consider the effects of corporate action "on em-
ployees, suppliers, creditors, and customers of the corporation and communities
in which offices or other facilities of the corporation are located." NEB. REv.
STAT. § 21-2035(1) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
328. Hearings, supra note 35, at 49-50 (statement of Sen. Hartnett); I& at 66-67 (state-
ment of Moon Landrieu); Id. at 69 (statement of Gordon McDonald); Id. at 92-94
(statement of Bill Stadtwald).
329. See, e.g., id. at 54-55 (statement of Sen. Wesely); id. at 68-69 (statement of Gordon
McDonald); Debate, supra note 35, at 9357 (statement of Sen. Johanns); id. at
9358-59 (statement of Sen. Wesely).
330. Debate, supra note 35, at 9359 (statement of Sen. Wesely).
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those are the first things they cut out.3 3 1
Ironically, the Act would not have prevented either of the take-
overs which concerned the proponents of the bill. As the bill's propo-
nents recognized in the legislative debates, the Act would not have
applied to the proposed takeover of Goodyear because Goodyear would
not be an "issuing public corporation."33 2 It is not a Nebraska corpora-
tion and does not have its principal executive offices in Nebraska. The
Act also would not have prevented the Enron move. Enron's merger
with Houston Gas was a friendly transaction and undoubtedly would
have fallen within the exceptions for advance board approval.333 The
bill's sponsor could not come up with any other threatened or actual
takeovers to justify the bill.334 Thus, the Act would have provided no
protection against the only two concrete examples of "harm" to Ne-
braska that its sponsors pointed out.
Even if one accepts the rationale that hostile takeovers harm com-
munities and employees, the Nebraska Act is of questionable value.
Nothing in the Act prevents a business from closing a plant or laying
off local employees in the pursuit of efficiency. Plant closings and lay-
offs of employees are not within the five-year ban on business combi-
nations. Substantial sales of assets are covered, but only if the
interested shareholder is itself a party to the transaction 3 5 A suc-
cessful acquiring company trying to rid the target of an inefficient
plant is unlikely to purchase that plant itself. Thus, once the tender
offer succeeds, there is little in the Act to stop a disruptive layoff or
relocation. Similarly, nothing in the Act prevents a corporation from
terminating all charitable and other contributions to the community.
Thus, the Act does not directly address such social concerns. 33 6
Because the Act does not directly prohibit plant closings, reloca-
tions, or employee layoffs, its supposed beneficial effects in these areas
331. Id. at 9357 (statement of Sen. Johanns).
332. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2442(1), (2) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
333. See id. §§ 21-2439, 21-2452.
334. In a candid statement, Senator Johanns said: "[D]oes Nebraska need this law
right now? And the answer to that question is we really don't. There are no
threatened takeovers occurring right now." Debate, supra note 35, at 9357 (state-
ment of Sen. Johanns).
335. See NEB. Rlv. STAT. § 21-2437(2) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
336. One reading of the Nebraska Act might even encourage businesses to relocate to
other states. The Act, it will be recalled, only applies to "issuing public corpora-
tions." See id § 21-2442. What happens if the corporation ceases to be an issuing
public corporation after the Act has been triggered? Do the limitation on voting
rights and the ban on business combinations still apply? Assume, for example,
that a Nebraska corporation is covered by the Act solely because its principal
executive offices are in Nebraska. See i&L § 21-2442(1)(b)(i). A tender offeror
then acquires more than 20 percent of the corporation's stock, triggering both the
restriction on voting rights and the ban on business combinations. Could the ac-
quiring person avoid the Act's restrictions once he gained control of the board by
moving the company's principal executive offices outside the state of Nebraska?
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must come from its general deterrence of takeovers. First, the Act
must make hostile takeovers less likely. Second, those people making
hostile tender offers must be more likely to harm the community than
existing management. This latter premise is questionable. Gelfond
and Sebastian conclude:
[Tihere is no basis for expecting an offeror to be less socially responsible than
a target. To permit the target to judge the more responsible of the two and
take actions preventing the shareholders from selling control of the company
to the offeror guarantees no social improvement. If, for example, a successful
The corporation would cease to be an "issuing public corporation," but would that
retroactively remove the disqualifications imposed by the Nebraska Act?
The voting rights limitation probably would not be affected. Section 21-2451
limits the voting rights of "[s]hares acquired in a control-share acquisition"
which is the acquisition of the requisite amount of stock of an issuing public cor-
poration. Id. § 21-2439. This definition seems to look to the time of acquisition.
When the shares were acquired, the target clearly was an issuing public corpora-
tion, and there is nothing in section 21-2451 that would remove the voting rights
limitation when the target ceases to be an issuing public corporation. The shares
would remain "shares acquired in a control-share acquisition" and remain dis-
qualified from exercising full voting rights.
The ban on business combinations is more problematic. Section 21-2452 pro-
hibits business combinations between an issuing public corporation and any inter-
ested shareholder. Read literally and in isolation, this would require a court to
look at the target's status as of the date of the proposed combination; is the corpo-
ration about to engage in the transaction an "issuing public corporation?" If not,
because of a prior move of the corporation's headquarters or the loss of some
other Nebraska contact, then section 21-2452 would not apply. This reading
would allow an interested shareholder to circumvent the ban on business combi-
nations by first moving the corporation's headquarters from Nebraska.
However, the definition of "issuing public corporation" specifies that "[flor
purposes of section 21-2453 only," a corporation's issuing public corporation status
is to be determined as of the share acquisition date in question. rd. § 21-2442(1),
(2). In other words, for purposes of section 21-2453 only, it does not matter that
the issuing public corporation later ceases to meet the definitional requirements.
However, the reference to section 21-2453 makes no sense. Section 21-2453 lists
situations in which the Act does not apply. Read literally, the Act thus says not
to look to the original share acquisition date in deciding whether the business
combination is prohibited by section 21-2452, but only in deciding if a statutory
exception to the ban applies. What the Legislature obviously meant to say was
that a subsequent loss of issuing public corporation status would not prevent the
ban on business combinations from operating, but the statute is worded most in-
artfully on this point. A literal-minded court might hold that the business combi-
nation ban could be circumvented by causing the corporation to lose its issuing
public corporation status. If so construed, the Act creates a perverse incentive for
the successful acquirer to move its business from Nebraska.
If the Act is construed only to require issuing public corporation status at the
time of the acquisition, then a constitutional problem emerges. If a foreign corpo-
ration moves its principal executive offices elsewhere and sells its Nebraska as-
sets, what basis does Nebraska have to continue to regulate the corporation? A
continued application of the Nebraska Act after these Nebraska contacts cease is
purely extraterritorial regulation with severe commerce clause problems of the
type condemned in MITE. Nebraska has no continuing state interest to justify
the continued application of the Act.
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offeror fires target employees, but also cuts pollution and improves racial hir-
ing practices, who can say that the offeror is less socially responsible than the
target?337
Plant closings and layoffs are commonly undertaken by incumbent
management as well, with the same negative effects on local commu-
nities and employees. 338 Professor Jensen in 1984 was unable to find
any evidence that takeovers produce more plant closings, layoffs, and
dismissals than would otherwise have occurred.33 9 The Act does not
in any way deter existing management from taking such actions.
Thus, it is not clear whether the Act would make plant closings and
employee layoffs more or less likely. One might argue that many cor-
porate restructurings by existing management are defensive-
designed to make hostile acquisitions less likely-and that the Act
would render such restructurings less necessary. However, incumbent
management usually seeks as many defenses against hostile offers as
possible. The Act might make hostile takeovers less likely, but a re-
structuring, including plant closings and layoffs, still might be used as
an additional defense. The Act is weak enough that reliance on the
Act alone is probably inadvisable.
The disruption and dislocation argument also ignores the possible
benefits to the community and employees of hostile takeovers. The
synergistic gains and increased managerial efficiency potentially asso-
ciated with takeovers could result in an expansion of the company's
business rather than a contraction. This would result in even greater
employment and benefits to the community than before. The Act
would make it more difficult for such value-creating acquisitions to
occur. In addition, even if the local plant is sold, those assets must be
purchased by someone. The purchaser may itself plan to operate the
local facility, in which case the net gain or loss to the community is
indeterminate. Only if the local assets are scrapped does local employ-
ment necessarily suffer.
Finally, the disruption and dislocation argument assumes that the
incumbent management should have unchecked power to pursue so-
cial and charitable goals at the expense of profit. Tender offers do not
337. Gelfond & Sebastian, supra note 234, at 459.
338. See, e.g., Krasnowsky, Goodyear Threatens to Move Hose Division, Lincoln Star,
Aug. 3, 1988, at 1, col. 1 (Goodyear Tire and Rubber threatening to move its hose
production to a new plant, costing Lincoln over 700 jobs, unless the hose division
shows a five percent profit by March 1989); Goodsell & Gersten, Consolidation
Closing U.P. 's Shops in Omaha, Omaha World-Herald, July 1, 1988, at 1, col. 1
(Union Pacific to close its locomotive and car repair shops in Omaha and relocate
much of the work to Arkansas, costing Omaha 810 jobs, representing a payroll of
$23.6 million).
339. Jensen, supra note 323, at 114. But see S. BRUE, LOCAL ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF
CORPORATE MERGERS: THE NEBRASKA EXPERIENCE (1972)(arguing that mergers
of Nebraska corporations with outside acquirers lowered employment within the
state).
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prevent management from pursuing such goals but merely give share-
holders the ultimate decision as to how much of their money should be
devoted to such goals.340 Taking that ultimate control away from
shareholders, who bear the residual risk of the corporation, in effect
allows these other groups to play with the shareholders' money. 4
The Nebraska Act, in trying to protect local communities and employ-
ees, in effect imposes a tax on corporate shareholders in order to subsi-
dize inefficient local operations.
Takeovers generally improve economic efficiency, which benefits
the economy as a whole.42 Changes that increase long-run social wel-
fare often produce dislocations that reduce the short-run welfare of
some individuals. The argument for protecting local plants and em-
ployees is both inefficient and provincial. It is inefficient because it
encourages companies to keep pouring capital into local plants and
employees even when other uses of the money would be more produc-
tive.343 It is provincial because it ignores the benefits to the communi-
ties in which the corporation's new employees and new plants will be
located.344 Today's loss of a Nebraska plant because of a hostile take-
over is tomorrow's gain when a successful Nebraska bidder moves the
operations of an acquired target to Nebraska.
Professor Coffee focuses on the layoffs of one particular type of
employee-corporate managers. He argues that hostile takeovers may
substantially impair the efficiency of the managerial labor market.34 5
Coffee points out that managers may be overinvested in firm-specific
human capital and that hostile takeovers, which often result in firings
of incumbent management, destroy that investment. Existing manag-
ers may have traded off salary for implicit promises of long-term em-
ployment stability, only to find their expectations frustrated when a
hostile takeover occurs. Managers may demand greater compensation
to offset the increased risk that they will lose their investment. Ineffi-
cient companies may find it difficult to retain their best existing man-
agers or to attract new managerial talent because of the risk. The
demoralization resulting when a hostile takeover is imminent may ac-
tually harm the corporation:
340. Gilson, supra note 224, at 862-65. See also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 226,
at 1191-92.
341. Jensen, supra note 323, at 111.
342. See i. at 114 ("even if takeovers lead to plant closings, layoffs, and dismissals,
their prohibition or limitation would generate real social costs and reduce aggre-
gate human welfare because of the loss of potential operating economies.").
343. If the local facility were the most productive use of the company's money, the
bidder would have no incentive to close the local plant. Even if the local plant
were sold to obtain cash, the buyer would still find it profitable to operate the
plant rather than closing it. It makes sense to close a plant only when a greater
return could be earned elsewhere.
344. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 226, at 1191 n.84.
345. Coffee, supra note 226, at 1234-43; Coffee, supra note 305, at 73-81.
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The divisional or more senior manager who has performed diligently but who
knows that management tends to be replaced as a team following a takeover
has little motivation to perform, and every incentive to shirk, once a takeover
appears imminent. He also has an increased incentive to engage in predatory
self-dealing that reduces shareholder wealth.
3 4 6
The extent of the problem pointed out by Coffee is unclear. To
some extent, managers can protect themselves contractually. Coffee
admits that management can protect itself through a properly drafted
severance compensation provision-a golden parachute.3 47 Also, the
hostile bidder has an incentive to retain the good managers, although
there may be a problem identifying those people. The possibility of
retention lessens the disincentives caused by the imminence of a hos-
tile takeover. Managers have an incentive to continue performing
well so that the bidder does not misidentify them as inefficient manag-
ers needing to be replaced.
Even if a problem remains after contractual solutions, the Ne-
braska Act does nothing to correct that problem. A hostile bidder re-
mains free to control the board and replace existing management even
without a shareholder vote. Nothing in the five-year ban on business
combinations prohibits the removal of existing management. A bidder
might be unwilling to proceed with the offer unless the shareholders
grant full voting rights, but the shareholder vote is unlikely to protect
management. The rational shareholder exiting the corporation would
be concerned only about the size of the premium the bidder was pay-
ing and would have no incentive to worry about protecting manage-
ment. A tender offer offering shareholders what they believe to be
fair compensation is unlikely to be rejected in order to protect mana-
gerial interests. Thus, even if hostile takeovers do impair the effi-
ciency of the managerial labor market, the Nebraska Act is not the
solution.
5. Curtailing Inefficient, Empire-Building Expansion
Another argument often made against takeovers is that they repre-
sent empire-building by the bidder that provides no real economic gain
346. Coffee, supra note 226, at 1242.
347. Coffee, supra note 305, at 75-81. Golden parachutes and tin parachutes, providing
large severance payments to upper-level and lower-level management in the
event of takeovers or certain restructurings, are prime examples of contractual
protections against the risk to management associated with takeovers. Contrac-
tually-negotiated plant closing notice provisions are another example. Although
there are some transaction costs associated with the negotiation of such contrac-
tual provisions, the companies most likely to be subjected to hostile takeovers are
of such a size that the transaction cost per worker should be relatively small,
assuming collective bargaining. Thus, if the loss to employees is sufficiently im-
portant, transaction costs should not prevent the negotiation of such provisions.
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to the bidder's shareholders. 4 8 This argument hypothesizes that the
bidder's managers overpay for target companies in order to maximize
the size of the bidding firm. There are a number of reasons why the
bidder's management might be willing to pay an economically unjusti-
fied premium in the pursuit of firm growth:
(1) executive compensation and associated perquisites tend to be a function of
firm size; (2) increased size in turn implies increased immunity from a hostile
takeover, (3) acquisitions dilute the stockholdings of existing large sharehold-
ers and thereby confer increased autonomy on the management of the bidder;,
and (4) expansion both provides an opportunity for advancement within the
corporate hierarchy for younger managers and justifies the continued employ-
ment of those who are acquisition specialists. 3 49
Under this view, a successful takeover represents a transfer of wealth
to the target shareholders, who are overpaid, from the shareholders of
the bidder, who receive an asset-the target company-worth less
than the value paid.
To the extent that such takeovers involve transaction costs and
produce no overall gains, they are economically wasteful. However,
the Nebraska Act is ill-suited to respond to such a concern.35 0 The
Nebraska Act's approach is to place more discretion in the hands of
target shareholders and target management, neither of which is a
plausible proxy for the interests of the bidder's shareholders. The un-
derlying premise of the empire-building hypothesis is that the bidder
pays an amount to the target shareholders greater than the value of
the target shareholders' interests. Target shareholders could protect
the bidder's shareholders only at their own financial sacrifice. They
are unlikely to use their disapproval of control share voting rights to
block a tender offer that gives them a windfall gain. Target manage-
ment has incentives to block a bid even in some cases where the bidder
is overpaying, and the Nebraska Act might help them do it. However,
management's incentives to block a bid are in no way positively corre-
lated with whether the bidder is overpaying. If anything, target man-
agement's position imperfectly mirrors that of the bidder's
shareholders-the higher the bid, the more likely it is that the bid will
be accepted. Thus, the target's management is also a poor proxy for
the interests of the bidder's shareholders. If the bidder is willing to
pay an excessive price to acquire the target, the Nebraska Act, in giv-
ing the target shareholders and management greater bargaining
power to demand a higher bid, encourages even greater transfers of
wealth from bidder shareholders to target shareholders.
348. See Coffee, supra note 226, at 1167-69, 1224-29; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note
226, at 1185.
349. Coffee, supra note 226, at 1224.
350. Indeed, one might ask why the Nebraska Legislature would pass a statute that
takes windfall gains away from the shareholders of Nebraska corporations in or-
der to protect the shareholders of non-resident bidders.
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In addition, the Nebraska Act, to the extent that it deters take-
overs, actually makes it harder for the bidder's shareholders to control
the empire-building behavior of their management. The threat of a
takeover disciplines the bidder's management. If the bidder has a pol-
icy of empire building and unprofitable acquisitions, the bidder would
itself become a takeover candidate because the price of its stock would
fall.351 Because it discourages hostile takeovers, the Nebraska Act
makes it more difficult for the bidder's shareholders to police their
own management, and in this way makes inefficient, empire-building
takeovers more likely to occur.
VI. APPLICATION OF THE ACT-MAKING AN OFFER
An investor contemplating a hostile tender offer for a corporation
covered by the Nebraska Act must deal with the Act's voting rights
limitation and its five-year prohibition of business combinations. Cir-
cumventing those provisions will not be easy, but, in many cases, it is
not clear that a bidder would want to incur the cost to work around
the Act. The costs of staying within the Act may not be that great.
The Act also poses problems for investors in friendly transac-
tions-transactions with the target company approved by the target's
board of directors or transactions with controlling shareholders. In
each of these cases, the Act may have unintended consequences that
will trap the unwary.
A. The Act's Effect on Hostile Offers
1. Why Bother?
The first question to be confronted in discussing how to deal with
the Nebraska Act's restrictions on voting rights is-"why bother?"
Shares acquired in a tender offer that constitutes a control-share ac-
quisition still have full power to elect directors.352 A bidder who suc-
cessfully acquires more than half of the target corporation's voting
stock will, therefore, control both the board and the policies of the
corporation.3 53 The directors elected by a successful bidder are free to
take any action consistent with their fiduciary duties that does not re-
quire a shareholder vote.35 4 The successful bidder's board can fire the
351. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 226, at 1185; M. Mitchell & K. Lebn, Do Bad
Bidders Become Good Targets? (Office of Economic Analysis, SEC Aug. 1988).
352. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2451 (Cur. Supp. 1988).
353. "All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the
business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed under the direction of, a
board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in the Nebraska Business
Corporation Act or in the articles of incorporation." Id. § 21-2035.
354. Control shares would be disqualified from voting on the following matters requir-
ing a shareholder vote under Nebraska law: the issuance of rights or options to
directors, officers, employees, or a subsidiary of the corporation, id. § 21-2019; the
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old officers and hire new officers, drop certain business lines, change
the business policies of the corporation, close plants, and even sell cor-
porate assets and facilities as long as those assets and facilities do not
constitute substantially all of the corporation's assets.3 5 5 Any bidder
ratification of contracts with directors, id. § 21-2040.01; a distribution out of capi-
tal surplus not authorized in the corporation's articles of incorporation, id. § 21-
2044(2); amendment of the articles of incorporation, id. § 21-2057; a merger or
consolidation, id. § 21-2072; a sale of substantially all of the corporation's assets
not in the regular course of business, id. § 21-2078; and the voluntary dissolution
of the corporation or the revocation of voluntary dissolution proceedings, id.
§§ 21-2083, 21-2087 to -2088.
One particularly troublesome problem relates to the NBCA provisions for the
premature removal of directors. The NBCA allows directors to be removed, with
or without cause, at a meeting called expressly for that purpose. Id. § 21-2039.
Directors may be removed only "by a vote of the holders of a majority of the
shares then entitled to vote at an election of directors." Id. Nothing in section 21-
2039 says that all shares entitled to vote for the election of directors are also enti-
tled to vote for removal; the previously quoted provision can be read as only spec-
ifying how many votes must be cast for removal to be effective. Section 21-2451 of
the Shareholder Protection Act says that control shares can vote only to elect
directors, presumably denying them the right to vote to remove directors.
This creates two problems for a successful bidder. First, an acquiring person
cannot use the removal provisions to replace the unfriendly board immediately,
but must wait until the next regular election of directors. That result may have
been intended. Second, section 21-2451 presents problems after the acquiring per-
son has had a chance to elect directors. Suppose that the acquiring person be-
comes dissatisfied with the performance of a director. If section 21-2451 prohibits
the acquiring person from voting on removal, he has no way to prematurely re-
move that director. However, since he retains the right to vote out the unsatisfac-
tory director at the annual meeting, this problem is minor.
A more important problem is presented when the acquiring person owns less
than fifty percent of the shares, but manages to control one or more directorships
through cumulative voting. If the acquiring person is unable to vote against re-
moval, the majority has sufficient votes to remove the directors affiliated with
the acquiring person. Section 21-2039 attempts to protect the rights of the minor-
ity in the usual case by providing that "no one of the directors may be removed if
the votes cast against his removal would be sufficient to elect him if cumulatively
voted at an election of the entire board of directors." In a removal proceeding
unaffected by the Shareholder Protection Act, the minority shareholder would
vote against removal of his directors and thereby protect the minority directors.
However, section 21-2451 of the Act appears to deny the minority acquiring per-
son the right to vote against removal, since the removal proceeding is not an elec-
tion of directors. Therefore, there will not be sufficient votes cast to protect the
minority director. The majority could deny representation to the minority ac-
quiring person by removing his directors using the section 21-2039 procedure,
then having the majority-dominated board fill the vacant slot using section 21-
2038. Thus, although the minority acquiring person could use cumulative voting
rights at each annual meeting to get representation on the board, the majority
could use removal powers to quickly replace that minority representative until
the next annual meeting and so on ad infinitum. This possibility is a practical
reason to read section 21-2451 of the Act creatively to grant control shares voting
rights not only to elect directors, but also to vote on their removal.
355. The NBCA requires shareholder approval for a sale by the corporation of sub-
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who intends only to continue operating the corporation as a separate
entity and is willing to live with minority ownership356 should not be
significantly deterred by the Act.
However, some people would be unwilling to live with these re-
strictions, and the Act, therefore, would deter some takeovers. A
takeover may be valuable to the bidder only if the acquiring company
can be merged with the target to achieve synergistic gains. The bidder
may find it necessary to finance his bid using the assets of the target as
collateral, and this may be possible only through a second-tier transac-
tion. The bidder may not want to incur the administrative costs and
procedural hassles associated with minority ownership. In such cases,
the bidder may be willing to proceed with the takeover only if some
way can be found to circumvent the restrictions of the Act.
2. Application of the Act to Hostile Offers
Hostile bidders have several ways to try to circumvent the Act, but
none of these is completely effective. The easiest way for a hostile
bidder to avoid the Act's voting rights limitation is to never acquire
twenty percent of a covered corporation's stock. As long as the buyer
stays below the twenty percent threshhold, his shares retain full vot-
ing rights.357 The easiest way for a hostile bidder to avoid the Act's
ban on business combinations is to never acquire ten percent of a cov-
ered corporation's stock.358 Thus, as long as a person is willing to limit
his ownership of the corporation's stock, he need not worry about the
Act. However, those levels of ownership are insufficient for a hostile
bidder to wrest control of the corporation from incumbent manage-
stantially all of its assets. Id. § 21-2078. An acquiring person without full voting
rights, of course, would be unable to vote on such a transaction. Id. § 21-2451.
Any sale to which the acquiring person was a party would be a business combina-
tion prohibited during the first five years of the acquiring person's control. Id.
§§ 21-2437(2), 21-2452.
356. The minority could not be cashed out in the first five years after the takeover
because of the section 21-2452 prohibition on business combinations. Even after
the five-year ban expired, an acquiring person without full voting rights could not
vote on a cashout transaction. Id. § 21-2451. Thus, after the five-year period ex-
pired, an acquiring person without full voting rights could cash out the minority
only if he could convince a majority of the minority shareholders to approve the
transaction.
357. An acquisition is not a "control-share acquisition" unless the twenty percent
threshhold is crossed. Id. § 21-2439. Only shares acquired in a control-share ac-
quisition have limited voting rights. Id. § 21-2451. If the person already owned
more than twenty percent prior to the Act's effective date, acquisitions still pres-
ent no problem unless they cause the person to cross one of the two higher
threshholds-33 1/3 percent or 50 percent. Id. § 21-2439.
358. The Act prohibits business combinations with interested shareholders. Id § 21-
2452. A person is not an interested shareholder until he acquires ten percent or
more of the corporation's stock. Id § 21-2440.
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ment, so a hostile bidder seeking control must find some other way
around the Act.
The Act has carefully guarded against the most obvious way to
avoid passing a threshhold while obtaining control-a number of
smaller acquisitions by separate but related parties. The Act defines
two or more persons acting together as a single acquiring person,3 5 9
and the definition of ownership includes ownership by affiliates and
associates.3 60 Thus, any coordinated strategy where each of several
persons acquires just under the minimum percentages of the target's
stock will still trigger the voting rights limitation and the restriction
on business combinations.
The Act also discourages step transactions, where majority owner-
ship is acquired in a series of technically separate acquisitions. Sup-
pose, for example, that a person purchased nineteen percent of the
corporation's stock, then an additional 1.1 percent to cross the twenty
percent threshhold, then an additional twelve percent. The Act only
limits the voting rights of shares acquired in a "control-share acquisi-
tion" which is an acquisition that causes the acquirer to pass one of the
three voting threshholds. The acquisition in the example that actually
causes the acquirer to cross the twenty percent threshhold is the 1.1
percent purchase. If the control-share acquisition could be limited to
this single transaction, then the buyer would still have full voting
rights as to the remaining thirty-one percent of his stock. However,
the Act makes this very difficult. All shares acquired within a single
120-day period are treated as having been acquired in the same acquisi-
tion.361 Thus, a step transaction would work only if a 120-day delay
separated each of the steps. It would take over 600 days to acquire
majority ownership in a step transaction designed to minimize the loss
of voting rights.362 But even a 120-day delay between steps would not
359. Id. § 21-2434.
360. Id. § 21-2443.
361. Id. § 21-2439. This provision raises an interesting issue. When two 120-day peri-
ods partially overlap, which shares are treated as part of the same control-share
acquisition? For example, suppose that the purchaser acquires an initial ten per-
cent of the corporation's stock on day one, another eight percent on day sixty, and
an additional three percent on day 150. This last acquisition pushes the purchaser
above twenty percent ownership and is therefore a control-share acquisition. The
eight percent purchase clearly is part of that same control-share acquisition
under the 120-day rule, and, therefore, is also subject to the voting rights limita-
tion. But what about the initial ten percent purchase? It was not acquired within
120 days of the purchase which exceeded the threshhold, but it was acquired
within 120 days of the second purchase, which is part of that same control-share
acquisition. Section 21-2439 provides that all shares "acquired within a one-hun-
dred-twenty-day period... shall be deemed to have been acquired in the same
acquisition," but within a 120-day period of what? Does this mean within 120 days
of the purchase that gives the buyer twenty percent or within 120 days of any
purchase that is part of the same control-share acquisition?
362. Suppose that the purchaser bought nineteen percent of the target's stock on day
19s8
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guarantee success. Transactions more than 120 days apart are still
treated as part of the 'same acquisition if they are acquired "pursuant
to a plan to make a control-share acquisition."3 63 Since careful plan-
ning of the overall transaction is the essence of a successful step trans-
action, a series of purchases is probably a single control-share
acquisition, and all of the shares acquired, therefore, would have lim-
ited voting rights.364 A series of acquisitions will be treated separately
only if: (1) each is more than 120 days apart from any other; and
(2) none is made in contemplation of any of the others.36 5 This is an
extremely limited exception.
Another alternative an acquiring person might consider is to
reincorporate the target in another state that does not have limitations
such as those in the Nebraska Act. Because the voting limitation and
the ban on business combinations are purely statutory, they presuma-
bly would not survive a change in the state of incorporation. 366 How-
ever, reincorporation would require an amendment to the
corporation's articles of incorporation which would require the ap-
proval of two-thirds of the shareholders entitled to vote.367 An acquir-
ing person without full voting rights would be unable to vote on this
amendment.3 68 Reincorporation thus makes little sense from the
standpoint of the voting rights limitation. If the acquiring person can
obtain two-thirds approval from the other shareholders to
reincorporate merely to restore his voting rights, then he could much
more easily obtain a majority vote under the Act to restore those vot-
one, waited 120 days, then bought an additional one percent, crossing the twenty
percent threshhold. This one percent would not have full voting rights, as it was
acquired in a control-share acquisition. On day 240, 120 days later, the purchaser
buys another thirteen percent, now owning a total of thirty-three percent. On
day 360, the purchaser buys another .4 percent, crossing the 33 1/3 percent
threshhold and resulting in another control-share acquisition. On day 480, the
buyer purchases another 16.5 percent and now owns a total of 49.9 percent. On
day 600, the buyer purchases another .2 percent, crossing the final control-share
acquisition threshhold. This .2 percent would again be limited voting stock. The
buyer now owns 50.1 percent of the target's stock and, assuming that each of
these step transactions is respected as a separate acquisition, only 1.6 percent of
the stock would have limited voting rights. But see infra text accompanying
notes 363-64.
363. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2439 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
364. The information statement filed by the acquiring person would have to disclose
all of the shares to be acquired as part of the overall plan. Id. § 21-2449(1)(d).
365. It is unclear who has the burden of proving that separate purchases are or are not
part of a single overall plan. It often might be difficult for the target corporation
to prove that purchases made more than 120 days apart were pursuant to a plan,
since such a plan is unlikely to be in writing or even openly discussed.
366. This discussion assumes that the Nebraska Act is unconstitutional as applied to
foreign corporations. See supra text accompanying notes 144-71.
367. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2057(3) (1987).
368. Id. § 21-2451.
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ing rights.3 69 The business combination ban, however, contains no ex-
ceptions for shareholder approval. Thus, an interested shareholder
could not engage in a business combination with the corporation even
if all of the minority shareholders approved. This prevents even bene-
ficial transactions from occurring. Reincorporation would provide a
way around the absolute five-year ban on business combinations. If
the interested shareholder can convince two-thirds of the minority
shareholders that the transaction is beneficial, they could
reincorporate in another state and avoid the Nebraska Act entirely.
The simplest way to acquire full voting rights in a hostile tender
offer under the Act is to leave the offer open long enough for voting
rights to be approved. If the offer is kept open for longer than fifty
days, the bidder can file an information statement at the beginning of
the offer and demand a shareholder meeting to determine voting
rights.370 The target would have to hold that meeting before the
tender offer closed. The bidder could actively participate in this
shareholder voting through proxy solicitation. The Act provides that
an acquiring person may vote proxies solicited from non-related par-
ties.3 71 However, the bidder would not be able to vote any shares
which it or related parties already owned.372 If the shareholders ap-
proved full voting rights, the bidder could proceed with the offer. If
shareholders refused to grant full voting rights to the bidder, the bid-
der could terminate the offer.
A similar way to circumvent the Act would be to make the tender
offer conditional on subsequent approval of full voting rights.373 The
bidder could close the offer after the minimum twenty-business-day
period required by the SEC,s74 but condition the actual purchase of
the tendered shares on subsequent shareholder approval of voting
rights. The bidder would not own those tendered shares, so the hold-
369. See i& But see supra text accompanying notes 64-66 (arguing that a subsequent
vote to restore voting rights may in some cases not be allowed).
370. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2450(1) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
371. "Interested shares" are precluded from voting to grant the acquiring person vot-
ing rights. Id. § 21-2451. "Interested shares" are shares owned by an acquiring
person. Id. § 21-2441. "Acquiring person" includes one who proposes but has not
completed a control-share acquisition, id. § 21-2434, but an acquiring person does
not own shares solely because he holds a revocable proxy to vote those shares, if
that proxy was acquired in a solicitation made to ten or more shareholders. Id.
§ 21-2443(2), (3).
372. An acquiring person "owns" shares held by affiliates, associates, and persons act-
ing as a group with the acquiring person to acquire, own, or vote those shares. Id.
§§ 21-2443, 21-2434.
373. This was suggested by the Supreme Court in CTS as a way to avoid a fifty-day
delay under the Indiana Act. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct.
1634 (1987). The SEC has indicated that such a procedure would be acceptable
under the federal rules. See Interpretative Release Relating to Tender Offer
Rules, Release No. 34-16623, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 24,2841 (March 5, 1980).
374. Rule 14e-1(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1(a)(1987).
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ers of those shares could still vote them, 375 knowing that if they did
not vote in favor of the bidder, their shares would not be purchased.
A proxy fight is another way around the Nebraska Act's ban on
business combinations. Section 21-2452 does not apply if the inter-
ested shareholder's acquisition of shares or the proposed business
combination was approved by the corporation's board of directors
prior to the interested shareholder's share acquisition date.3 76 A hos-
tile bidder could solicit proxies to elect a friendly board of directors
before the bidder acquired ten percent of the target's stock.3 7 7 If the
hostile bidder could gain control of the board before acquiring more
than ten percent of the corporation's shares, board approval would
stop the business combination ban from ever being triggered.
B. The Act's Effect on Friendly Transactions
1. Application to Friendly Transactions with the Corporation
The best way to acquire full voting power is in a friendly transac-
tion agreed to by the target corporation's board. The Nebraska Act
excludes from the definition of "control-share acquisition" the acquisi-
tion of control "pursuant to a merger or plan of share exchange ef-
fected in compliance with section 21-2070 if the issuing public
corporation is a party to the agreement."3 78 Thus, if target manage-
ment agrees to a combination, any stock acquired in such a merger or
share exchange would have full voting rights. A friendly acquisition
also could be done through a sale of all of the target's assets to the
bidder, either for stock or cash. "Control-share acquisition" includes
only acquisitions of the target's voting stock, and not other forms of
combination. However, the corporation's shareholders would have to
approve a merger or sale of assets in any case, so the offeror still
would have to get shareholder approval even with management's ap-
proval of the deal. If the bidder insisted on doing the acquisition by
tender offer, for tax reasons or otherwise, the board alone could not
insure that the bidder would acquire full voting rights. The issue
would have to be submitted to a vote of the shareholders,3 79 and the
bidder would acquire full voting rights only if management could per-
375. "Interested shares" are precluded from voting to grant the acquiring person vot-
ing rights. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2451 (Cum. Supp. 1988). "Interested shares" are
shares owned by an acquiring person. Id. § 21-2441. An acquiring person does not
"own" tendered stock which has not yet been accepted for purchase. Id. § 21-
2443(2). Therefore, the tendered shares would not be interested shares and
would be eligible to vote to approve full voting rights.
376. Id. § 21-2452.
377. This solicitation of proxies would not make the bidder the owner of the solicited
shares. Id. § 21-2443.
378. Id. § 21-2439.
379. Id. § 21-2450.
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suade a majority of the shareholders--excluding the bidder and re-
lated parties-to go along.380
If the offeror does not "own" ten percent of the target's stock at
the time of a friendly transaction, the ban on business combinations in
section 21-2452 presents no problem. Section 21-2452 does not apply if
the interested shareholder's acquisition of shares was with the prior
approval of the board of directors.38 1 However, once the bidder ob-
tained ten percent of the corporation's shares, he would become an
interested shareholder, and any subsequent transactions with the cor-
poration, whether or not approved by the target's board, would be
barred by the business combination prohibition.382 Thus, the Act
would make more difficult a common pattern in takeovers-a bidder
acquires a substantial stake in the company, makes an initially hostile
tender offer, and after an increase in consideration or some other
change, the board agrees to the transaction.383
2. Application to Transactions with Controlling Shareholders
The Act also poses a problem in sales of control by controlling
shareholders. If the selling shareholder acquired his majority shares
prior to the effective date of the Act, those shares would have full
voting rights when transferred, because such a transfer is exempted
from the definition of "control-share acquisition."384 However, if the
selling shareholder acquired majority control after the effective date
of the Act, or if the seller owns less than fifty percent of the corpora-
tion's stock, the transfer would be a control-share acquisition and the
buyer would not automatically acquire voting rights.
At first glance, this appears to be a relatively minor inconvenience.
The selling shareholder could simply use his voting power to approve
full voting rights at a special meeting called for that purpose. How-
ever, the selling shareholder might find himself disqualified from vot-
ing at that meeting. An acquiring person is treated as the owner of
380. Id. § 21-2451.
381. Id. § 21-2452.
382. Id. The five-year prohibition on business combinations exempts transactions ap-
proved by the issuing public corporation's board, but that approval must come
before the person becomes an interested shareholder. Id. §§ 21-2452, 21-2445.
383. The business combination prohibition would not prevent an offeror from acquir-
ing a ten percent stake and then making a tender offer, hostile or otherwise, for
the corporation's stock. A tender offer is not within any of the defined classes of
business combinations. See id. § 21-2437. The closest category of business combi-
nation is § 21-2437(4)--any transaction involving the corporation or a subsidiary
which increases the proportionate ownership of the interested shareholder. This
does not apply because a tender offer does not involve the target corporation or
its subsidiaries, but is a purchase directly from other shareholders.
384. Id. § 21-2439(f). Because the Act includes the holdings of affiliates and associates
in the definition of ownership, id. § 21-2443, majority ownership need not be held
by a single person to be exempted.
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any shares which he has the right to acquire "pursuant to any agree-
ment, arrangement, or understanding" or as to which the acquiring
person has "any agreement, arrangement, or understanding for the
purpose of acquiring" such stock.38 5 The selling shareholder and the
buyer-the acquiring person-may have no binding contract of sale
prior to the vote, but they certainly have an understanding that the
seller will sell the stock to the buyer if the voting rights are ap-
proved.38 6 The acquiring person, therefore, would be deemed to own
the controlling seller's stock and the controlling seller would be un-
able to vote his shares to approve the buyer's voting rights.387 The
buyer would get full voting rights only if approved by a majority of the
minority shareholders. This is problematic because the remaining
shareholders may be unhappy that the controlling shareholder is not
sharing the premium sales price with them. An alternative would be
to proceed by tender offer. The controlling shareholder then could
vote to grant the buyer full voting rights because stock tendered pur-
suant to a tender or exchange offer is excluded from the definition of
385. Id. § 21-2443(2)(a), (3).
386. The Act does not define the term "understanding," and there are no Nebraska
cases defining the term. Nebraska Supreme Court cases using the word "under-
standing" tend to couple it in the disjunctive with "agreement" without discuss-
ing the difference between the two terms. See, e.g., Mike Pratt & Sons, Inc. v.
Metalcraft, Inc., 222 Neb. 333, 340, 383 N.W.2d 758, 763 (1986) (defining conspiracy
as "an agreement or understanding between two or more persons to inflict a
wrong or injury upon another"); Idaho Forest Indus. v. Minden Exch. Bank &
Trust Co., 212 Neb. 820, 825, 826 N.W.2d 176, 179 (1982)(holding that because of
"an agreement or understanding" between the parties, a payor bank was not lia-
ble for failing to return checks prior to the midnight deadline); First Nat'l Bank
v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 191 Neb. 249, 251, 214 N.W.2d 483, 485 (1974)("in the ab-
sence of some agreement or understanding between the parties to the contrary,
rent is not due until the expiration of the term").
Some courts in other jurisdictions have held that "understanding," especially
as used by laymen, is synonymous with "agreement." See, e.g., Reyes v. Boyd, 150
Cal. App. 167, 170, 34 P.2d 1058, 1059 (1934); Allison v. Horn, 249 Iowa 1351, 1355,
92 N.W.2d 645, 647 (1958); Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Evans, 101 Vt. 250, 257,143 A. 290,
292 (1928); Southern Ry. v. Powell, 124 Va. 65, 69, 97 S.E. 357, 358 (1918). Other
courts define "understanding" as anything mutually agreed upon. See, e.g., Bul-
lock v. Johnson, 110 Ga. 486, 491, 35 S.E. 703, 705 (1900); Ferguson v. D.S.A., Inc.,
430 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968). On the other hand, other courts have
held that an "understanding" is no more than an expectation or confidence fall-
ing short of a binding agreement or contract. Domme v. Ostheimer, 128 Conn. 31,
34, 20 A.2d 406, 407 (1941); Camp v. Waring, 25 Conn. 520, 529 (1857); Williams v.
Yazoo & M.V.R. Co., 82 Miss. 659, 666, 35 S. 169 (1903).
It is not clear that any of these definitions would prevent the problems noted
in the text because the acquiring person probably would have some sort of agree-
ment prior to the request for board approval, especially if the term is broadly
read to include something short of a binding contract.
387. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2451 (Cumn. Supp. 1988). The majority's shares would be
"interested shares" because they would be "owned" by the buyer. Id. § 21-2441.
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ownership.38 8 The problem with this solution from the controlling
shareholder's standpoint is that the controlling shareholder would
have to share the control premium with the other shareholders in a
tender offer.38 9
The selling controlling shareholder might also use his control to
obtain board approval of a merger or share exchange with the buyer.
Such a merger or share exchange would not be a control-share acquisi-
tion,39 0 but it presents the same difficulty in getting the control pre-
mium to the controlling shareholder. Any major difference between
the consideration going to the controlling shareholder in the merger
and the consideration going to the minority would present serious fi-
duciary duty problems.3 9 '
Thus, as to controlling ownership acquired after the effective date
of the Act, the Nebraska Legislature may have inadvertently imposed
the equal opportunity rule advocated by Professor Andrews. 92 A con-
trolling shareholder can sell out only if he is willing to share the pre-
mium paid with the minority shareholders, unless his buyer is willing
to accept reduced voting rights (in which case the buyer is unlikely to
pay as large a premium).
The five-year ban on business combinations also presents a prob-
lem to the controlling shareholder attempting to sell his interest in
the corporation. On the surface, it appears that a majority owner
wishing to sell out could simply direct the board to approve the sale,
and the buyer would not thereafter be prohibited from engaging in
any "business combination." The Nebraska Act exempts transactions
where the interested shareholder acquired his shares with the prior
approval of the target's board.393 However, this board approval must
come prior to the "share acquisition date" which is the date the person
first becomes an "interested shareholder."3 94 As mentioned above,
ownership includes "any agreement, arrangement, or understanding"
giving the person a right to acquire the stock or for the purpose of
acquiring the stock. By the time an acquisition is presented to the
board for approval, there is almost certainly going to be an agreement
388. Id. § 21-2443(2)(a).
389. A tender offer or exchange offer must be open to all holders of the security
sought. Rule 14d-10, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (1987). If the offer was oversub-
scribed, the offeror could not prefer the controlling shareholder over the others
but would have to accept the tendered shares on a pro rata basis. Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 § 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6)(1981).
390. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2439 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
391. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710-11 (Del. 1983) (majority
shareholder in a cashout merger owes minority shareholders fiduciary obligations
of fair price and fair dealing).
392. See Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares,
78 HARv. L. REv. 505, 515 (1965).
393. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2452 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
394. Id. § 21-2445.
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or understanding concerning the buyer's acquisition of the stock. It
therefore will be very difficult for a person acquiring ten percent of
the corporation's stock from a controlling shareholder to avoid the
statutory prohibition on business combinations.
C. Application of the Act to Subsequent Offers
The Nebraska Act also has unintended consequences when more
than one offer is made for the same corporation. If the Act is read
literally, a person who makes a control-share acquisition is perma-
nently barred from voting on whether to grant full voting rights to the
shares of any other acquiring person. Suppose that Offeror A acquires
fifty percent of the voting stock of Target Corporation, and that the
Target shareholders meet and grant full voting rights to A's shares.
Some time later, Offeror B acquires twenty percent of Target's voting
stock, and forces a special meeting to consider the voting rights of B's
shares. Clearly, B's shares are "interested shares," and B cannot vote
on his own voting rights. But the term "interested shares" includes all
voting stock "owned by an acquiring person,"3 95 not just shares owned
by the acquiring person whose voting rights are being considered. Be-
cause "acquiring person" is one who makes a control-share acquisi-
tion,396 and Offeror A made a control-share acquisition, Offeror A is
an acquiring person. Nothing in the Act ever terminates one's status
as an acquiring person, so A's shares remain "interested shares" in
perpetuity, forever barred by section 21-2451 from voting on future
acquiring persons' voting rights.397
VII. CONCLUSION
In its third attempt to regulate corporate takeovers, the Nebraska
Legislature, like the legislatures of many other states, has struck out.
It has adopted a statute that is clearly unconstitutional in some re-
spects and of debatable constitutionality in others. It has succumbed
to popular, fatalistic arguments against hostile takeovers without
395. Id. § 21-2441 (emphasis added).
396. Id. § 21-2434.
397. Construing the Act so that A's status as an acquiring person terminates once the
acquisition is completed would defeat the voting rights limitation. If A ceased to
be an acquiring person upon completion of the acquisition, then A could vote to
give his own shares voting rights. Section 21-2451 provides that "interested
shares" may not vote on the question of whether to grant full voting rights to
control shares, and "interested shares" are defined as shares owned by an acquir-
ing person. Id. § 21-2441. If A ceased to be an acquiring person upon completion
of the acquisition, then A could vote to grant himself full voting rights and sec-
tion 21-2451 would only be a nuisance. An alternative construction would be to
say that A ceases to be an acquiring person when A receives full voting rights.
This would allow A to vote on the voting rights of B's shares. Unfortunately,
there is nothing in the text of the Act to support this construction.
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closely examining the economic reality behind those arguments. It
has enacted a statute that penalizes investors in order to achieve dubi-
ous gains in terms of economic protection from competition with other
states. Most importantly, in its excessive zeal to free corporate man-
agement from the market discipline of hostile takeovers, the Legisla-
ture has further removed corporations and their managements from
the control of the investors whose money is at risk.
If these changes were confined to Nebraska, the damage would not
be extraordinary. Unfortunately, the Nebraska Act is representative
of legislation being enacted by states across the country. More and
more, the long-standing idea of shareholder sovereignty is crumbling
as states take away one of the shareholders' basic tools to control their
corporations. Instead of protecting shareholders as promised, these
statutes protect inefficient businesses and facilitate mediocrity.
